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ABSTRACT 
               Why do some allies restructure their existing alliance relationships which they 
once favored, but some do not? In what ways do allies restructure their alliances? 
Historically interstate military alliances change their original agreements more than they 
remain the same, and the average duration of bilateral alliances is less than a decade. 
Theoretically, previous works have paid great attention mostly to the formation and 
duration of alliances. Answers to the above basic questions have been largely 
indeterminate, despite the fact that when allies change their original agreements, it 
reshapes the behaviors of both allies and non-allies. This study argues that when a state 
grows more powerful relative to its neighbors and external powers; and experiences a 
domestic regime change, the state is likely to restructure its exiting alliance relationship. 
These external and internal changes since the alliance formation cause the state’s original 
preference on the arms-and-allies balance to shift, and the state has greater incentive to 
restructure the existing alliance by way of dealignment, expiration, or renewal.  
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               In order to test the argument, this study first provides the quantitative results by 
testing 142 post-WWII alliances formed from 1946 to 2000, and identifies the 
statistically significant and substantial effects of three factors, capabilities increase, 
regime change (democratization and authoritarianization), and government change (both 
leadership and supporting coalition change), on the state’s alliance restructuring. Then 
this study qualitatively tests the quantitative findings and traces the causal process 
through case studies for three U.S. alliances in East Asia (the Philippines, South Korea, 
and Japan). The Philippine alliance restructuring in 1992 is examined as a typical case 
demonstrating that the argument empirically works. Then this study investigates why 
South Korea did not restructure the alliance with the U.S. in the 1990s even though the 
external and internal factors suggest that it would restructure. Lastly, the U.S.-Japan 
alliance case in 2009-2010 is examined to assess the explanatory power of the argument 
beyond the data population. An alliance restructuring can significantly affect an 
individual state’s security positively or negatively, therefore state leaders must continue 
to pay a close attention to the management of alliances.      
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Research Question 
               Over 640 interstate military alliances have been formed since 1815, and more 
than 60% of them have changed their original alliance agreement by either violation, 
termination, expiration, or modification as of 2003.1 According to Leeds and Savun 
(2007), the average duration of bilateral military alliances is less than ten years and 34% 
of bilateral alliances experienced a unilateral violation of alliance agreements and 25% of 
bilateral alliances were renewed with new conditions.2 These figures are puzzling 
because we may not so often hear the actual cases that allies violated, terminated, or 
modified the ongoing alliance agreements in the recent years.  
               However, as historically interstate military alliances change their original 
agreements more than they remain the same, several cases can be identified around the 
world within the last several years. In Latin America, four countries (Nicaragua, Bolivia, 
Venezuela and Ecuador) have withdrawn from the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance (Rio Treaty), a U.S.-led collective defense arrangement, since 2012.3 In the 
Asia-Pacific, the United States and Japan have agreed to the strengthening of its bilateral 
                                                          
1 Brett Ashley Leeds, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long, “Alliance Treaty 
Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944.” International Interactions 28, 3 (2002): 237–60.; Actual data set 
can be accessible in the following website. This data set records all formal alliances among states between 
1815 and 2003. Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, Michaela Mattes, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Jeffrey 
M. Ritter, and Burcu Savun, The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) Data (version 3.0, 
2005). http://atop.rice.edu/data. Since 1815, 648 military alliances have been formed around the world, and 
391 alliances (60.3%) have dissolved by the year of 2003. 
2 Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?” 
Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1118-1132: 1125. 
3 BBC Monitoring Latin America-Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring. “Venezuela: Four 
Latin American Countries Pull out of Defence Treaty.” June 7, 2012. 
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. (accessed on December 30, 2015) 
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alliance by expanding the existent defense cooperation into a new stage.4 In Europe, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has taken new measures to deal with 
security challenges in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.5 In the Middle 
East, the United States and Afghanistan have signed a strategic partnership agreement 
and the former designated the latter as a major non-NATO ally of the United States in 
2012,6 even though Afghanistan initially failed to approve the bilateral security 
agreement in early 2014.7 Why have some military alliance members changed their 
original alliance agreements, while others have not? 
               Answers to this significant question have been largely indeterminate, despite the 
fact that when allies change their original agreements, it reshapes the behaviors of both 
allies and non-allies. Most scholars have paid great attention to questions such as: why 
and how do states choose their allies?; what are the consequences of alliances?; and once 
a treaty is formed, how do allies keep the alliance alive? Thanks to their achievements, 
there are large amounts of theoretical literature available on the formation (e.g., 
                                                          
4 Martin Fackler, and David E. Sanger.  “Japan Announces a Military Shift to Thwart China.” New York 
Times, July 1, 2014; Julie Hirschfeld Davis, and Michael R. Gordon. “Japan and U.S. Set New Rules for 
Military Cooperation.” New York Times, April 27, 2015. 
5 Steven Erlanger, Julie Hirschfeld Davis, and Stephen Castle. “NATO Plans a Special Force to Reassure 
Eastern Europe and Deter Russia.” New York Times, September 5, 2014. 
6 Mark Landler. “Obama Signs Pact in Kabul, Turning Page in Afghan War.” New York Times, May 1, 
2012. Online edition. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/world/asia/obama-lands-in-kabul-on-
unannounced-visit.html?_r=0. (accessed on May 31, 2015); Matthew Rosenberg, and Graham Bowley. 
“U.S. Grants Special Ally Status to Afghans, Easing Fears of Abandonment.” New York Times, July 7, 
2012. Online edition. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/world/asia/us-grants-special-ally-status-to-
afghanistan.html. (accessed on May 31, 2015) 
7 Azam Ahmed, and Matthew Rosenberg. “Karzai Arranged Secret Contacts With the Taliban.” New York 
Times, February 3, 2014. Online edition. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/world/asia/karzai-has-held-
secret-contacts-with-the-taliban.html. (accessed on May 31, 2015) 
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balancing,8 bandwagoning,9 balance of threat,10 and learning11) and the cohesion of 
alliances (e.g., alliance security dilemma,12 institutionalization,13 and shared values and 
norms14). However, if there is a typical life cycle for an alliance (i.e., from the formation, 
and the duration to the termination or renewal), the most theoretically understudied area 
in the literature to this day is the last stage of the alliance: alliance restructuring. The 
research question of this study is: Why and how do allies restructure their existing 
alliance relationship which they once favored?  
 
1.2. Literature Review 
               The previous works have paid attention to the two main possible sources of 
allied behaviors on restructuring: (1) capabilities change variables; and (2) domestic 
political change variables. This section first clarifies what is known or unknown 
regarding the causal effects and mechanisms of two independent variables. Then, this 
section identifies the remaining puzzles and gaps in the literature and summarizes how 
this study will advance our theoretical knowledge regarding alliance restructuring.  
                                                          
8 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956); Kenneth 
N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979) 
9 Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, “The Balance of Power in International History: Theory and Reality,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 17, 1 (1973): 33-61.; Robert Kaufman, “To Balance or Bandwagon?: 
Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe,” Security Studies 1, 3 (1992): 417-447.; Randall L. Schweller, 
“Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, 1 (1994): 72-
107. 
10 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987) 
11 Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliance, and World Wars (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1996) 
12 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997) 
13 Celeste Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War,” International 
Organization 54, 4 (2000): 705-735.  
14 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community,” in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The 
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996); Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and 
World Politics (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina, 1990)  
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1.2.1. Causal Effects and Mechanisms of Capabilities Change 
               There are five previous works that examine cross-nationally the effects of shifts 
in capabilities on the last stage of military alliances: Berkowitz (1983); Altfeld (1984); 
Morrow (1991); Bennett (1997); and Leeds and Savun (2007).15 Even though these five 
works were studied in a different manner in terms of: spatial and temporal population, 
measurement of capabilities shift, dependent variables, and statistical methods, they can 
be categorized into three different causal mechanisms as follows: (1) “capability-
aggregation” model; (2) “autonomy-security trade-off” model – Altfeld version; and (3) 
“autonomy-security trade-off” model – Morrow version. This section reviews each model. 
 
Capability-Aggregation Model 
               The term capability-aggregation model was first used by Morrow (1991).16 This 
model was presented as a synthesis of common elements in traditional balance of power 
theories and neorealist theories, and assumes that a state is a unitary actor, which means 
that the state behaves in the same manner, regardless of differences in domestic political 
factors such as regime type and leadership turnover.17 Under an anarchic international 
system, the most important goal of states is to secure independence from the external 
                                                          
15 Berkowitz, “Realignment in International Treaty Organizations”: 77-96.; Altfeld, “The Decision to 
Ally”: 523-544.; Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry”: 904-933.; Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of 
Alliance Duration, 1816-1984”: 846-878.; Leeds and Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States 
Abrogate Agreements?”: 1118-1132. 
16 Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry”: 906-907. 
17 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956); Morton 
A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957); 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1987) 
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threatening powers. In order to achieve this goal, states strengthen their own military 
capabilities and seek to form alliances with other states to increase the likelihood that the 
allies will use their military capabilities for mutual defense against a common enemy.   
               Therefore, this model suggests that alliances serve to aggregate the military 
capabilities of the individual allies, that the aggregation of military capabilities of the 
individual allies increases the allied ability to defeat a common enemy, that the greater 
military capabilities of allies improve the national security positions of allies, and that the 
greater military capabilities of an ally, the more valuable it will be to the other alliance 
partners.  
               In this model, when a state’s relative capabilities increase, this state’s ability to 
deter or defeat  the external threatening powers on its own also increases, which makes 
the alliance to this state less valuable, and this state is more likely to terminate the 
alliance relationship. Also when a state’s relative capabilities decrease, the value of this 
state to the alliance partner decreases, which makes the alliance to the partner less 
valuable, and this alliance partner is more likely to terminate the alliance relationship.18 
Assuming that state A allies with state B, when state A becomes more powerful, state A 
is more likely to terminate the alliance. When state A becomes less powerful, state B is 
more likely to terminate the alliance. 
 
                                                          
18 Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry”: 906-907; Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance 
Duration, 1816-1984”: 848-849. Berkowitz did not use the term of “capability-aggregation model,” but one 
of his hypotheses is based on the logic of “capability-aggregation model.” The following is his hypothesis: 
“ITO [International Treaty Organizations] members tend to defect when making foreign commitments after 
periods during which their capabilities relative to those of non-members increase: ITO members tend to 
confirm their commitment to an ITO in the course of making foreign policy following periods during which 
their relative capabilities decline.” Berkowitz, “Realignment in International Treaty Organizations”: 83. 
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Autonomy-Security Trade-off Model – Altfeld version 
               Altfeld’s model came about as an idea borrowed from the rational choice theory 
(more specifically, consumer choice theory in micro-economics). The model assumes that 
each state’s utility function is defined over three commodities: (1) national security; (2) 
autonomy or freedom of action; and (3) civilian wealth.19 A state wants to achieve these 
three goals. In order to produce additional national security, states have two options: (1) 
procurement of armaments; and (2) to seek military alliances.20 The model further 
assumes that when a state decides the specific balance of armaments and alliances in 
order to produce its desired level of national security, each state considers the costs of 
each option (i.e., armaments and alliances). The formation of alliances increases the 
national security of its member states and saves some civilian wealth but is always for the 
cost of some autonomy or freedom of action of this state. The additional procurement of 
armaments also increases the national security and saves autonomy or freedom of actions 
of this state but is always at the cost of some civilian wealth.21  
               From the Altfeld model’s perspective, the dissolution of alliances can be 
expected in the following five conditions: (1) an increase in the marginal productivity of 
armaments (i.e., a state can expect the increase of procuring armaments to improve the 
national security, greater than the alliance support in the past); (2) an increase in the 
marginal utility of autonomy (i.e., a state’s preference for autonomy has increased greater 
than in the past, and the cost of autonomy in exchange for alliance support becomes 
                                                          
19 Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally”: 524. 
20 Ibid: 525. 
21 Ibid: 526; Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry”: 911; Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance 
Duration, 1816-1984”: 849. 
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unbearable for any longer.); (3) a decrease in the marginal utility of civilian wealth (i.e., a 
state’s preference for civilian wealth has decreased further than in the past); (4) a 
decrease in the marginal productivity of alliances (i.e., the same amount of alliance 
support can NOT improve national security greater than the same amount of 
armaments) ; and (5) a decrease in the marginal utility of security (i.e., a state’s 
preference for national security has decreased further than in the past, and the state is 
more likely to seek greater civilian wealth and autonomy at the cost of alliance support 
and more armaments).22 
 
Autonomy-Security Trade-off Model – Morrow version 
               Altfeld’s version of the autonomy-security trade-off model makes two important 
assumptions that a state wants to achieve three goals: (1) national security; (2) autonomy 
(freedom of action); and (3) civilian wealth; and that more alliance support can be always 
gained at the cost of autonomy. Morrow’s model modified both assumptions. Morrow 
first assumes that a state seeks “values” in the broad scope from the ideological, the 
pragmatic to the material.23 In Morrow’s model, security and autonomy are not treated as 
the state’s goals to be achieved, but rather a state’s ability to maintain or change the 
status quo respectively.24 His model assumes that security and autonomy represents a 
state’s interest dichotomously, and that a state generally prefers a moderate combination 
                                                          
22 Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally”: 528. 
23 Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry”: 907. 
24 Ibid: 908. 
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of autonomy and security to high levels of one and low levels of the other.25 According to 
Morrow, the trade-off between security interest and autonomy interest should be the main 
focus when scholars consider a model of alliance behavior.26   
               Morrow’s logic is the same as Altfeld’s when it explains the formation of a 
symmetric alliance between almost equal powers, but diverges when Morrow applies his 
model to major powers’ alliance formation with minor powers.27 In terms of capabilities, 
major powers are able to provide a large security benefit to minor powers. Minor powers 
are not able to provide great security benefits to major powers, however they are instead 
able to offer concessions attractive to major powers (e.g., changes in minor powers’ 
policies, control over minor powers’ domestic and foreign policies, military bases in 
strategic locations inside the territory of minor powers). By accepting concessions offered 
by minor powers, major powers can increase their autonomy benefits.28 As a result of this 
trade-off with the autonomy benefits offered by minor powers, major powers increase 
their security cost because an alliance formation with minor powers can sometimes 
provoke new challenges from other major powers. Also the alliance formation with major 
powers may unnecessarily encourage the minor power allies to become more provocative 
externally, which may drag the major powers into unnecessary war, just serving minor 
powers’ national security interest (i.e., alliance entrapment).29  
               Based on the logic of Morrow’s version of the autonomy-security trade-off 
model, two major motivations could result in the breakdown of an alliance. First, when 
                                                          
25 Ibid: 910. 
26 Ibid: 911. 
27 Ibid: 913. 
28 Ibid: 913-914. 
29 Ibid: 910-911.  
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one ally’s military capabilities increase, its ability to provide for its own security 
increases. Then, its security in the alliance also increases. As a result of this security 
increase in the alliance, this ally will demand additional autonomy from its alliance 
partner, either by obtaining new concessions or by removing old obligations. Second, a 
decline in a state’s capabilities has the same effect when its ally obtains security from the 
alliance. The alliance now provides less security, and the partner with constant 
capabilities will demand additional autonomy to continue the alliance. In sum, the greater 
the change in capabilities, the greater the renegotiation required, therefore creating a 
higher likelihood of an alliance breakdown.30  
 
Capabilities Change and the Previous Findings 
               In order to measure the changes in capabilities, all five works used the 
Correlates of War (COW) Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) data set, 
which contains annual values for the following six indicators: total population; urban 
population; iron and steel production; energy consumption; military personnel; and 
military expenditure of all state members from 1816-2007.31 The CINC is widely used in 
the International Relations studies. The variable of change in capabilities measured in 
                                                          
30 Morrow found a positive correlation in this hypothesis. See Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry”: 916-
919. 
31 J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major 
Power War, 1820-1965.” In Peace, War, and Numbers, edited by Bruce M. Russett (Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage Publications, 1972): 19-48.; J. David. Singer, “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on 
Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985,” International Interactions 14, 2 (1988): 115-32.; Actual data 
set can be accessible in the following website. This data set records all state members, currently from 1816-
2007. J. Michael Greig and Andrew J. Enterline, Correlates of War Project: National Material Capabilities 
Data (version 4.0, 2000). http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc4.htm.     
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slightly different manners was tested in different temporal and spatial scopes, with 
different statistical methods, to the variously defined dependent variables.32  
               While Berkowitz focused on an individual ally’s decision as the unit of analysis, 
the other four works (Altfeld, Morrow, Bennett, and Leeds and Savun) analyzed the 
outcomes of alliances as a whole. The findings in the previous works are mixed. 
Especially a reduction of external threats expressed by decreasing capabilities of enemy 
states is not associated with the alliance restructuring. For example, Bennett reported that 
the greater the increase in the capabilities of each ally to its enemy state (i.e., the more the 
enemy states become weakened), the longer the alliances last as a whole.33 As a similar 
result, Leeds and Savun’s finding showed that a decrease in levels of external threat 
expressed by the set of states that do not share an alliance and a similar foreign policy 
orientation, does not lead to the end of alliances as a whole by treaty violation at a 
statistically significant level.34 
               There are findings which support the effect of capabilities change on alliance 
restructuring. For example, Berkowitz found that an individual ally in multilateral 
                                                          
32 Berkowitz tested the capabilities change variables to the scope of multilateral alliances from 1945 to 
1973, and applied the probit analysis to 36 individual alliance members' decision. See Berkowitz, 
“Realignment in International Treaty Organizations.” Morrow tested the capabilities variables to the scope 
of both bilateral and multilateral alliances from 1815 to 1965, and applied the probit analysis to a set of 164 
military alliances. See Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry.” Bennett tested the capabilities variables to the 
scope of both bilateral and multilateral alliances from 1816 to 1984, and used the survival analysis with a 
Weibull model for the set of 207 military alliances. See Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance 
Duration, 1816-1984.” Leeds and Savun tested the capabilities change variables to the scope of 304 
bilateral alliances from 1816 to 1989, and used the survival analysis (more specifically a competing risk 
analysis) with a Cox proportional model. See Leeds and Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States 
Abrogate Agreements?” Altfeld tested the expected utility of war theory in the scope of six European great 
powers (i.e., Austria-Hungary, Prussia/Germany, Russia, France, Italy, and United Kingdom) from 1816 to 
1900. See Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally.” 
33 Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984”: 857-870. 
34 Leeds and Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?”: 1125-1129. 
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alliances is more likely to defect the existing alliance commitments (e.g., withdrawal 
from the alliances, alliance formation with the third states, dissolutions of alliances) when 
this individual ally becomes more powerful to the non-alliance member states (i.e., when 
the non-alliance member states become more weakened).35   
               While Berkowitz specified a direction of capabilities change (i.e., increasing or 
decreasing), Morrow, Bennett, and Leeds and Savun did not differentiate between the 
increase of capabilities and the decrease of them. Morrow found that the two independent 
variables: (1) the sum total change in the percentage share of all alliance members’ 
capabilities in the whole international system; and (2) the largest change in the 
percentage share in the whole international system by any one alliance member among all 
allies, is more likely to lead to the end of military alliances as a whole.36 Bennett also 
found that a larger capabilities change (whether increasing or decreasing) is more likely 
to shorten the duration of alliances as a whole at the statistically significant level. It is 
also found that the other variable: capability concentration index is statistically 
significant and if one ally in the bilateral alliance or a few allies in the multilateral 
alliance holds a large share of the total allied capabilities, then that alliance is more likely 
to last longer.37 Leeds and Savun tested the relative change (absolute value) in the 
percentage share of one alliance member’s capabilities in comparison to all other states in 
the whole international system, regardless of increasing or decreasing, and found that this 
                                                          
35 Berkowitz, “Realignment in International Treaty Organizations”: 88-92. 
36 Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry”: 920-925. 
37 Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984”: 870-873. 
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variable is more likely to lead to the end of alliances as a whole in violation of alliance 
treaty terms at the statistically significant level.38 
       
1.2.2. Causal Effects and Mechanisms of Domestic Political Change 
               Since the 1990s, there were four major cross-national works regarding the 
domestic political change’s effects on the last stage of military alliances as follows: 
Siverson and Starr (1994); Bennett (1997); Leeds and Savun (2007); and Leeds, Mattes, 
and Vogel (2009).39 They can be categorized into two different causal mechanisms as 
follows: (1) regime change model; and (2) winning coalition size and leadership change 
model. This section reviews each model. 
 
Regime Change Model 
               The regime change model assumes that an ally under a different domestic 
political structure (i.e., democracies or authoritarians) behaves differently, although some 
scholars have stated that there is no significant difference between democracies and 
authoritarians in terms of an ally’s behavior.40 Siverson and Starr (1994) defined “regime 
changes” as the instances in which government leaders are replaced simultaneously with 
the entire way in which politics are conducted.41 They assumed that this type of 
fundamental change in the domestic political structure is more likely to bring about a 
                                                          
38 Leeds and Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?”: 1128-1129. 
39 Siverson and Starr, “Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances,” pp. 145-161; Bennett, “Testing 
Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984”: 846-878; Leeds and Savun, “Terminating Alliances: 
Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?”: 1118-1132; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, “Interests, Institutions, and 
the Reliability of International Commitments”: 461-476. 
40 For example, Haas and Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations: 182. 
41 Siverson and Starr, “Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances”: 148. 
 13 
 
significant departure from the past policies toward military alliances formed by the old 
regime/government.  
               They then categorized the forms of regime change into three: (1) as the result of 
war, when a former enemy state installs or helps a new regime/government to be installed 
in the state that lost in war (e.g., Japan after the Second World War); (2) as the result of 
internal conflict/violence, when a new regime/government replaces an old 
regime/government (e.g., Batista in Cuba was replaced by Castro); and (3) as the result of 
a domestic political crisis, but not involved with violence, when a new 
regime/government replaces an old regime/government (e.g., De Gaulle came into power 
and the Fourth French Republic was over). It was assumed that these three modes of 
regime change are likely to replace a current ruler with another and that the new ruler 
with different policy preferences and perceptions is likely to change policies toward the 
existing alliance relationship accordingly.42                                                      
 
Winning Coalition Size and Leadership Change Model 
               Siverson and Starr’s research excluded such cases as the government change 
from the Democratic Truman administration to the Republican Eisenhower 
administration because they assumed that the range of policy differences between the two 
administrations was relatively limited.43 But the winning coalition size and leadership 
change model takes such changes of “rulers” even without the change of “rules of the 
                                                          
42 Ibid: 148-150. 
43 Ibid: 148. 
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game” more seriously, while the regime change approach focusses on the change of 
“rules of the game,” (i.e., the entire way politics is conducted at the domestic level).44  
               The winning coalition size and leadership change model assumes that different 
domestic groups in a society have different policy preferences and these policy 
preferences have an impact on the leaders’ policy decision making. This model further 
assumes that the new leaders’ most important goal is to retain power. In order to do so, 
the new leaders must secure support from a certain set of domestic groups. If these 
domestic groups have different preferences on alliance policy from those of the past who 
supported the previous leaders, then a new leader must listen to their supporters and most 
likely will change the current alliance relationship accordingly. Bueno de Mesquita, 
Smith, Siverson, and Morrow’s seminal work, The Logic of Political Survival (2003) 
termed the set of people with a say in choosing leaders as a “selectorate,” and a subgroup 
of the selectorate who maintains incumbents in office as a “winning coalition.”45 If a new 
winning coalition has different preferences on the alliance policy from those held by a 
former winning coalition, it is more likely that the new leader will change the alliance 
relationship in order to stay in power. 
 
Domestic Political Change and the Previous Findings 
               Siverson and Starr used the Polity II data set and collected information 
regarding a ruler’s change in an ally occurred along with an external imposition, internal 
                                                          
44 Ibid: 148. 
45 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. The Logic of 
Political Survival. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003): xi. 
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violence, or internal crises.46 They found that an individual ally experiencing regime 
change is more likely to change its alliance commitment forms among defense, neutrality, 
entente, and no alliance.47 Bennett tested how many times a ruler’s change in an ally 
occurred along with an external imposition, internal violence, or internal crises during a 
five-year span, and found no empirical support for the idea that regime changes lead to 
the shortening of military alliances, contrary to the finding of Siverson and Starr.48 Leeds 
and Savun used Polity IV data set, which provides information regarding various 
institutional characteristics of states by the index of a positive 11-point democracy scale 
and a negative 11-point autocracy scale,49 and determined that when a state experiences 
at least a 2-point shift in this scale, a regime change occurred in this state.50 They found 
that when a state experiences regime change, the alliance including this state is more 
likely to end in violation of the treaty terms.51         
                                                          
46 Ted Robert Gurr, Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, 1800-1986. (Ann Arbor, MI: Center 
for Comparative Politics [producer], 1989; Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 
[distributor], 1990.), http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR09263.v1.  
47 Siverson and Starr, “Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances”: 150-155. They tested regime 
change to the scope of mainly European alliances (including the United States and Japan) from 1816 to 
1965. They identified the total as 77 regime changes (13 external imposition cases; 29 internal violence 
cases; 35 internal crises cases) and as the result of regression analysis. 
48 Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984”: 867-868. Bennett tested how 
many times a ruler’s change in an ally occurred along with an external imposition, internal violence, or 
internal crises during a five-year span, to the scope of both bilateral and multilateral alliances from 1816 to 
1984. While collecting information from the Polity II data set in the same manner as Siverson and Starr, 
Bennett applied survival analysis with a Weibull model to the set of 207 military alliances. 
49 Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009 (version 2012). 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm: Center for Systemic Peace. 
50 Leeds and Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?”: 1127-1128.; Leeds 
and Savun also tested the two more measures of at least one point shift and three point shift and they found 
no changes in the interpretation of the results in either case. See Leeds and Savun, “Terminating Alliances: 
Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?”: 1128 note 24.  
51 Ibid: 1129. They tested their measured regime change, to the scope of 304 bilateral alliances from 1816 
to 1989. They used the survival analysis (more specifically a competing risk analysis) with the Cox 
proportional model. 
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               Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel (2009) measured winning coalition size and 
leadership change in the following four manners: (1) leadership change, regardless of 
regime type and whether a domestic supporting coalition shifted or not; (2) leadership 
change under the democratic regime, regardless of whether a domestic supporting 
coalition shifted or not; (3) leadership change accompanied by a domestic supporting 
coalition shift, but regardless of regime type; and (4) leadership change under the 
democratic regime along with a domestic supporting coalition shift.52 They used the 
Archigos data set in order to collect information regarding the leadership turnovers,53 and 
also referred to Geddes (1999, 2003) and Morby (2002) for information regarding 
autocracies and dynasties respectively.54 As a result, they found that leadership change 
along with a change of a domestic supporting coalition, regardless of democracies or 
autocracies, is more likely to make an ally experiencing this type of leadership change 
terminate the existing alliance in violation of the treaty terms. But they found no 
                                                          
52 Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, “Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments”: 
467-469, 470, 472-474. They tested these four measures, within the scope of bilateral alliances from 1919 
to 2001, and used a logit analysis with controls for time dependence to the set of 234 military alliances, 74 
of which ended in violation of the treaty terms. They identified the 6,842 state-years with 1,183 years of 
leadership change. Among the 1,183 years, 574 leadership changes occurred under the democratic regime, 
554 leadership changes were accompanied by a change of a domestic supporting coalition, and 407 
leadership changes under the democratic regime occurred along with a change of a domestic supporting 
coalition. See Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, “Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International 
Commitments”: 469-471.   
53 Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, “Introducing Archigos: A Dataset 
of Political Leaders.” Journal of Peace Research 46, 2 (2009): 269-283.; Henk E. Goemans, Kristian 
Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. Archigos: A Data Set of Political Leaders 1875-2004 (version 
2.9; 2012). http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm. 
54 Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after 20 Years?” Annual Review of 
Political Science 2 (1999): 115-144.; Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and 
Research Design in Comparative Politics. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003); John E. 
Morby, Dynasties of the World. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
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statistical significance to the other three measures’ effects on the termination of alliances 
in violation of their terms.55   
 
1.2.3. Puzzles and Gaps in the Current Literature on the Alliance Restructuring 
               The previous works have indeed led to advancements in our knowledge of the 
possible effects of capabilities change and domestic political change in the last stage of 
alliances (i.e., alliance restructuring), however there are still at least four key points to be 
further studied in order to construct a theory of alliance restructuring.  
               As a first point to consider, the previous studies’ “unit of analysis,” with the 
exception of only two works (Berkowitz 1983; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel 2009), was set 
to an alliance, not a state.56 Why does the unit of analysis matter? On capabilities change, 
the current studies do not make a distinction between one case of the stronger state’s 
behavior to change an alliance and another case of the weaker state’s behavior to change 
an alliance. Also, on domestic political change, the existing studies do not distinguish 
between the following two cases: (1) when one ally experiences a domestic political 
change, and as the result, a new leader of this state changes the existing alliance; or (2) 
when one ally experiences domestic political change, and as the result, the states 
currently allying with this state, change the existing alliance. Between these cases, there 
may be a difference in both causal effects and mechanisms regarding these individual 
alliance members’ behavior.  
                                                          
55 Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, “Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments”: 
472-474. 
56 Berkowitz, “Realignment in International Treaty Organizations.”; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, “Interests, 
Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments.” 
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               Second is the measurement of a “change in capabilities.” There are at least three 
points to be further studied in terms of capability change. First, the past works 
investigated the effect of capabilities shifts as the percentage share in the total 
international system, whether increasing or decreasing, on the duration of alliances. But 
capabilities are always shifting in an either increasing or decreasing direction. This 
measure should be further specified in terms of the directions of capabilities change. 
Second, most conflicts involve major powers and/or neighboring states due to a limit of 
projection capability. Therefore, it is more reasonable to focus on a capability change at 
the regional level, rather than throughout the total international system and the total set of 
non-alliance member states which was a center of attention in the previous works. 
               Third, the previous works have aimed at the causal effects of independent 
variables on the last stage of alliances, and have provided helpful ideas on how these 
independent variables could possibly lead to the outcomes of alliance behaviors. But 
none of them has actually traced the processes regarding how independent variables 
cause the outcomes of dependent variables. In order to propose a theory of alliance 
restructuring, it is necessary to investigate both the causal effects of independent 
variables on dependent variables and the causal mechanisms between them.   
               Lastly, all previous works have included various types of security commitments 
from offense (i.e., allies that promise to provide offensive military support during times 
of contingencies) to consultation (i.e., allies that promise to consult with each other 
during times of contingencies), and such differences in commitments from a high risk to 
a low risk may have a significant effect on an ally’s choice regarding whether an ally 
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would keep or break the existing alliances.57 Therefore, it is more appropriate to avoid 
including functionally different types of military alliances when theoretically 
investigating the causal effects of independent variables. 
 
1.3. Significance of the Study 
               The study of alliance restructuring is significant for four reasons. First, a 
systemic or structural level theory remains very influential in order to explain a state’s 
behavior regarding military alliances. Scholars (e.g., Powell 1993, Snyder 1997) 
sometimes attempt to incorporate both international and domestic factors into a proposed 
theory and continue to debate on how both factors are associated with the allied 
behaviors.58 Waltz once remarked that “…the structure of the state system does not 
directly cause state A to attack state B…the immediate causes of every war must be 
either the acts of individuals or the acts of states.”59 In the similar vein, Morrow also 
points out that states view international politics through a lens of domestic politics.60 On 
the other hand, Gourevitch reversed Waltz and Morrow’s causal direction and looked at 
how international politics affect domestic structure in terms of war and trade.61 My study 
                                                          
57 Gartzke and Gleditsch made a similar point. See Gartzke and Gleditsch. “Why Democracies May 
Actually Be Less Reliable Allies”: 786 note 18. Bennett (1997) included the following types of alliances: 
defense, neutrality, and entente, drawing from the same typology as the COW data set, while Leeds and 
Savun (2007) and Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel (2009) included only alliances that promised defensive support, 
offensive support, neutrality in the event of conflict, or consultation in the event of military crisis. 
58 Robert Powell. “Guns, Butter, and Anarchy.” American Political Science Review 87, 1 (1993): 115-32.; 
Glenn H. Snyder. Alliance Politics. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997): 143. 
59 Kenneth N. Waltz. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959): 232. 
60 James D. Morrow. “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science 3, 1 
(2000): 63-83: 80. 
61 Peter Gourevitch. “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.” 
International Organization 32, 4 (1978): 881-912: 911. 
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participates at this scholarly debate by focusing on the allied behaviors of restructuring 
the existing alliance relationship.  
               Second, the current literature on alliance theories is greatly skewed toward the 
formation side, and this study addresses the most understudied area: alliance restructuring. 
The literature on alliance restructuring also suffers from conflicting results in empirical 
studies and a lack of related case studies. This study constructs a theory of alliance 
restructuring by identifying correlations between the variables and by exploring causal 
mechanisms through the case studies at the same time, and then fills the theoretical 
deficiencies in the literature.   
               Third, in spite of numerous empirical cases of alliance restructuring around the 
world, there is no systematic framework to explain a general tendency in allied behaviors 
for restructuring the current alliances. Policy decisions regarding military alliances have 
had and will continue to have a great impact on the national security of not only alliance 
members but also of the countries outside the alliances. Especially, a decision to 
restructure the existing alliance relationship concerns various actors at the international 
and domestic levels to encourage a recalculation of national interests and to adopt a new 
means to achieve redefined national interests. This study provides policy makers with a 
framework to analyze key factors and logics regarding allied behaviors when 
restructuring current alliances, and knowledge offered by this study hopes to serve as 
input to policy decision makers.    
               Finally, understanding relationships among key factors and alliance 
restructuring decisions can help to reveal the underlying interest calculations and logics 
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of alliance restructuring decisions, and this study can help the public of alliance member 
states to evaluate their countries’ alliance strategies.      
 
1.4. Argument in Brief 
               This study presents that there are two factors shifting after the alliance 
formation: (1) capabilities; and (2) domestic political setting. For the former factor, when 
an ally becomes more powerful in comparison with its neighbors and external powers, 
this ally is more likely to restructure the existing alliance relationship because it now is 
able to rely on its own arms more greatly than at the time of alliance formation. For the 
latter factor, when an ally experiences domestic political changes, this ally is also likely 
to restructure the existing alliance relationship because the changes could bring about a 
new leader or new political group with different views toward the current alliances. These 
two changes in capabilities and domestic political setting have led to shifts in state 
preferences and interest calculations, and the ally has greater incentive to restructure the 
existing alliance. In the end, allies change the original alliance terms by dealignment, 
expiration, or renewal. 
 
1.5. Research Design 
               This study uses an explanatory sequential mix methods design. This mixed 
methods design involves collecting and constructing quantitative data first, and then 
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explains the quantitative results with in-depth qualitative data.62 In the first phase, 
quantitative data regarding alliance members’ power and domestic political structure is 
collected from various datasets including the Correlates-of-War (COW) Projects, 
POLITY IV, Archigos, and the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP).63 
Then, this study tests whether the alliance member’s capabilities change and the domestic 
political change are associated with the alliance member’s restructuring of the existing 
alliance relationship. In the second phase, the qualitative phase, three case studies have 
been conducted in order to trace the processes of the alliance member’s decision of 
alliance restructuring. Based on the quantitative results, the U.S.-Philippines alliance has 
been chosen as a typical case, while the U.S.-South Korean alliance has been selected as 
a negative/deviant case. The last case study, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been chosen 
from outside of the population which was used to construct a theory of alliance 
                                                          
62 John W. Creswell. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. 4th 
Edition. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2014) 
63 Melvin Small and J. David Singer, “Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: An Extension of the Basic Data.” 
Journal of Peace Research 6, 3 (1969): 257–82.; Douglas M. Gibler and Meredith Reid Sarkees, 
“Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000,” Journal of 
Peace Research 41, 2 (2004): 211–22; Douglas M. Gibler, International Military Alliances, 1648-2008. 
Correlates of War Series. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009); Actual data set can be accessible in the 
following website. This data set records all formal alliances among states between 1816 and 2012. Douglas 
M. Gibler, The Correlates of War Formal Alliance Data Set (version 4.1, 2013). 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Alliances/alliance.htm.; Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert 
Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009 
(version 2012). http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm: Center for Systemic Peace.; Henk E. 
Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, “Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political 
Leaders.” Journal of Peace Research 46, 2 (2009): 269-283.; Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 
and Giacomo Chiozza. Archigos: A Data Set of Political Leaders 1875-2004 (version 2.9; 2012). 
http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm.; Brett Ashley Leeds, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara 
McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long, “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944.” 
International Interactions 28, 3 (2002): 237–60.; Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, Michaela Mattes, 
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Jeffrey M. Ritter, and Burcu Savun, The Alliance Treaty Obligations and 
Provisions (ATOP) Data (version 3.0, 2005). http://atop.rice.edu/data. 
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restructuring, and this case has been explored in order to assess the explanatory power of 
the theory.    
 
1.6. Organization of the Remaining Chapters          
               This dissertation has eight chapters. Chapter 2 proposes a theory of alliance 
restructuring to be tested and explored in this study. Chapter 3 describes in detail how 
this study was conducted. Chapter 4 provides the quantitative analysis results and reports 
a statistically significant relationship between two key variables: changes in power and 
domestic political setting, and the outcomes of alliance restructuring. Chapters 5-7 are 
designated to the qualitative analysis. Chapter 5 traces the process of the Philippine 
decision of restructuring the alliance with the United States as a typical and positive case. 
Chapter 6 explores the U.S.-South Korea alliance as a deviant and negative case, and 
examines why alliance restructuring did not occur for this alliance. Chapter 7 attempts to 
test the generalizability of quantitative and qualitative findings in this study by examining 
the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Conclusion describes what the findings in this 
study mean and what conclusions are drawn from them, and also includes practical 
implications for policy practitioners and recommendations for further research. 
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2. A Theory of Alliance Restructuring 
               Based on the literature review presented in the Introduction, this chapter puts 
forward a theory of alliance restructuring. This chapter supplies the analytical framework 
for the quantitative analysis and case studies in the upcoming chapters. The chapter 
begins by defining the concepts of alliance and alliance restructuring, which is the 
dependent variable in this study. Secondly, the chapter presents my argument in full on a 
theory of alliance restructuring, and explains why both international and domestic factors 
are fundamental in a theory of alliance restructuring. Also in order to explain the causal 
mechanisms of alliance restructuring, it is essential to include a theory of why and how 
state leaders of one individual ally modify a preferred balance between arms and allied 
support after the alliance formation. Thirdly, the chapter elaborates on the causal effects 
component of the theory. I define the two key independent variables (capabilities change 
and domestic political change) and present the hypotheses which are tested in the 
quantitative analysis chapter. Lastly, the chapter explains the causal mechanisms part of 
the theory which is built on insights from the rational choice theory.   
 
2.1. Definition of Terms 
2.1.1. What is an “alliance”? 
               Forming a definition of alliance is always the first hurdle in alliance-related 
research because there is no general consensus on the definition among scholars.64 For 
                                                          
64 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: 3; Michael Don 
Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics. Vol. 19. Monograph Series in World Affairs. (Denver, Colo.: 
Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1982): 4; Volker Krause and J. David 
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example, Fedder once counted thirty five different definitions for the term alliance from 
the literature of alliance studies.65 Without a definition, it is difficult to compare one 
study to the others and to accumulate knowledge and findings reported by the research. In 
order to conceptualize the alliance, the past works have mainly focused on the following 
two points: (1) the differences and similarities in terms for the term alliance (e.g., 
alliances, alignments, coalitions, or ententes); and (2) the differences in functional 
attributes for the types of alliances (e.g., defense pacts, offense pacts, neutrality pacts, 
non-aggression pacts, and consultation pacts).  
               In comparison with the similar terms as alignments, coalitions, or ententes, the 
concept of alliances in the literature is generally defined in a relatively restricted manner. 
For example, members of the alliances are sovereign states. Alliance agreements are 
written and formal, therefore the agreements must take a format such as a treaty and/or 
executive agreement. The goals of alliances should be related to a cooperation in terms of 
national security for the alliance members. While excluding a pure format of offense 
pacts, neutrality pacts, non-aggression pacts and consultation pacts, this study defines an 
alliance as a written and formal treaty and/or an executive agreement among sovereign 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Singer, “Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns.” In Small States and 
Alliances, edited by Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner, 15–23. (Heidelberg; New York: Physica-Verlag, 
2001): 16. For the past works on the concepts of alliances, see Edwin H. Fedder, “The Concept of 
Alliance.” International Studies Quarterly 12, 1 (1968): 65–86; Bruce M. Russett, “An Empirical Typology 
of International Military Alliances.” Midwest Journal of Political Science 15, 2 (1971): 262–289; Roger V. 
Dingman, “Theories Of, and Approaches To, Alliance Politics.” In Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, 
Theory, and Policy, edited by Paul Gordon Lauren, 245–266. (New York, NY: Free Press, 1979); Douglas 
M. Gibler, “An Empirical Typology of Alliances: Uncovering the Relationship between Alliance 
Formation and War” (PhD Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1997); Stefan Bergsmann, “The Concept of 
Military Alliance.” In Small States and Alliances, edited by Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner (Heidelberg; 
New York: Physica-Verlag, 2001): 25-37; Thomas S. Wilkins, “‘Alignment, Not Alliance’ - the Shifting 
Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment.” Review 
of International Studies 38, 1 (2012): 53-76. 
65 Bergsmann, “The Concept of Military Alliance”: 25 note 3. 
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states with the obligation to provide security assistance in the case of a current and 
future national security emergency.  
               The choice in definition of “alliances” affects the case universe distribution. 
One notable limitation is that this definition excludes such relations as the one between 
the United States and Israel because there is no “formal” alliance treaty between them. 
The quantitative part of this study investigates what shifting factors since alliance 
formation are most likely to cause the outcome of alliance restructuring. Therefore, it is 
crucial to determine when the alliance started and in an unwritten or informal agreement 
it is difficult to identify both the starting and ending time of the alliance. Informal 
alliances are excluded from this study’s case universe for the methodological reasons, but 
a proposed theory of alliance restructuring can be applied to informal alliances as long as 
the states are in agreement with the obligation to provide security assistance in the case of 
a current and future national security emergency.    
               As the chapter of methodology explains in more detail, this study also sets the 
temporal scope and focuses on the alliances formed between 1946 and 2000, in order to 
attempt to deal with possible and unknown confounders in the statistical analysis. 
According to the ATOP data, 648 military alliances have been formed around the world 
since 1815,66 and as a result, a general theory of alliance restructuring that this study 
proposes, attempts to explain 142 military alliance cases (approximately 22% of 648 
                                                          
66 Brett Ashley Leeds, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long, “Alliance Treaty 
Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944.” International Interactions 28, 3 (2002): 237–60.; Actual data set 
can be accessible in the following website. This data set records all formal alliances among states between 
1815 and 2003. Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, Michaela Mattes, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Jeffrey 
M. Ritter, and Burcu Savun, The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) Data (version 3.0, 
2005). http://atop.rice.edu/data. Since 1815, 648 military alliances have been formed around the world, and 
391 alliances (60.3%) have dissolved by the year of 2003. 
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military alliances around the world, but 100% of the post-WWII formal military alliances 
with defensive obligations).   
                                                       
2.1.2. What is an “alliance restructuring”? 
               The past works describe the last stage of the alliance cycle in various terms as 
follows: disintegration,67 dealignment,68 realignment,69 dissolution,70 break or break up,71 
abrogation,72 restructuring,73 collapse,74 and termination.75 Some works use these terms 
                                                          
67 Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 90; A. M. Halpern, “The Emergence of an Asian Communist Coalition.” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 349 (1963): 117-129; Charles Burton 
Marshall, “Détente: Effects on the Alliance,” in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Changing East-West Relations and 
the Unity of the West (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964): 17-54; John W. Burton, International 
Relations: A General Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965): 209; Herbert S. Dinerstein, 
“The Transformation of Alliance Systems.” The American Political Science Review 59, 3 (1965): 589-601; 
Andrew MacKay Scott, The Functioning of the International Political System (New York: Macmillan Co., 
1967): 112; Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: 59-60; D. 
Scott Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984,” American Journal of 
Political Science 41, 3 (1997): 846-878. 
68 Liska, Nations in Alliance: 42-55. 
69 Liska, Nations in Alliance: 55-60; Bruce D. Berkowitz, “Realignment in International Treaty 
Organizations,” International Studies Quarterly 27, 1 (1983): 77-96.  
70 Liska, Nations in Alliance: 168-201; Paul Y. Hammond, “Nonmilitary Instruments of Policy in a 
Disarming and Disarmed World,” in Arnold Wolfers, Robert E. Osgood, Paul Y. Hammond, Laurence W. 
Martin, Robert W. Tucker, Charles Burton Marshall, and Livingston T. Merchant, The United States in a 
Disarmed World: A Study of the U.S. Outline for General and Complete Disarmament (Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966): 55-87; Michael F. Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test.” 
The Western Political Quarterly 37, 4 (1984): 523-544.; Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry”: 923; 
Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984”: 846-878; Stephen M. Walt, “Why 
Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39, 1 (1997): 156-179. 
71 Osgood Hardy, 1919. “South American Alliances: Some Political and Geographical Considerations.” 
Geographical Review 8, 4/5 (1919): 259-265; William J. Horvath and Caxton C. Foster, “Stochastic 
Models of War Alliances,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, 2 (1963): 110-116; Morrow, “Alliances 
and Asymmetry”: 923-925; Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984”: 846-
878. 
72 J. David Singer and Melvin Small, “Formal alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description,” Journal 
of Peace Research 3, 1 (1966): 1-31; Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why 
Do States Abrogate Agreements?” Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1118-1132.  
73 Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, “Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances,” American 
Journal of Political Science 38, 1 (1994): 145-161; Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance 
Duration, 1816-1984”: 846-878. 
74 Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse”: 156-179. 
75 Singer and Small, “Formal alliances, 1815-1939”: 1-31; Russett, “An Empirical Typology of 
International Military Alliances:” 262-289; Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in 
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interchangeably without a clear definition,76 while other works explicitly define the terms 
or categorize a mode of the last stage of alliance for their studies. This study uses the 
term “restructuring” and broadens the scope of “restructuring” beyond what is currently 
used in the literature in the following three ways. First, the ordinary meaning of 
“restructuring” in the dictionary is “the action of giving a new or different structure to 
something.”77 This definition seems to have little problem when incorporating the various 
modes of alliance termination which are currently identified in the literature.78 Second, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
International Alliances: 59-60; Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry”: 907; Bennett, “Testing Alternative 
Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984”: 846-878; Leeds and Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do 
States Abrogate Agreements?”: 1118-1132; Brett Ashley Leeds, Michaela Mattes, and Jeremy S. Vogel, 
“Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments.” American Journal of Political 
Science 53, 2 (2009): 461-476. 
76 Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry,”; Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,”; Bennett, “Testing 
Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984.”   
77 "restructuring, n.". OED Online. December 2013. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/275588?redirectedFrom=restructuring (accessed February 04, 2014). 
78 “Termination” is most commonly used in past quantitative works. One of the earliest works categorizes 
the three modes of alliance terminations: (1) formal abrogation occurred; (2) the treaty was formally 
renewed or extended; (3) informal abrogation occurred via an explicitly recognized violation of the 
commitments, or via the assumption of new and incompatible obligations by one or more alliance members. 
Since then, one work further divides the mode of alliance termination into seven: (1) new alliance; (2) 
denunciation; (3) war between members; (4) one member ceased to be independent as a result of war; (5) 
expiration; (6) termination sanctioned by terms of treaty; (7) alliance still in effect, while the other work 
treats the alliance termination as a subcategory of alliance disintegration as mentioned earlier. See Singer 
and Small, “Formal alliances, 1815-1939”: 6.; Russett, “An Empirical Typology of International Military 
Alliances”: 268.; Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: 59-
60. More recent works use a slightly simpler version by dividing four modes of alliance termination. One 
example identifies the following four modes of alliance termination: (1) the alliance was formally 
abrogated; (2) the alliance was extended; (3) the terms and commitments of the alliance were explicitly 
violated (e.g., by armed attack by one member on another); and (4) the loss of a state’s sovereignty. See 
Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984”: 862.; Another example of the four 
modes of alliance termination categorizes as follows: (1) fulfillment (i.e., the goals of the alliance have 
been accomplished, or the value of the alliance has declined to one or more members, and the members 
decline to renew the alliance when it expires); (2) exogenous loss of independence (i.e., one or more 
members become incapable of conducting an independent foreign policy and the loss of independence is 
not attributable to interaction with the ally); (3) renegotiation (i.e., the allies mutually agree to continue to 
cooperate militarily, but on new or modified alliance obligation terms.); and (4) violation (opportunistic 
abrogation: i.e., a major provision of the alliance is violated and the allies indicate no intention to continue 
to recognize the alliance; or one or more of the allies specifically declares that it will no longer recognize or 
be bound by the alliance agreement even before the scheduled alliance termination date.). See Leeds and 
Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?”: 1124. 
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the cases of strengthening or upgrading the alliance security obligations can be much 
more easily incorporated in the modes of alliance restructuring. Lastly, the currently 
applied meaning of “alliance restructuring” describes the shifting of alliance obligations 
among defense, neutrality, ententes, and no alliance,79 but it excludes many other possible 
modes of restructuring such as the changes in alliance obligations without the shifts 
among the above four categories. It seems better and necessary to broaden the definition 
of “restructuring.”      
               To be clear, my research interest on the dependent variable explores whether an 
ally “restructures” unilaterally or mutually the current alliance obligations and under 
what conditions and what processes. I also define alliance restructuring in the following 
three modes: (1) dealignment (i.e., when an ally ends an alliance relation unilaterally); (2) 
expiration (i.e., when an ally terminates it mutually at the end of the term or earlier); and 
(3) renewal (i.e., when an ally renews the current alliance with new obligations).80  
               The first mode of alliance restructuring: dealignment includes such cases as: (1) 
an ally unilaterally secedes an alliance and remains independent from all other states; (2) 
                                                          
79 “Restructuring” is not so often used in the past works and is defined as changes in the alliance portfolio 
of a state, which is a combination of a state’s security commitment with other states. For example, if state 
A already had a defense commitment with state B and a neutrality commitment with state C at the time T1, 
and if state A changed its commitment with state B from defense to entente and/or a commitment with state 
C from neutrality to no alliance at the time T2, then it can be argued that alliance restructuring occurred. 
See Siverson and Starr, “Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances”: 151-152. 
80 As a definition of alliance restructuring in this study, the following three cases in the category of alliance 
termination are excluded: (1) when an ally ceases to be an independent and sovereign state; (2) when an 
ally makes a formal military commitment outside the current alliance (i.e., new alliance); and (3) when an 
ally abrogates a formal military commitment with non-alliance members. This study examines the 
processes of alliance restructuring by way of the state’s “decisions.” For the first case, lost independence is 
not a state’s decision. For the second and third cases, both the formation and termination of alliance with 
the outside states do not visibly change the current alliance obligations with the other alliance members. 
My definition of alliance restructuring therefore applies only to the cases when change to the current 
alliance obligations occurs. 
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an ally unilaterally secedes an alliance and forms an alliance with the other states (i.e., 
realignment); (3) an ally unilaterally secedes an alliance in accordance with the alliance 
treaty terms; (4) an ally unilaterally secedes an alliance in violation with the alliance 
treaty terms (i.e., abrogation, denunciation, one form of violation, etc.); and (5) an ally 
militarily attacks the other ally (i.e., one form of violation). 
               The second mode of alliance restructuring: expiration includes such cases as: 
(1) an ally mutually agrees with the other allies and does not renew the current alliance 
relationship (i.e., one form of fulfillment); (2) an ally mutually agrees with the other 
allies and ends the current alliance relationship prior to the end of the alliance treaty term 
(i.e., one form of fulfillment); and (3) an ally mutually agrees with the other allies and 
ends the current alliance relationship forming a new security relationship agreement but 
not an alliance (e.g., neutrality pact, nonaggression pact and consultation pact). 
               The third mode of alliance restructuring: renewal includes such cases as: (1) an 
ally mutually agrees with the other allies and strengthens or upgrades its alliance 
commitments to new alliance obligations (one form of renegotiation); (2) an ally 
mutually agrees with the other allies and weakens or downgrades its alliance 
commitments to new alliance obligations (one form of renegotiation); and (3) an ally 
mutually agrees with the other allies and merges the alliance with another outside alliance. 
 
2.2. Argument 
               Once the alliance is formed, this study assumes that it continues to be in effect 
as long as the settings outside and inside the allaince remain the same, because allies will 
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have no incentive to change the existing relationship. At the time of the formation, allies 
establish a most preferred combination of its own arms and allied support in times of 
contingencies among available combinations.  
               This study argues and demonstrates that there are two key factors shifting after 
the alliance formation: (1) power/capabilities; and (2) domestic political setting. For the 
former factor, when an ally becomes more powerful in comparison with its neighbors and 
external powers, this ally will have a growing incentive to restructure the existing alliance. 
This ally now is able to rely on its own arms more greatly than at the time of alliance 
formation. During times of security contingencies, a state’s own arms are more reliable 
than its allied support because this ally cannot control the capabilities of its allies. This 
ally now has a stronger incentive to modify the originally preferred combination of arms 
and allied support since the alliance formation. 
               For the latter factor, when an ally experiences changes in the domestic political 
settings, this ally is also likely to restructure the existing alliance relationship because the 
changes could bring about a new leader or new political group with different views 
toward the current alliances. This ally will want to restructure the alliance relationship to 
meet the newly defined interests which might be different from those held by the 
previous rulers. In certain cases, a new leader in state X will see the greater value of its 
own arms and less value of ally Y’s support in times of contingencies. In the other case, 
this new leader in state X will see the greater value of ally Y’s support in times of 
contingencies and less value of its own arms. The domestic political change also leads 
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more frequent outcomes of alliance restructuring by way of the preference shifts between 
arms and allied support. 
               This study argues that both factors, capabilities change and domestic political 
change must be incorporated in a theory of alliance restructuring. The data constructed in 
this study has identified a total of 213 cases of alliance restructuring during the period of 
1946 to 2000. Table 2.1 categorizes all 213 restructuring cases by the two variables of 
capabilities increase in comparison with the neighbors and external powers and domestic 
regime change. The five models reviewed in the Introduction provide us with a mono-
variable explanation. As a result, the capabilities increase cannot explain 76 cases 
(approximately 36%) of alliance restructuring and the domestic regime change cannot 
explain 107 cases (more than 50%). However, when BOTH variables are incorporated as 
in my proposed theory, approximately 88% (187 cases) of alliance restructuring 
outcomes can be explained by a single theoretical framework.  
   
         Table 2.1: Alliance Restructuring Cases (1946-2000) 
 Capabilities 
Increases 
  
Domestic Regime Change Yes No Total 
Yes 56 50 106 
No 81 26 107 
Total 137 76 213 
  
               The two changes in capabilities and domestic political setting have led to shifts 
in state preferences and interest calculations, and the ally has greater incentive to 
restructure the existing alliance relationship. As the result of negotiations, allies change 
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the original alliance terms by dealignment, expiration, or renewal in the end. The 
argument is summarized the following diagram: 
 
 Causal Effects           Causal Mechanism 1     Causal Mechanism 2             Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
                
 
2.3. Hypotheses on the Causal Effects 
               This section elaborates on the causal effects part of the theory. I define the two 
key independent variables (capabilities change and domestic political change) and present 
the hypotheses which are tested in the quantitative analysis chapter.  
 
2.3.1. Power/Capabilities Change 
               To examine the possible effect of an alliance member’s shifting power, this 
study first investigates the following three independent variables: (1) relative change in 
capabilities with an alliance partner (i.e., relative change in distribution of capabilities 
among the allies); (2) relative change in capabilities with non-allied neighbors and 
external major powers (i.e., relative change in distribution of capabilities between a 
specific alliance member and its non-allied neighbors and external major powers); and (3) 
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relative change in capabilities of allies with non-allied neighbors and major powers (i.e., 
relative change in distribution of capabilities between alliance partners and their 
neighbors/major powers).  
               First, if state X becomes relatively stronger in comparison with an alliance 
partner, state X is more likely to restructure the current alliance relationship. In this case, 
state X perceives that alliance military support is less necessary in a security emergency. 
In short, a relative change in capabilities among the allies is likely to be associated with 
the allied behaviors of restructuring. For one empirical example, when the German 
capabilities declined after its alliance formation with Romania in 1941, the Romanian 
capabilities increased relatively to its ally Nazi Germany and later dealigned with 
Germany in 1944. As the quantitative section of the Methodology Chapter explains in 
greater detail, this study has identified 213 allied behaviors of restructuring the existing 
alliance relationship after 1946, and 112 cases of allied restructuring behaviors occurred 
when an ally’s power became relatively stronger than the allied partner since the alliance 
formation. Therefore, my hypothesis on relative change in capabilities with the allies is as 
follows: 
 
H1: When capabilities of an alliance member (i.e., state X) increase relative to an ally, 
state X will be more likely to restructure the current alliance with this ally. 
 
               The second is a relative change in capabilities with the non-allied neighbors and 
major powers. From the theoretical perspectives on alliance formation, the classic 
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balance of power theory assumes that states are likely to form alliances to balance against 
the more powerful states in the international system.81 Therefore, if state X becomes 
relatively stronger in comparison with the non-allied neighbors and major powers, state X 
is more likely to restructure the existing alliance relationship. In this case, state X 
perceives that alliance military support is less necessary in a security emergency, and is 
likely to seek greater autonomy on its security policy. Following the increasing level of 
capabilities since the alliance formation in 1951, the Philippines’ request for total U.S. 
bases removal led to the restructuring of the U.S.-Philippines alliance in 1992. Among 
the total 213 allied restructuring behaviors in the postwar, 137 cases occurred under this 
condition. In short, a relative change in capabilities with the non-allied neighbors and 
major powers is likely to be associated with the allied behaviors of restructuring.  
               Therefore, my hypothesis on relative change in capabilities with the non-allied 
neighbors and major powers is as follows: 
 
H2: When capabilities of an alliance member increase relative to the non-allied 
neighbors and major external powers, this alliance member will be more likely to 
restructure the current alliance with its ally. 
 
               The third is a relative change in capabilities of alliance partners with their non-
allied neighbors and major powers. If state X’s alliance partner Y becomes relatively 
stronger in comparison with State Y’s non-allied neighbors and major powers, state X 
                                                          
81 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), Kenneth 
N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979) 
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may consider it to be more advantageous to rely on larger security assistance from ally Y, 
and will also see an opportunity to restructure the existing alliance relationship with ally 
Y. Following the recovering Japanese capabilities, the United States agreed with Japan to 
restructure the 1951 alliance treaty, creating new obligations for Japan to increase its 
defense forces and defend the U.S. armed forces inside the Japanese territories in 1960. 
Among the total 213 allied restructuring behaviors in the postwar, 120 cases occurred 
under this condition. In short, a relative change in capabilities of alliance partners with 
their non-allied neighbors and major powers is likely to be associated with the allied 
behaviors of restructuring.  
               Therefore, my hypothesis on relative change in capabilities of alliance partners 
with their non-allied neighbors and major powers is as follows: 
 
H3: When allied capabilities of an alliance member increase relative to the non-allied 
neighbors and major external powers, this alliance member will be more likely to 
restructure the current alliance with its ally. 
 
2.3.2. Domestic Political Change 
               To examine the possible effect of domestic political change, this research 
investigates the following three independent variables: (1) regime change; (2) winning 
coalition size; and (3) leadership change. The regime change approach basically assumes 
that an ally under a different domestic political structure (i.e., democracies or 
authoritarians) behaves differently. In scholarly debates on the credibility of democratic 
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allies, some scholars have argued that democratic allies are more reliable and predictable, 
because democracies tend to require a broad range of domestic actors in the policy 
making process and this democratic decision making is likely to mitigate the impact of 
leadership change on the alliance policy.82 Some other scholars counter-argue that 
democratic allies are actually less reliable than authoritarian allies, because policies under 
democracies tend to be unstable and unpredictable by reflecting fluctuating public 
preferences along with frequent leadership turnovers.83  
               If democratic allies are more reliable than authoritarian allies or vice versa, in 
either case of shifting from democracies to authoritarians or from authoritarians to 
democracies, it may have an impact on this ally’s behavior accordingly. Among the total 
213 allied restructuring behaviors in the postwar, 106 cases occurred under this condition. 
Therefore, my hypothesis on regime change is as follows: 
 
H4: When an alliance member experiences a change in domestic regime 
(democratization or authoritarianization), this alliance member will be more likely to 
restructure the current alliance with its ally. 
                                                          
82 For examples of democracies as a reliable ally, Peter F. Cowhey, “Domestic Institutions and the 
Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States.” International Organization 47, 2 
(1993): 299-326.; Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations.” 
International Organization 50, 1 (1996): 109-139.; William Edward Rapp, “Theory of Democratic Alliance 
Reliability: A Study of Alliance Commitments, 1816-1980” (PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, 1996); 
Brett Ashley Leeds, “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International 
Cooperation.” American Journal of Political Science 43, 4 (1999): 979-1002; Brett Ashley Leeds, 
“Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties.” International 
Organization 57, 4 (2003): 801-827.    
83 For examples of democracies as an unreliable ally, Alastair Smith, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A 
Biased Decision.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, 1 (1996): 16–40.; Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam. 
Democracies at War. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede 
Gleditsch. “Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies.” American Journal of Political 
Science 48, 4 (2004): 775-795. 
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               The winning coalition (i.e., supporting constituencies) and leadership change 
approach is different from the regime change approach. The winning coalition/leadership 
change approach states that different domestic groups in a society have different policy 
preferences and these policy preferences have an impact on the leaders’ policy decision 
making. This approach further assumes that the new leaders’ most important goal is to 
retain power.84 In order to do so, the new leaders must secure support from a certain set 
of domestic groups. If these domestic groups have different preferences on alliance 
policy from those of the past who supported the previous leaders, then a new leader must 
listen to their supporters and most likely will change the current alliance relationship 
accordingly.                 
               In short, changes in winning coalition size and leadership (even in the same type 
of domestic political regime) can be described as the replacement of one ruling group 
with another ruling group, bringing about sharp changes in the institutional structures of 
politics and policy making. The leaders, whether presidential or legislative, especially 
care about the policy preferences of those who keep them in office. The supporting 
constituencies and their preferences on foreign policy may have great impact on the 
leaders’ foreign policy making. Among the total 213 allied restructuring behaviors in the 
postwar, 81 cases occurred under the changing winning coalition and 83 cases occurred 
under the changes in leadership. Therefore it is likely that a change in winning coalition 
                                                          
84 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. The Logic of 
Political Survival. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, 
Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace.” 
American Political Science Review 93, 4 (1999): 791-807. 
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size and leadership brings to power rulers of different policy perspectives on alliance 
policy from those who were replaced.85 This research tests the following hypothesis on 
change in winning coalition size and leadership as follows: 
 
H5: When an alliance member experiences a change in the winning coalition size, this 
alliance member will be more likely to restructure the current alliance with its ally. 
 
H6: When an alliance member experiences a change in leadership (leaders and 
supporting coalitions), this alliance member will be more likely to restructure the current 
alliance with its ally. 
 
2.4. Causal Mechanism of Alliance Restructuring                
               As the preceding diagram shows, a proposed mechanism of alliance 
restructuring has the two phases: (1) incentive mechanism; and (2) bargaining mechanism. 
The first section explains how both capabilities change and domestic political change are 
likely to increase the incentive of an ally to restructure the existing alliance relationship. 
The incentive mechanism is proposed based on a microeconomics perspective. The 
second section explains how allies bargain in the negotiation of alliance restructuring 
following the incentive mechanism phase.  
 
                                                          
85 Glenn H. Snyder (1997: 143) pointed out the role of domestic politics on national interests and judging 
strategies of alliance. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al (1999) also advanced a theory of the effects of 
domestic political institutions on state policy.  
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2.4.1. State’s Incentive Mechanism for Alliance Restructuring 
               In microeconomics, consumer behavior can be understood in the following three 
steps. The first step is to consider consumer preferences, describing how a consumer 
prefers one good over another with the assumption that preferences do not consider prices. 
As a second step, consumers have limited incomes, therefore it is necessary to consider 
budget constraints. Lastly, economists examine what combinations of goods consumers 
will choose in order to maximize their satisfaction (i.e., utility), given their preferences 
and budget constraints.86 This section uses the insights of microeconomics and explains 
how a state’s preference shifts between its own arms and allied support at first cause an 
individual ally to have a greater incentive to restructure the existing alliance relationship. 
               The models of Altfeld and Morrow have been widely discussed in the field of 
alliance formation and duration, but also in the field of a state’s security policy choice of 
the “arms versus allies.”87 In the latter field, Sorokin (1994) proposed a modified model 
of Altfeld’s and Morrow’s,88 and aimed to explain through his model how a state chooses 
between arms and allies when a state needs additional security for the purpose of 
maintaining the status quo.89 As the following two sections explain, his microeconomic 
model is also applicable to the question of how a changing condition (i.e., capabilities 
change and domestic political change) is likely to give a state the incentive to restructure 
                                                          
86 For an example of introductory text for consumer behavior, see Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld. Microeconomics. 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), chapter 3: 62-63. 
87 For a brief review on the literature of “arms versus allies,” see Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them 
Down?”: 76-77. 
88 Gerald L. Sorokin. “Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries.” International 
Studies Quarterly 38, 3 (1994): 421-446. 
89 Sorokin, “Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries”: 424. 
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the existing military alliances by modifying a most preferred balance between arms and 
allies.  
 
2.4.1.1. Capabilities Change and a State’s Incentive to Restructure the Alliances 
               When a relative change in a state’s capabilities in comparison with a certain 
subject (e.g., allies, neighboring states and external major powers, share of the total 
capabilities in the entire international system) occurs, it is assumed that the change leads 
to a relative change in available resources that this state can use up in order to acquire its 
own arms and/or the ally’s support. Figure 2.1 (a) illustrates the case of when state X’s 
power relatively increases. The relative increase in state X’s power since the alliance 
formation leads to the relative increase of state X’s available resources for two security 
policy choices. If two assumptions are made as follows: (1) the amount of state X’s own 
arms given up for ally Y’s support along with state X’s new budget line (L2) remains the 
same everywhere; and (2) there is no change between the two budget lines (L1 and L2) in 
the two prices of state X’s own arms (PCX) and the tightness of the alliance with ally Y 
(PT),  the budget constraint line (L1) at the time of alliance formation shifts outward to the 
new budget line (L2). Another assumption is that there is no change in state X’s 
preferences on the combinations of its own arms and the ally’s support, which means that 
the original indifference curve (U1) also shifts outward to the new indifference curve (U2). 
Therefore, the combination of arms and allies at point A does not maximize state X’s 
security satisfaction any longer, but point B does maximize state X’s security satisfaction. 
This shift from point A (at the time of alliance formation) to point B (when the state X’s 
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power changes) represents that state X now has an incentive to restructure the existing 
alliance in order to maximize state X’s security satisfaction.  
               Oppositely, Figure 2.1 (b) illustrates the case in which state X’s power 
relatively decreases and state X’s available resources also decrease. Following the same 
logic as above, the combination of arms and allies at point A no longer maximizes state 
X’s security satisfaction because point A is shown to be not affordable. The shift from 
point A (at the time of alliance formation) to point C (when state X’s power changes) 
represents that state X now has an incentive to restructure the existing alliance in order to 
maximize state X’s security satisfaction. 
Figure 2.1. State X’s Overall Power Change 
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2.4.1.2. Domestic Political Change and a State’s Incentive to Restructure the Alliances                     
               Figure 2.2 illustrates how the factors of domestic political change increase a 
state’s incentive to restructure the existing military alliances. Here I assume that there is 
no change in the amount of available resources for its own arms and ally’s support. As a 
result of domestic political change, a new leader with a new security preference over the 
arms-versus-allies trade-off takes office. In Figure 3.7 (a), point A expresses the 
maximized security preference of the former leader in state X under the budget 
constraints. Following the leadership turnover, the new leader takes office and as the 
slope of the new indifference curve (U2) shows, this new leader places a relatively greater 
value on ally’s support over its own arms, in contrast to the previous leader. Since it is 
assumed that there is no change in the amount of available resources for the security 
policy choice, in order to reflect the new leader’s security preferences, the original budget 
line of the previous leader (L1) shifted inward on the X-axis (“Allies”) and shifted 
outward on the Y-axis (“Arms”). Under the conditions of the new budget line (L2) and 
the new indifference curve (U2) under the new leadership, point B expresses the 
maximized security preference of the new leader in state X. This shift from point A (the 
leadership at the time of alliance formation) to point B (the new leadership which took 
office as a result of domestic political change in state X) represents that state X under the 
new leadership now has an incentive to restructure the existing alliance in order to 
maximize state X’s security satisfaction.  
               Figure 2.2 (b) illustrates the case in which the new leader places a relatively 
greater value of its own arms over the ally’s support, in contrast to the previous leader. 
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Since it is assumed that there is no change in the amount of available resources for the 
security policy choice, in order to reflect the new leader’s security preferences, the 
original budget line of the previous leader (L3) shifted outward on the X-axis (“Allies”) 
and shifted inward on the Y-axis (“Arms”). Under the conditions of the new budget line 
(L4) and the new indifference curve (U4), point D expresses the maximized security 
preference of the new leader in state X. This shift from point C (the leadership at the time 
of alliance formation) to point D (the new leadership which took office as a result of 
domestic political change in the state X) represents that state X under the new leadership 
now has an incentive to restructure the existing alliance in order to maximize state X’s 
security satisfaction.  
Figure 2.2. Domestic Political Change in the State X 
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               But this shift in state X and ally Y’s security preferences will not go straight to a 
certain outcome of alliance restructuring. State X will decide to make a move in order to 
maximize its new security preference regarding the combination of its own arms and 
allied support. As a result of strategic bargaining with ally Y which also has its own 
security preference on the balance between its own arms and allied support, state X and 
ally Y will reach a certain outcome (i.e., this is an equilibrium) expressed in the proposed 
mechanism of alliance restructuring bargaining.  
 
2.4.2. Bargaining Mechanism of the Alliance Restructuring 
               This section explains the bargaining mechanism of alliance restructuring. 
Snyder (1997) once described that “[Alliance] Management involves pursuing both 
common interests and competitive interests and thus is essentially a process of bargaining, 
either tacit or explicit.”90 This study shares Snyder’s view of alliance management as a 
bargaining process. In order to explain why and how allies reach their outcome from the 
possible choices of dealignment, expiration, renewal or status quo, it is essential to 
include a theory of how allies bargain in the process of alliance restructuring.  
               Snyder categorized the alliance bargaining episodes into the following three: (1) 
preparedness (e.g., bargaining regarding the allies’ respective contributions to military 
preparedness and burden sharing); (2) action (e.g., bargaining regarding joint allied 
strategy in times of contingencies); and (3) diplomacy (e.g., bargaining regarding allied 
                                                          
90 Snyder, Alliance Politics: 165. 
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commitments of support).91 Snyder especially paid attention to the third category: the 
diplomatic, and further subdivided this category into the following four: (1) renegotiation 
of alliance terms; (2) addition of members; (3) bargaining regarding the diplomatic stance 
toward an adversary; and (4) bargaining regarding intra-allied conflicts not involving an 
adversary.92  
               This study of alliance restructuring finds the first subcategory: renegotiation of 
alliance terms as important. Snyder explains that the meaning of “renegotiation of 
alliance terms” is a redistribution of long-term alliance payoffs. The primary purpose for 
this type of alliance bargaining is that an alliance member as a bargainer can increase the 
value of the alliance as a whole while also seeking to increase its own position in the 
alliance. To achieve these two objectives, this ally may exploit the two fears of either 
alliance abandonment (i.e., exploiting the alliance partners’ dependence by threatening to 
leave the alliance), or alliance entrapment (i.e., exploiting its own dependence on the 
alliance partners by threatening to act provocatively against the partners’ interests).93 
               Built on Snyder’s bargaining model and the incentive mechanism previously 
explained in the chapter, this study argues that the primary purpose for alliance 
restructuring bargaining is that an individual ally as a bargainer modifies the originally 
preferred combination between arms and allied support. The individual ally has a 
growing incentive to meet a new preference reflected by the two variables of capabilities 
                                                          
91 Snyder, Alliance Politics: 34, 177. 
92 Ibid: 177-178. 
93 Ibid: 177. 
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change and domestic political change which shift since the alliance formation. The next 
section elaborates on a bargaining model of alliance restructuring.   
 
2.4.2.1. Bargaining Model of Alliance Restructuring 
              In an inter-state bargaining situation, a state more commonly acts in sequence, 
one after the other. Therefore, the extensive form game with the assumption that the 
players move sequentially is more fruitful than the strategic form that Snyder once 
chose.94 The extensive-form game shown in Figure 2.3 is a simplified representation of 
the sequential moves involved in alliance restructuring. 
               In this game, there are two states seeking the best combination of one’s own 
arms and allied support in order to satisfy their preferences. The first state (X) 
experienced a change of capabilities and/or domestic political setting since alliance 
formation and now has an incentive to change the original combination of its own arms 
and the ally’s support. The second state (Y) is the ally of X or the group of X’s allies, and 
responds to state X’s moves in this game. This study assumes that both states are rational 
and they always choose an action which expectedly gives the most preferred outcome, 
based on what they expect each other to do.  
               This game attempts to capture the general characteristics of a bargaining process 
regarding alliance restructuring. This game only allows state X to make the first move. 
State X makes the single offer to ally Y reading termination or renewal respectively. 
Only ally Y can make a counter proposal to state X’s offer of renewal or termination just 
                                                          
94 This study treat the model as noncooperative games, in which an agreement between the players can be 
enforced only through the interests of the consenting players in the game. 
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one time during the game. In most moves, both states can choose an option of either 
“accept” or “reject.” Certainly the alliance bargaining situation in the real world is more 
complicated than this model, however it is a good start to trace the process of bargaining 
mechanisms.95        
Figure 2.3. A Bargaining Model of Alliance Restructuring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
95 I believe that further modification of this model in the future will make this simplified model closer to 
“real world” alliance restructuring bargaining. Morrow made the similar points in his work on game theory. 
See, Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists: 51-58. 
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2.4.2.2. Preferences on the Alliance Restructuring Bargaining Outcomes 
               In accordance with the definition of alliance restructuring examined in the 
earlier section, there are five possible outcomes in this game model of alliance 
restructuring: (1) status quo (SQ); (2) dealignment by state X (i.e., unilateral termination: 
DX); (3) expiration (i.e., mutually agreed termination: E); (4) renewal of existing 
alliances in state X’s term (RX); and (5) renewal of existing alliances in both state X and 
ally Y’s term (RXY). In order not to lose generality in the model, first this study assumes 
that a state in the alliance relationship prefers a moderate level of both its own arms and 
allied support rather than an unbalanced combination of a great deal of one and a scarcity 
of the other.96 Based on this assumption, both state X and ally Y prefer a set of outcomes 
of SQ, RX, and RXY to a set of outcomes of DX and E. The outcomes of DX and E are 
the cases of alliance termination, meaning that there is no allied support in the 
combination. Between the two termination cases, the unilateral action by state X of 
terminating the alliance (i.e., DX) may benefit state X, assuming that the action is based 
on state X’s rational calculation. But in comparison with the case of mutual agreement to 
alliance termination, this unilateral action will be linked to the cost of a reputation as a 
defector of alliance commitment. Therefore, this study assumes that a state generally 
prefers E to DX. Among the three outcomes: SQ, RX, and RXY, this study assumes that 
a state prefers its own advantage to the status quo, and the status quo to an advantage for 
                                                          
96 Morrow made the similar assumption in his model of autonomy versus security. See Morrow, “Alliances 
and Asymmetry”: 913. 
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the other.97 Secondly this study assumes that a newer mutually agreed combination of 
arms and allies (RXY) is more preferable than the previously agreed combination of arms 
and allies (SQ). Therefore, while state X prefers RX to either SQ or RXY, and prefers 
RXY to SQ, ally Y prefers RXY to SQ, and SQ to RX. By using a numerical number of 1 
to 5 (the greater the number, the higher the utility for outcomes), this study assumes that 
state X and ally Y have an ordering preference over the five outcomes respectively as 
follows: 
   Table 2.2. State X and Ally Y’s Ordering Preference 
Utility (or 
Payoffs) for 
outcomes 
DX E SQ RX RXY 
State X 1 2 3 5 4 
Ally Y 1 2 4 3 5 
 
               As mentioned earlier, the main purpose of this chapter is to provide the 
analytical framework for the quantitative analysis and case studies in the subsequent 
chapters. The information in the chapter should be sufficient enough to achieve the 
purpose. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
               In sum, this study maintains that both capabilities change and domestic political 
change must be incorporated in order to explain why an individual ally has a greater 
incentive to restructure the existing alliance relationship, which was once favored at the 
                                                          
97 Kigour and Zagare made the similar assumption in their model of deterrence. See D. Marc Kilgour and 
Frank C. Zagare. “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence.” American Journal of Political Science 35, 2 
(1991): 305-334: 313. 
 51 
 
time of formation. The current theories of alliance studies have failed to do so thus far 
and their explanatory power remain empirically limited. This study also argues that it is 
essential to include a theory of why and how an individual ally changes an original 
preference of combination between arms and allied support in order to explain the 
incentive mechanism. It is also essential to include a theory of how the individual ally 
reaches an alliance restructuring outcome from the possible options (dealignment, 
expiration, renewal, and status quo) in order to explain the bargaining mechanism.  
               The next chapter will explain how a proposed theory of alliance restructuring is 
tested. This study conducts the quantitative analysis (the rare event regression analysis) 
and assesses a correlation between the main factors (capabilities change and domestic 
political change) and the outcomes of alliance restructuring. This study then conducts 
case studies and the entire process of alliance restructuring bargaining explained in this 
chapter will become the template for tracing a state’s decision on alliance restructuring. 
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3. Methodology 
               The purpose of this study is to build a theory of alliance restructuring, and in 
order to achieve this goal, this study uses an explanatory sequential mix methods design. 
This mixed methods design involves collecting and constructing quantitative data first, 
and then explains the quantitative results with in-depth qualitative data. In the first phase, 
quantitative data regarding alliance members’ power and domestic political structure is 
collected from various datasets including the COW Projects, POLITY IV, Archigos, and 
the ATOP. Then, by using the rare event regression method, this study statistically tests 
whether the alliance member’s power change and the domestic political regime change 
are associated with the alliance member’s restructuring of the existing alliance 
relationship. In the second phase, the qualitative phase, three case studies have been 
conducted in order to trace the processes of the alliance member’s behaviors of alliance 
restructuring. Based on the quantitative results, the U.S.-Philippines alliance has been 
chosen as a typical case, while the U.S.-South Korean alliance has been selected as a 
negative/deviant case. The last case study, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been chosen from 
outside of the population which was used to construct a theory of alliance restructuring, 
and this case has been explored in order to assess the explanatory power of the theory. 
               This chapter has two sections. The first describes the data on military alliances, 
and also explains the data collection and measurement of the dependent variable (i.e., 
alliance restructuring). This section further states the choice of statistical method, and 
explains the data collection and measurement of both independent, and control variables 
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in the quantitative analysis. The second section of this chapter describes how this study 
selected the above three case studies.      
 
3.1. Quantitative Analysis Phase 
3.1.1. Data on Alliances 
               This study focuses on the data of both formal bilateral and multilateral alliances 
formed between 1946 and 2000. I place this temporal scope of the inference after the end 
of the Second World War, since Leeds and Mattes (2007)’s empirical work provides 
evidence that alliance political dynamics after 1946 are different from those of prior 
years.98 This decision of limiting the temporal scope should help to reduce the impact of 
potential and unknown confounders. I also exclude a pure form of offense pact, neutrality 
pact, nonaggression pact, and consultation pact, and focus on an alliance with defensive 
obligations.99 The form of alliance determines the degree of an ally’s commitments to its 
allies. While an offense pact obligates the alliance members to jointly conduct offensive 
military operations, a consultation pact simply obligates the members to talk with each 
other in times of contingencies, and a nonaggression pact does not even obligate the 
alliance members to coordinate with each other actively. The different degrees of alliance 
commitments are possibly associated with a variety of factors and processes, and this 
study focuses on alliances with defensive obligations.100 This study further excluded all 
alliances with less than one year duration between 1946 and 2000 due to my research 
                                                          
98 Brett Ashley Leeds and Michaela Mattes, “Alliance Politics during the Cold War: Aberration, New 
World Order, or Continuation of History?” Conflict Management and Peace Science 24, 3 (2007): 183-199. 
99 For example, I excluded an offense pact among United Kingdom, France and Israel signed in 1956. 
100 Leeds and Savun took the same approach. Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating 
Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?” Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1118-1132: 1125. 
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design observing the annual change of variables since the time of alliance formation.101 In 
the end, this study determines the population to be 142 alliances with the obligation of a 
defense pact, and included bilateral and multilateral forms.102   
 
3.1.2. Dependent Variable of Alliance Restructuring 
              This study annually observes whether state X restructured an alliance 
relationship with the other alliance partner(s). As mentioned in the Theory chapter, this 
study defines alliance restructuring as the following three modes: (1) dealignment (i.e., 
when an ally ends an alliance relation unilaterally); (2) expiration (i.e., when an ally 
terminates mutually at the end of the term or earlier); and (3) renewal (i.e., when an ally 
renews the current alliance with new obligations). I collected the information from the 
ATOP coding sheets, and coded a binary variable “1” as alliance restructuring defined 
above, and coded “0” for alliance duration or alliance restructuring caused by the other 
alliance member(s). The total number of observed years with 142 alliances formed 
between 1946 and 2000 is 10, 197 with 213 cases of a state’s decisions in favor of 
alliance restructuring, the population of which is approximately 2.1 percent of the total 
observed years. The list of all 213 cases of a state’s alliance restructuring can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
 
                                                          
101 I excluded the following six defense pact alliances: (1) Jordan – Iraq in 1958; (2) France – Mali in 1960; 
(3) Central African Republic – Chad – Democratic Republic of Congo in 1968; (4) Syria – Libya in 1980; 
(5) Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (COPAX) since 2000; and (6) A joint defense pact 
signed by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) since 2000. 
102 Bennett (1997) included a total of 207 alliances (both bilateral and multilateral forms) formed from 1816 
to 1984 in the COW data set, while Leeds and Savun (2007) used total 304 alliances (only bilateral 
alliances) formed from 1816 to 1989 in the ATOP data set. 
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3.1.3. Statistical Method 
               This statistical analysis seeks to answer the question: under what conditions 
regarding capabilities shifts and domestic political changes is an individual ally most 
likely to restructure the existing alliance relationship; and investigates the possible effects 
of annually observed independent variables on that outcome. Therefore, the data structure 
is formatted by way of the event history data (or time-series-cross-section data or 
duration data) with a binary dependent variable (i.e., whether an individual ally decided 
to restructure the alliance or not).  
               Another important characteristic of my data set is that the event (i.e., a state’s 
alliance restructuring) as the dependent variable is rare. As mentioned previously, the 
number of cases of a state’s alliance restructuring from 1946 to 2000 is 213, is 
approximately 2.1 % out of the total observed 10,197 years during the same time period. 
When the dependent variable is rare and the proportion of the event occurrence is skewed, 
King and Zeng (2001) argue that a logistic regression model reports a biased coefficient 
and underestimates of the probability of rare events.103 In order to deal with the problems 
of rare events data, they recommend that researchers use a Relogit model, which is open 
and free to use.104 King and Langche (2001) present that the effects of their methods will 
                                                          
103 Gary King and Langche Zeng, “Explaining Rare Events in International Relations,” International 
Organization 55, 3 (2001): 693-715. 
104 Michael Tomz, Gary King, and Langche Zeng, Relogit: Rare Events Logistic Regression, Version 1.1. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, October 1, 1999), http://gking.harvard.edu/relogit (accessed January 
8, 2013) 
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be largest when the events occurrence out of the total observations is under 5%.105 
Consistent with their recommendations, this study conducts the rare events data analysis.      
               In the traditional logit and probit models, there is an assumption that the 
probability of event occurrence at any point in time is always the same (i.e., assumption 
of time independence). However, this assumption raises doubts in the cases using the 
longitudinal data set (e.g., time-series-cross-section data, duration data) such as my data 
format. To address inefficiency in the coefficients (i.e., underestimation of the standard 
errors) due to time dependency (i.e., the probability of event occurrence at any point in 
time is not always the same), I estimate all of my models with cubic splines following 
Beck, Katz, and Tucker’s (1998) recommendation that cubic splines are probably the 
most appropriate way to deal with time dependence.106 In the end, all of my models 
include three cubic splines and a variable (i.e., alliance years) that calculates the number 
of years since the alliance formation. I also address the possibility that data is not 
independent within a given state, but independent across given states, and I compute a 
robust variance estimator by using the cluster option in STATA (version 13) in all my 
models.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105 Gary King and Langche Zeng, “Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data,” Political Analysis 9, 2 
(2001): 137-163. 
106 Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker, “Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-
Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable,” American Journal of Political Science 42, 1 (1998): 
1260-1288.   
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3.1.4. Independent Variables of Capabilities Change 
3.1.4.1. Capabilities Change in Comparison with the Allies 
               The act of measuring power has been recognized as a difficult task due to the 
lack of a shared definition of power, and the difficulty of measurement,107 but power is 
most often measured by tangible assets.108 The best known of indices overall for this 
measurement is the COW Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC), and this 
study also uses the CINC, just as the previous empirical studies have used for their 
analysis.109 The CINC records the proportion of total international power in the 
international system by a given state in a given year.110 The capabilities change between 
the allies is calculated as   
Δ C (SX & AY) = [SXy / (SXy + AYy) - SXy-1 / (SXy-1 + AYy-1)] / [SXy-1 / (SXy-1 + AYy-1)] (1) 
where C = Capabilities, SXy = State X’s CINC in year y, and AYy = Ally Y’s CINC in 
year y.  
                                                          
107 J. David Singer, “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-
1985,” International Interactions 14, 2 (1988): 115-132.; Richard L. Merritt, and Dina A. Zinnes, “Validity 
of Power Indices,” International Interactions 14, 2 (1988): 141-151. 
108 The examples of tangible assets include the number of troops, the amount of military hardware, gross 
national product (GNP), population, and the like. 
109 The COW data treats power as a property in kind, rather than relational influence. It assumes that all 
states are equally capable of mobilizing national resources at all times and across all issues. COW’s 
treatment of power and its assumption do have flaws however because the data does not portray a 
meaningful operational dimension of power, and contrary to the COW’s assumption, some states would be 
able to mobilize national resources more effectively than others. Although the COW data cannot easily 
escape from these problems in terms of conceptualization and measurement of power, this data set is most 
often used by researchers in the field of international relations and from what we have seen, a more useful 
and precise alternative has not yet been developed. See David A. Baldwin, “Power and International 
Relations,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, ed., Handbook of International 
Relations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002): 177-191; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “What Is Power?,” in 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Principles of International Politics: People’s Power, Preferences, and 
Perceptions, third edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2006): 233-262. 
110 The CINC is calculated by six material indicators: (1) energy consumption; (2) iron & steel production; 
(3) military expenditure; (4) military personnel; (5) total population; and (6) urban population. It can 
capture the relative power position of a given state in comparison to all other states in the international 
system. 
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If the relative percentage change of the annual power position ratio becomes larger than 
zero, this indicates that this alliance member becomes relatively more powerful than the 
other alliance partner(s) in that year since the time of alliance formation. I use this 
relative percentage change variable and also a dummy variable coded as “1” for the 
alliance member that becomes more powerful since the formation of the alliance, and 
coded as “0” for the alliance member that becomes less powerful since the formation of 
the alliance. Hypothesis 1 predicts that a positive value on the coefficient (i.e., a greater 
increase in capabilities relative to its allies) leads to a more frequent alliance restructuring. 
 
3.1.4.2. Capabilities Change in Comparison with the Neighbors and External Powers 
               To operationalize a relative change in capabilities with the non-allied neighbors 
and major powers, I must identify which states should be categorized as an annual threat 
environment to each state.111 This study uses Quakenbush’s politically active dyads 
(PAD) to identify whether a dyadic relation has an open opportunity for militarized 
conflict in terms of power, contiguity, and allied relations,112 and annually decides which 
                                                          
111 In the field of international conflict studies, Most and Starr (1989) presented the concept of opportunity 
and willingness as a necessary condition for international conflict. They define opportunity as a possibility 
for militarized conflict between states, and willingness as desire by states to engage in militarized conflict. 
According to the past studies including Weede (1983); and Kinsella and Russett (2002), the former 
includes power, contiguity, and proximity, while the latter includes latent territorial conflict, democracy, 
dependence, and international organization. See Benjamin. A. Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic and 
International Politics (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Erich Weede, “Extended 
Deterrence by Superpower Alliance,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, 2 (1983): 231-254; David Kinsella 
and Bruce Russett, “Conflict Emergence and Escalation in Interactive International Dyads,” Journal of 
Politics 64, 4 (2002): 1045-1068. 
112 Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Identifying Opportunity for Conflict: Politically Active Dyads,” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 23, 1 (2006): 37-51. 
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states are within the threat environment to a certain state.113 The PAD can explain 95.0% 
of all militarized interstate disputes from 1816 to 2000, which is a higher percentage than 
other available equivalent data.114 I collected the PAD data though the EUGene 
program,115 and combined it with the CINC. Then I annually calculated the power 
position ratio between one alliance member and all states in the PAD relations to this 
particular alliance member since the time of alliance formation.116 The only modification 
to the PAD is that this research excludes states in the PAD relations if they are allied 
members in the same alliances. The capabilities change in comparison with the non-allied 
neighbors and external major powers is calculated as 
 
   
                                                          
113 Among the aforementioned empirical works on alliance terminations, Bennett (1997) focused on 
“willingness” as a condition for international conflict by measuring past militarized disputes between states. 
On the other hand, Leeds and Savun (2007) mainly used Maoz (1996)’s idea of “politically relevant 
international environment” (PRIE), which can be constructed by using the opportunity variables (i.e., 
power and contiguity). The PRIE includes all contiguous states, regional powers of its own geographic 
region, and major powers with global projection capacity. Later on Leeds and Savun (2007) modified the 
PRIE by employing the S score of alliance portfolio similarity, which was developed by Signorino and 
Ritter (1999), and by excluding states with whom they share an alliance. See D. Scott Bennett, “Testing 
Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984,” American Journal of Political Science 41, 3 (1997): 
846-878; Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate 
Agreements?” Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1118-1132; Zeev Maoz, Domestic Sources of Global 
Change (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Curtis S. Signorino and Jeffery M. Ritter, 
“Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions,” International Studies 
Quarterly 43, 1 (1999): 115-144. 
114 Quackenbush (2003)’s study has shown that the PRIE explains only 85.8% of militarized interstate 
disputes from 1816 to 2000. While both the PAD and PRIE include the factors of power and contiguity, the 
PAD has added some noncontiguous dyads in cases when these states are able to reach each other through 
another state with which they are allied. Through this modification, the PAD can explain, for example, the 
militarized conflicts between Israel and Iraq in 1973, because Iraq was only able to reach Israel through the 
alliances with Syria and Jordan. 
115 D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, III, Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program 
(EUGene), http://eugenesoftware.org/; For the publication record,   D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, III, 
“EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” International Interactions 26 (2000): 179-204.  
116 The only modification to the PAD is that this research excludes states in the PAD relations if they are 
allied members in the same alliances. 
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Δ C (SX & XN) = [SXy / (SXy + XNy) - SXy-1 / (SXy-1 + XNy-1)] / [SXy-1 / (SXy-1 + XNy-1)] (2) 
where C = Capabilities, SXy = State X’s CINC in year y, and XNy = State X’s non-allied 
neighbors and external major powers’ combined CINC in year y.  
               If this annual PAD power position ratio becomes bigger than zero, this means 
this alliance member becomes relatively more powerful since the alliance formation than 
all states in the PAD in that year. I use the percentage change variable and also a dummy 
variable coded as “1” for the alliance member that becomes more powerful since the 
alliance formation, and coded as “0” for the alliance member that becomes less powerful 
since the formation of alliance. Hypothesis 2 predicts that a positive value on the 
coefficient leads to a more frequent alliance restructuring.  
 
3.1.4.3. Allies’ Capabilities Change in Comparison with the Neighbors and External 
Powers 
               The third variable of capabilities change focuses on the allies in comparison 
with their neighbors and external major powers. If ally Y becomes stronger in 
comparison with its neighbors and external major powers since the alliance formation, 
state X may consider it possible to rely on greater support from ally Y, and see a growing 
opportunity to restructure the existing alliance relationship with ally Y. To operationalize 
a relative change in capabilities of ally Y in comparison with the non-allied neighbors 
and major powers, I used the second variable of relative change in capabilities of state X 
in comparison with the non-allied neighbors and major powers. In the case of bilateral 
alliances, I simply used the relative percentage change in ally Y’s capabilities in 
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comparison with the total capabilities of all PAD states to ally Y, and assigned it to state 
X. The capabilities change between an alliance partner Y and its non-allied neighbors and 
external major powers is calculated as   
Δ C (AY & YN) = [AYy / (AYy + YNy) - AYy-1 / (AYy-1 + YNy-1)] / [AYy-1 / (AYy-1 + YNy-1)] (3) 
where C = Capabilities, AYy = Ally Y’s CINC in year y, and YNy = Ally Y’s non-allied 
neighbors and external major powers’ combined CINC in year y.  
               In the case of multilateral alliances, I identified the alliance member with the 
largest annual power position ratio, which was calculated when I measured the first 
variable of capabilities change between state X and its allies. Then I used the relative 
percentage change in this alliance member’s capabilities in comparison with the total 
capabilities of all PAD states to this alliance member with the largest annual power 
position ratio, and assigned it to state X. Hypothesis 3 predicts that a positive value on the 
coefficient (i.e., a greater increase in allied capabilities relative to all states in the their 
PAD) leads to a more frequent alliance restructuring. 
 
3.1.5. Independent Variables of Domestic Political Change 
3.1.5.1. Regime Change 
               Several researchers have explored the possible effect of regime change in the 
past. Siverson and Starr (1994) found a correlation between regime change and alliance 
restructuring, while Bennett (1997) denied the correlation.117 Leeds and Savun (2007) 
                                                          
117 Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, “Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances,” 
American Journal of Political Science 38, 1 (1994): 145-161; D. Scott Bennett, “Testing Alternative 
Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984,” American Journal of Political Science 41,3 (1997): 846-878. 
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show mixed results: a change in domestic political institutions has a causal effect on the 
alliance ending in violation of its terms, and alliance fulfillment, but not on alliance 
renegotiation.118 To operationalize a regime change (whether democratization or 
authoritarianization), I use an absolute value shift from the time of alliance formation 
calculated from the democracy-autocracy composite variable of the POLITY IV data 
with the scale from +10 (most democratic) to -10 (most authoritarian). Hypothesis 4 
predicts that a positive value on the coefficient (i.e., a greater change of a state’s domestic 
regime) leads to a more frequent alliance restructuring. 
 
3.1.5.2. Change of the Winning Coalition Size 
               Winning coalition is defined as “groups supporting political leaders in 
office,”119 and the political survival of leaders depends on whether they can secure 
support from the winning coalition. The smaller the size of the winning coalition, the 
more autocratic the political system, whereas the larger the size of the winning coalition, 
the more democratic the political system. Therefore it is likely that a change in the 
winning coalition size brings to power rulers of different policy perspectives on alliance 
policy from those who were replaced. In order to measure a change in the winning 
coalition size, this study collects the information from the data set of the Logic of 
Political Survival Data Source developed by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and 
                                                          
118 Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?” 
Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1118-1132. 
119 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, The Logic of 
Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004) 
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Morrow.120 The data set of the winning coalition size uses a scale from 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 
to 1,121 and I recorded an absolute value of the difference between the winning coalition 
size at the time of alliance formation and the winning coalition size at the time of alliance 
restructuring (or the year of 2000). Hypothesis 5 predicts that a positive value on the 
coefficient (i.e., a greater change of a state’s winning coalition size) leads to a more 
frequent alliance restructuring. 
 
3.1.5.3. Change of Government (Both Leadership and Supporting Coalitions) 
               To measure whether a change of government (both leadership and supporting 
coalitions) occurred or not, this study collects the data regarding leader’s change and their 
political party affiliation mainly from the following two sources: (1) Archigos: A Data 
Set of Political Leaders version 2.9., developed by Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza;122 
and (2) Zarate’s Political Collections (ZPC).123 Based on these data sets, I annually 
identify whether government change (i.e., change of both leaders and their ruling parties 
at the same time) occurred or not since the time of alliance formation. I coded a dummy 
variable “1” for the state that experienced government change since the formation of the 
                                                          
120 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow, The Logic of 
Political Survival Data Source, http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm  
121 The size of the winning coalition is estimated by various institutional variables from the POLITY IV, 
including competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment. The key difference between the regime 
type level variable and the winning coalition size is that the latter includes a variable to measure the extent 
of institutionalized constraints by the winning coalition on the executive decision making powers, whether 
they are democracies or authoritarians. 
122 Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. Archigos: A Data Set of Political 
Leaders 1875-2004 (version 2.9, 2009). http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm.; 
They introduced the dataset in Goemans et al, “Introducing Archigos: A Data Set of Political Leaders,” 
Journal of Peace Research 46, 2 (2009): 269- 283. 
123 Roberto Ortiz de Zárate, Zárate’s Political Collections (ZPC) 1996-2013. (2013), 
http://www.zarate.eu/index.html. Further information of specific political parties, Richard Kimber, Political 
Science Resources: Politics and Government Around the World, http://www.politicsresources.net/  
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alliance, and “0” for the state that experienced no government change since the formation 
of alliance. In the event a ruling party at the time of alliance formation returns to the 
executive office, I coded a dummy variable “0” again. Hypothesis 6 predicts that a 
positive value on the coefficient (i.e., a government change that replaces a ruling class at 
the time of alliance formation) leads to a more frequent alliance restructuring.124  
 
3.1.6. Control Variables 
              I categorize control variables as follows: variables of individual ally’s state 
characteristics (regime type level), variables of inter-allies relationship (symmetric power 
ally, regime dissimilarity, and alliance portfolio similarity), variables regarding 
international relations outside the alliances (rivalry and Cold War), variables of alliance 
arrangement (non-military cooperation, and institutionalized level), and variables 
regarding characteristics of alliance format (treaty, total number of allies, and wartime 
alliance). 
                                                          
124 Over the course of constructing the data on government change, it was necessary to make a few arbitrary 
judgments on whether government change occurred or not. First, there are some cases that involved 
multiple government changes in a year. In these cases, the information regarding the longest duration of 
government in that year was prioritized. For example, according to the Archigos data, Haiti experienced 
government changes six times in the year of 1957. I only identified the case of Antonio Kebreau’s 
approximately four-month’s rule as government change. Second, in some cases a coalition government 
ruled the state at the time of alliance formation, and then this state experienced multiple coalition shuffles 
over time. In these cases, this research coded “1” as leadership change, only when all major coalition 
parties at the time of alliance formation left the ruling coalition. For example, when German Federal 
Republic (West Germany) joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1954, the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) had formed a coalition government. As 
long as either the CDU or the FDP remained a part of ruling coalition after 1954, I coded a dummy variable 
“0” as no change in government. I also coded “0” when these major coalition members at the time of 
alliance formation returned to the executive office. In the case of Germany, when the CDU’s Merkel took 
office (although the CDU initially made a grand coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD)), I coded 
a dummy variable “0.” Third, there are many interim governments and acting presidents/prime ministers. In 
these cases this research regards the previous governments as continuing and I coded “0” as no government 
change. 
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3.1.6.1. Individual Ally’s State Characteristics 
3.1.6.1.1. Regime Type Level 
               Siverson and Emmons (1991) found that democratic states between 1946 and 
1965 formed and maintained alliances at much higher rates than non-democratic states.125 
Contrary to a realist perspective that the ability or the lack of ability for states to make 
and keep international commitments is a function of the anarchic international system,126 
Gaubatz (1996) claimed that alliances between liberal democracies are more durable than 
those between non-democracies and also alliances formed between democracies and non-
democracies.127 More recently, Leeds and Savun (2007) found that alliances involving 
democratic states are less likely to end in violation of their treaty terms.128 To control the 
possibility that a more democratic ally is less likely to restructure the current alliance 
relationship, I include the democracy-autocracy composite variable of the POLITY IV 
data set as a control variable in my statistical models.      
 
 
                                                          
125 Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann Emmons, “Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and 
Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, 2 (1991): 285-306 
126 For example, Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest 
Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42, 3 (1988): 485-507. 
127 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations,” International 
Organization 50, 1 (1996): 109-139. Later the following works confirmed Gaubatz’s argument. See 
William Reed, “Alliance Duration and Democracy: An Extension and Cross-Validation of “Democratic 
States and Commitment in International Relations,” American Journal of Political Science 41, 3 (1997): 
1072-1078; D. Scott Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984,” American 
Journal of Political Science 41, 3 (1997): 846-878. 
128 Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?,” 
Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1118-1132. 
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3.1.6.2. Inter-allies Relationship 
3.1.6.2.1. Symmetric Ally 
               An asymmetric alliance is formed between a stronger ally and a weaker ally (or 
weaker allies). In this type of alliance, the stronger ally provides security to the weaker 
ally, and the weaker ally provides autonomy to the stronger ally. In this patron-client 
relationship, the weaker ally greatly relies on the stronger ally for security, and therefore 
capabilities change for both the patron state and client state is less likely to change the 
incentive balance in the security-autonomy trade-off significantly. Morrow (1991) found 
that an asymmetric alliance lasts longer than a symmetric alliance, and Leeds & Savun 
(2007) found that an asymmetric alliance is less likely to end in violation of its terms.129 
To control the possibility that an individual ally in a symmetric alliance is more likely to 
restructure the existing alliance relationship, I use the categorical variable for three power 
statues: global, regional, and minor powers (Quackenbush 2006).130 I annually observe 
the power status of individual allies in an alliance. Then if all individual allies in an 
alliance belong to the same power status, I code “1” as a symmetric ally. 
 
3.1.6.2.2. Regime Dissimilarity 
               Leeds (1999) took a game theoretic approach and found that jointly democratic 
dyads and jointly autocratic dyads will cooperate more readily than mixed dyads between 
                                                          
129 Morrow (1991) and Leeds & Savun (2007) divided alliances into two categories: (1) symmetric alliance 
(i.e., major power-major power dyad and minor power-minor power dyad); and (2) asymmetric alliance 
(i.e., superpower-major power dyad, superpower-minor power dyad, and major power-minor power dyad). 
130 Based on the classification of Quackenbush (2006), this study treated as follows: the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France as a global power (1946-2000); the Soviet Union/Russia as a global power 
(1946-1991) and a regional power (1992-2000); China as a regional power (1950-2000); Germany and 
Japan as a regional power (1991-2000); and all the rest cases as a minor power. 
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democracy and autocracy.131 To control the possibility that an individual ally with a 
higher degree of regime dissimilarity to the alliance partner(s) is more likely to 
restructure the existing alliance relationship than an ally with a higher regime similarity 
to the alliance partner(s), I annually calculate the absolute value of difference in the 
regime type level by using the democracy-autocracy composite variable of the POLITY 
IV data, and include it as a control variable in my models. For a dyad in a bilateral 
alliance, I simply used the absolute value of the difference between the two allies. In the 
case of the multilateral alliance, I used the absolute value of the difference between the 
regime type value of one individual ally and the average regime type level value 
calculated as the total regime type level value of its alliance partners divided by the 
number of alliance partners. 
 
3.1.6.2.3. Alliance Portfolio Similarity 
               In international relations studies, researchers have tried to construct a measure 
of the similarity of state’s foreign policies and interests in order to test various hypotheses. 
The most widely used indicator today is the S score measured by the alliance portfolio 
similarity (Signorino and Ritter 1999).132 By using the EUGene program, I collect the 
annual S score of each dyad in both bilateral and multilateral alliances. For a dyad in a 
bilateral alliance, I simply use the value of the S score as a measure of alliance portfolio 
                                                          
131 Bret Ashley Leeds, “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International 
Cooperation,” American Journal of Political Science 43, 4 (1999): 979-1002. 
132 The S score is a spatial measure of foreign policy similarity, mainly based upon the alliance 
commitments and the UN voting records. The concept of “similarity” is very specific: the closer the two 
states’ revealed policy positions—the more “similar” their revealed policy positions. See Curtis S. 
Signorino and Jeffery M. Ritter, “Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy 
Positions,” International Studies Quarterly 43, 1 (1999): 115-144.  
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similarity. In the case of a multilateral alliance, I use the average value of the total S 
scores of all alliance partners in the alliance, divided by the number of alliance partners. 
This variable of alliance portfolio similarity is designed to control the possibility that an 
individual ally with a higher degree of alliance portfolio similarity to its alliance 
partner(s) is less likely to restructure the current alliance relationship. 
 
3.1.6.3. Other International Relations Variables 
3.1.6.3.1. Rivalry 
               Most militarized interstate conflicts and interstate wars occur between states in a 
rivalry, which is a long term competition between the specific states (Goertz and Diehl 
1993).133 Rivalries are often measured in a different manner.134 In order to investigate the 
effect of threat environment on the alliance duration, Bennett measured the average 
capabilities of all states in a militarized interstate dispute lasting at least 30 days with 
                                                          
133 Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,” 
International Studies Quarterly 37, 2 (1993): 147-171.  
134 Rivalries are mainly conceptualized in three slightly different manners. Bennett (1996, 1997, and 1998) 
and Klein, Diehl, and Goertz (2006) used the COW Project Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Data Set, 
and analyzed the frequency of militarized interstate disputes to identify enduring rivalries. Thompson 
(2001) emphasized perception of state leaders toward a specific state through historical sources and 
identified strategic rivalries. A third approach is Hewitt (2005)’s focus on the density of interstate crises by 
using the data set from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project by University of Maryland. See 
Justin Conrad and Mark Souva, “Regime Similarity and Rivalry,” International Interactions 37, 1 (2011): 
1-28; D. Scott Bennett, “Security, Bargaining, and the End of Interstate Rivalry,” International Studies 
Quarterly 40, 2 (1996): 157-183; D. Scott Bennett, “Measuring Rivalry Termination, 1816-1992,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 41, 2 (1997): 227-254; D. Scott Bennett, “Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry 
Duration,” American Journal of Political Science 42, 4 (1998): 1200-1232; James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, 
and Paul F. Diehl, “The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns,” Journal of Peace Research 43, 3 
(2006): 331-348.; William R. Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” 
International Studies Quarterly 45, 4 (2001): 557-586.; J. Joseph Hewitt, “A Crisis-Density Formation for 
Identifying Rivalries,” Journal of Peace Research 42, 2 (2005): 183-200. 
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allies in an alliance across a five year time period.135 Leeds and Savun (2007) measured 
the total capabilities of states that are in a politically relevant international environment 
with allies in an alliance after excluding the states with high ratios (over 0.775) of the S 
score (i.e., alliance portfolio similarity indicator) and the states with shared allies.136 Both 
works did not support their hypotheses, but in order to control the possibility that an 
individual ally involved in a rivalry is less likely to restructure the current alliance 
relationship, this study includes the control variable regarding rivalry. Here I apply 
Bennett’s rivalry data composing a total of 74 interstate and enduring rivalries, and I 
annually code “1” if an individual ally is in rivalry with the other states in a given year.      
 
3.1.6.3.2. Cold War 
               Leeds and Mattes (2007) evaluated a variance in the nature of alliance politics 
by using the ATOP data to include 648 alliances in the years from 1815 to 2003.137 They 
found that alliances signed during the Cold War have been more enduring on average 
than those signed earlier. Also they found a striking trend in alliance arrangement since 
the end of the Cold War from alliances formed to deal with a specific crisis or threat to 
alliances designed for any eventual threat without mentioning specific threats. Based on 
their findings, they present that alliances formed since the end of the Cold War are more 
                                                          
135 D. Scott Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984,” American Journal of 
Political Science 41, 3 (1997): 846-878. 
136 Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?,” 
Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1118-1132. 
137 Brett Ashley Leeds and Michaela Mattes, “Alliance Politics during the Cold War: Aberration, New 
World Order, or Continuation of History?” Conflict Management and Peace Science 24, 3 (2007): 183-
199.; Walt (2009) examined the alliance behaviors in a unipolar world descriptively. See Stephen Walt, 
“Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics 61, 1 (2009): 86-120. 
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likely to increase cooperation in the non-military areas, to connect bureaucratic 
organizations among the allies, and to become more durable. To control the possibility 
that the structural characteristics of the Cold War and the post-Cold War have an effect 
on state’s alliance restructuring, I create a dummy variable to distinguish alliances during 
the Cold War with alliances since the end of the Cold War. I code “1” for alliances during 
the Cold War (1946-1991) and expect that an individual ally during the Cold War period 
is more likely to restructure the existing alliance relationship than an individual ally 
during the post-Cold War period. 
 
3.1.6.4. Alliance Arrangement 
3.1.6.4.1. Non-military Cooperation 
               Neoliberal institutionalism in the IR theory pays attention to issue-linkage as a 
source of bargaining leverage by making one’s behavior on a given issue linked with 
another’s actions to other issues.138 Many alliance agreements have a clause to promote 
cooperation in non-military issues including economic cooperation.139 Such a linkage 
between security cooperation and economic cooperation possibly makes an alliance 
relationship more attractive and makes alliance restructuring more costly to the state 
leadership. To control the possibility that an individual ally is less likely to restructure 
such an alliance with non-military cooperation clauses than an alliance without these 
clauses, I use the ATOP data in order to identify whether an alliance has a clause of non-
                                                          
138 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions,” World Politics 38, 1 (1985): 226-254. 
139 Kathy L. Powers, “Regional Trade Agreements as Military Alliances,” International Interactions 30, 4 
(2004): 373-395; Andrew G. Long and Brett Ashley Leeds, “Trading for Security: Military Alliances and 
Economic Agreements,” Journal of Peace Research 43, 4 (2006): 433-451. 
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military cooperation and code “1” as a dummy variable for such an alliance.140 Leeds and 
Savun (2007) found that an alliance with the non-military cooperation clause is less likely 
to end in violation of the alliance treaty terms.141                         
 
3.1.6.4.2. Alliance Institutionalized Level 
              An alliance is designed to meet various requirements in times of both peace and 
contingencies. As a result in the degree of cooperation required by an alliance, the level 
of alliance coordination will vary from integrated joint command, deployment of military 
forces on the other allies, joint defense policy and planning, information sharing, etc. 
This variance of alliance institutionalization has an impact on a state’s alliance 
restructuring. The investment of institutionalizing an alliance is costly but the 
institutionalized alliance may prove to be valuable for the allies because there is a 
possibility that the alliances will become better able to make an easy adjustment to new 
security challenges.142 In a case such as this, the allies will have a weaker incentive to 
restructure the alliance.143 Long, Nordstrom and Baek (2007) also found that a higher 
                                                          
140 This measurement of non-military cooperation in alliances may not be able to capture the real and 
factual alliance cooperation in the non-military fields. Allies may cooperate economically with each other 
regardless of the existence or lack of non-military cooperation clause in the alliance treaties. It can be 
pointed out that there is a similar problem regarding the data of alliance institutionalization in this study. 
But there is no cross-national data based on the real and factual non-military cooperation yet. Also it is 
time-consuming to develop such a data, therefore this study uses the currently available data, as the 
previous works have. 
141 Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?,” 
Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1118-1132 
142 Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, Imperfect Unions: Security 
Institutions Over Time and Space (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
143 Another argument in favor of alliance institutionalization would be, if an alliance establishes a large 
formal bureaucracy, this inter-ally coordination mechanism will nurture a group of individuals whose 
professional perspectives and career prospects are deeply linked to the maintenance of the alliance. See 
Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39, 1 (1997): 156-179. 
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degree of alliance institutionalization will increase the duration of peace between the 
allies.144  
               To control the possibility that an individual ally in an alliance with a higher 
level of institutionalization is less likely to restructure the current alliance relationship, I 
collect information regarding whether an alliance treaty requires peacetime military 
coordination and what kinds of coordination measures are required from the ATOP 
dataset and its coding sheets. If an alliance requires the following measures: the 
establishment of a joint military command, common defense policy, or troops’ 
deployment, I code a dummy variable “2” as a highly institutionalized alliance. Then if 
an alliance requires the following measures: official military contacts, a formal military 
coordination entity, military aids, or subordination of one military to another, I code “1” 
as a moderately institutionalized alliance. Lastly I code “0” as non-existence of such 
measures.145      
 
3.1.6.5. Alliance Format 
3.1.6.5.1. Treaty 
               Leeds and Savun (2007) stated that treaty ratification may prevent the allies 
from violating the alliance treaty terms because the ratified alliance means that it was 
supported by not only the executive branch but also additional branches in the 
                                                          
144 Andrew G. Long, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kyeonghi Baek, “Allying for Peace: Treaty Obligations and 
Conflict between Allies,” Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1103-1117. 
145 This is basically the same measurement as Leeds and Savun (2007), but the difference is in the level of 
analysis, shifting from the whole alliance to the level of an individual allied member. See Brett Ashley 
Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?” Journal of 
Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1118-1132. 
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government.146 Gibler (2008) also states that governments in a state have an incentive to 
hold alliance treaty commitments because having a reputation as an alliance treaty 
violator will damage their ability to negotiate an alliance relationship in the future, 
making it much more difficult to deter potential aggressors.147 To control the possibility 
that an individual ally in a ratified alliance is less likely to restructure the current alliance 
relationship, I collect information from the ATOP data and code “1” for a member of a 
ratified alliance. 
 
3.1.6.5.2. Total Number of Allies 
               In terms of the size of alliances, Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) have suggested 
that a larger number of allies in an alliance would have a more severe collective action 
problem than a smaller number of allies in an alliance because of the free riding issue.148 
Later, Sandler (1993) stated that the size of alliances does not have a severe negative 
impact on the issue of free riding.149 Bennett (1997) tested the effect of size on alliance 
duration and found that an alliance with a larger number of allies is more likely to last 
longer than an alliance with a smaller number of alliances.150 To control the possibility 
that an individual ally in the larger number of alliances is less likely to restructure the 
                                                          
146 Leeds and Savun (2007) found no statistically significant effect of treaty ratification ending an alliance 
in a violation of the terms. See Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do 
States Abrogate Agreements?” Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1118-1132. 
147 Douglas M. Gibler, “The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 52, 3 (2008): 426-454; Beth Simmons, “Treaty Compliance and Violation,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 13 (2010): 273-296. 
148 Mancur Olsen, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics 
and Statistics 48, 3 (1966): 266-279. 
149 Todd Sandler, “The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 3 
(1993): 446-483. 
150 D. Scott Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984,” American Journal of 
Political Science 41, 3 (1997): 846-878. 
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existing alliance relationship, I annually observe the number of allies in an alliance and a 
state’s alliance restructuring.       
 
3.1.6.5.3. Wartime Alliances 
               In many cases, alliances are formed in wartime in order to achieve specific 
purposes of fighting and winning wars. Bennett (2007) investigated the possible effect of 
wartime alliances on the alliance duration and found that wartime alliances are shorter 
than alliances formed in the peacetime.151 To control a possibility that an individual ally 
in the wartime alliance is more likely to restructure the current alliance relationship, I 
code “1” for the wartime alliance and include it as control variable.  
 
3.1.7. Missing Data 
               Quantitative researchers face the issue of missing data in almost all fields of 
social science statistical analysis. If researchers leave missing data in their data set, 
statistical software will delete the entire row of information with missing data from the 
computations. In the end researchers lose large amounts of valuable information and time 
spent, and even worse the results of their models suffer from severe selection bias. If 
researchers use an average value in the variable to fill missing data, the results of their 
models are overestimated and at the same time the standard errors are too 
                                                          
151 Ibid: 846-878. 
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underestimated.152 In this statistical analysis, the data set also faced the missing data 
problem because there were some missing values in the original information sources of 
the COW CINC data,153 the democracy-autocracy composite regime level data of the 
POLITY IV,154 the winning coalition size data of the Logic of Political Survival,155 and 
the non-military cooperation and alliance institutionalization data in the ATOP data.156   
               This study divided the missing values in my data set into the following two 
categories: (1) only one or two values missing in a given state/dyad of a given alliance in 
a given year; and (2) entire values missing in a given state/dyad of a given alliance. For 
the former cases that are mainly the missing values in the COW CINC, the POLITY IV 
regime level data, and the Logic of Political Survival’s winning coalition size data, I 
                                                          
152 Gary King, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve, “Analyzing Incomplete Political 
Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation,” American Political Science Review 95, 1 
(2001): 49-69. 
153 The COW CINC data set lacks the following values (i.e., capabilities share of a given state in a given 
year in comparison with the total capabilities of whole international system): Syria (1959-1960); and 
Czechoslovakia (1993). 
154 The POLITY IV Project data set lacks the following regime type level values: Bahamas (1982-2000); 
Hungary (1956); Luxembourg (1948-2000); Barbados (1967-2000); Dominica (1979-2000); Grenada 
(1975-2000); St. Lucia (1979-2000); St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1981-2000); Antigua and Barbuda 
(1981-2000); St. Kitts and Nevis (1983-2000); Belize (1991-2000); Surinam (1977-2000); Iceland (1949-
2000); Syria (1958-1960); Lebanon (1990-2000); Kuwait (1961-1962, 1990); Laos (1953); German 
Democratic Republic (1989-1990); Tunisia (1957-1958); Malta (1964-1984); Uganda (1979); and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (1995-2000). 
155 The Logic of Political Survival data set lacks the winning coalition size values of all states in the year of 
2000. 
156 The ATOP data set lacks the alliance institutionalization information regarding the alliance between 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (1998-2000); and the non-military cooperation information in the following 
alliances: North Korea-Cuba (1986-2000); Niger-Libya (1974-1981); Guinea-Sierra Leone (1971-1986); 
Guinea-Liberia (1979-1986); Democratic Republic of Congo-Angola-Zimbabwe-Namibia (1999-2000); 
Uganda-Sudan (1972-1979); Algeria-Libya (1975-1984); Egypt-Yemen Arab Republic (1962-1967), and 
Egypt-Syria (1966-1967).  
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primarily carried over the most previous values prior to the missing data, and if the 
previous values were not available, I used the values right after the missing data.157  
               For the latter cases that are mainly the missing values in the POLITY IV regime 
type level data, and the ATOP data, I took the following approaches. First, I used the 
winning coalition size data in the Logic of Political Survival data assumed as related 
information to fill in the missing values in the POLITY IV regime level data.158 
               By applying the above mentioned methods, I filled in all missing data in my 
data set, including 20 capabilities shift related values, 674 regime change values, 620 
regime type level values, 471 regime dissimilarity values, 222 winning coalition change 
values, 154 non-military cooperation values, and 6 institutionalized level values.            
 
                                                          
157 There are a variety of methods to deal with the missing data problems. For example, Andrew Gelman 
and Jennifer Hill, “Chapter 25: Missing-data imputation,” in Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, Data 
Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007): 529-544. Recently even the open and free statistical software, called Amelia II, is available to 
fill the values of missing data. See James Honaker, Gary King, and Matthew Blackwell, “Amelia II: A 
Program for Missing Data,” Journal of Statistical Software 45, 7 (2011): 1-47. 
158 According to Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2004), winning coalition is defined as 
groups supporting political leaders in office. Without their support, political leaders cannot hold office, and 
political survival of leaders depends on whether they can secure the support from the winning coalition. 
The smaller the size of the winning coalition, the more autocratic the political system, whereas the larger 
the size of the winning coalition, the more democratic the political system. Therefore it seems able to refer 
this information for filling the missing values in the POLITY IV related variables. For more detail on the 
winning coalition size, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. 
Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003). The data of winning 
coalition size is available in the following website: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph 
Siverson, and James Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival Data Source, 
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm.  
For example, Luxembourg is given 1 as the winning coalition size value, which indicates that Luxembourg 
is the most democratic. Therefore I adopted the plus-10 value for Luxembourg’s missing data in the 
POLITY IV regime level data. Second, the missing data of non-military cooperation has been coded as 
“unknown,” and I assumed that there is no clause of non-military cooperation in the alliances. Third, I 
assumed that there is no clause on alliance institutionalization in the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan alliance 
(1998-2000) because there is a rivalry involving the border conflict in 2003 according to the ATOP data 
cord sheet. 
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3.2. Qualitative Analysis Phase 
3.2.1. Case Selection 
               The quantitative analysis chapter provides clear evidence that the stronger an 
ally becomes relative to its non-allied neighbors and external powers, the more likely this 
ally will be to restructure the alliances in which it is currently involved. It is also found 
that an ally experiencing a regime change is more likely to restructure the existing 
alliance relationship. The quantitative analysis has an advantage in identifying the causal 
effect of the independent variables on the dependent variables in a large population of 
cases, however it is still necessary to test whether a proposed causal mechanism is 
present or not through case studies, in order to build a complete causal argument. 
               As presented in the Theory chapter, my proposed causal mechanism has the 
following two parts: (1) change of leaders’ security preference on the existing alliance, 
led by change in capabilities to the non-allied neighbors/external major powers and 
domestic political regime; and (2) alliance restructuring negotiation process, initiated by a 
leader with a changed preference on the existing alliances. In order to test this mechanism, 
this chapter explains how this study selects a specific case from 142 alliances around the 
world formed between 1946 and 2000 with the observed years of 10,197.   
 
3.2.2. Selection of Typical Case 
               The goal of case studies here is not to explain a particular outcome in a specific 
historical case, but to test whether there is a proposed causal mechanism in a specific case 
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which is chosen from the findings of the quantitative analysis. Such cases, tested for this 
purpose are called “typical” cases and must represent a broader set of cases.159     
               In order to select a typical case from a population of cases, there are mainly two 
techniques. The first is to select a case with the low residuals, which is on or close to the 
regression line.160 The residual values of each case are easily calculated by statistical 
software packages such as STATA (version 13) which I use, and are often used to 
diagnose whether the dataset includes the case of an outlier. For example, a case with the 
standardized residual of greater than |2.0|161 or |2.5|162 is recommended to be excluded as 
an outlier, and a typical case is selected from cases with the low residuals.  
               The problem with simply selecting a case with low residuals as typical is that 
these are possible cases with little or no value for either theoretical interest independent 
or dependent variables. The selection of such a case as “typical” does not make sense in 
order to test a proposed causal mechanism which is supposed to link theoretical interest 
independent variables with the dependent variable.163 Therefore, the second technique 
focuses on the purpose of causal mechanism-testing through process tracing, and 
recommends that a researcher must choose a case where both theoretical interest 
independent and dependent variables are positively present.164  
                                                          
159 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007): 91.  
160 Gerring, Case Study Research: 93-96; Evan S. Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method 
Strategy for Comparative Research.” American Political Science Review 99, 3 (2005): 435-452: 444-446. 
161 Gerring, Case Study Research: 126. 
162 Paul David Allison, Multiple Regression: A Primer. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1999): 87. 
163 Derek Beach, and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. 
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013): 147. 
164 Beach, and Pedersen. Process-Tracing Methods: 146-154. 
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               The logic behind this second technique of selecting a typical case is often based 
on the comparative, set theoretic methods including the fuzzy-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA).165 In the QCA, a researcher measures all independent and 
dependent variables as fuzzy sets by categorizing them in terms of presence or absence. 
Then, the causal relationship in the cross-case analysis is assessed by comparing the 
values of cases on possible independent variables (or a combination of independent 
variables) with their values on dependent variables. When the values of cases on the 
independent variable (or a combination of variables) are greater than or equal to those on 
the dependent variable, the former (or a combination of them) is considered necessary to 
produce the outcome. When the values of cases on the independent variable (or a 
combination of independent variables) are smaller than or equal to those on the 
dependent variable, the former (or a combination of them) is considered sufficient to 
produce the outcome.166   
               This study uses a second technique to select a typical case. First on the 
dependent variable side, as presented earlier in this chapter, this study has already 
identified the total 213 cases of a state’s alliance restructuring. Second, I focus on the two 
independent variables: (1) change in capabilities to non-allied neighbors and external 
major powers; and (2) change in domestic regime. The former is a binary categorical 
variable, and it is simple to identify whether the value of this variable is present or not. 
The latter is a continuous variable with the range between the minimum value of 0 and 
                                                          
165 For detail of the QCA technique, see Charles C. Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science. (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000); Charles C. Ragin. Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008).  
166 For a recent useful review of qualitative methods including the QCA, see James Mahoney, “Qualitative 
Methodology and Comparative Politics.” Comparative Political Studies 40, 2 (2007): 122-144: 135-137. 
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the maximum value of 19, therefore I set up a threshold (i.e., greater than the mean value 
of 2.3 or not) to decide whether the condition of this variable is present enough. Table 3.1 
shows a population of all possible cases, and the case type 1 is considered as a typical 
case. 
   Table 3.1. Typology of a possible case 
Case 
type 
Two key independent variables Dependent variable 
Stronger capabilities to 
neighbors and external 
major powers 
Domestic regime change 
(shift with a greater than 
2.3 score of Polity IV) 
State’s decision to 
restructure the 
existing alliance 
Presence Absence Presence Absence Presence Absence 
Case 1 √  √  √  
Case 2 √  √   √ 
Case 3 √   √ √  
Case 4 √   √  √ 
Case 5  √ √  √  
Case 6  √ √   √ 
Case 7  √  √ √  
Case 8  √  √  √ 
 
               As a result, both conditions of two variables are present in the total 34 cases of a 
state’s alliance restructuring and these cases are listed as typical cases in Appendix 2. 
Any case in the list can be used as a typical case for testing a proposed causal mechanism. 
This study chose from the list, the Philippine case of restructuring its alliance with the 
United States in 1992 for the following three reasons. First, Asia has received and will 
continue to receive increasingly both scholarly and policy attention as one of the most 
strategically important regions in global politics.167 Second, along with the shifting 
                                                          
167 For an example of the recent scholarly work, Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot. 
Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014). For an example of policy decision maker’s attention to Asia, Hillary Clinton. “America’s Pacific 
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balance of power in Asia, the United States has been recently reinvigorating and 
strengthening its alliance ties in the region. In other words, the U.S. alliance restructuring 
is ongoing. The choice of the U.S. alliance cases in a strategically important region is 
valuable in analyzing the ongoing alliance restructuring events. Lastly, it is more 
reasonable to choose a bilateral alliance over a multilateral alliance because the research 
focus for just two states is more comparable. 
 
3.2.3. Selection of Deviant and Negative Case 
               A deviant case is defined as a case with a surprising value relative to the general 
knowledge of a topic (either a specific theory or common sense), or in other words, an 
“anomalous” case.168 The term “negative” case is also used as a similar meaning, and this 
term is defined as a case that lacks an outcome.169 The case type 2 in Table 3.1 is 
considered a deviant and negative case because the positive outcome is absent but the 
values of the two key independent variables (i.e., stronger capabilities to non-allied 
neighbors and external major powers; and domestic regime change) are positively present, 
which is very surprising. 
               The purposes of a deviant and negative case analysis are to find a possible 
omitted factor in a proposed causal mechanism, an error in the measurement and 
classification of variables, and/or to probe a new causal mechanism that might have been 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Century: The Future of Politics Will Be Decided in Asia, Not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States 
Will Be Right at the Center of the Action.” Foreign Policy 189 (2011): 56–63. 
168 Gerring, Case Study Research: 105-106. 
169 James Mahoney, and Gary Goertz. “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative 
Research.” American Political Science Review 98, 4 (2004): 653-669: 654. 
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previously overlooked.170 When a researcher conducts a theory-centric study on cases 
that he/she hopes to generalize from a large population of cases, it will be consequential 
to conduct a deviant and negative case analysis for testing a proposed causal mechanism.  
               I set up a list of negative outcome cases with the presence of positive values in 
the two key independent variables,171 and further narrowed them following a 
recommendation that a deviant and negative case should be similar to a typical and 
positive case in as many features (including temporal periods and spatial units) as 
possible except for the value on the dependent variable.172 In order to maximize a 
similarity to my typical case (i.e., the U.S.-Philippine alliance in 1992), I have applied the 
same exact thresholds which were adopted in the selection process for a typical case to all 
remaining cases except the U.S.-Philippine alliance: (1) U.S. involved alliances; (2) 
bilateral alliances; and (3) a state located in Asia.  
               As a result, possible deviant and negative cases were identified as follows: (1) 
South Korea in the alliance with the United States from 1960 to 1980 and from 1987 to 
2000; and (2) Pakistan in the alliance with the United States from 1963 to 1970, in 1976, 
from 1985 to 1998. Considering the temporal periods, South Korea from 1987 to 2000 
and Pakistan from 1985 to 1998 are similar to the Philippines in 1992. In terms of spatial 
                                                          
170 Gerring, Case Study Research, p. 106; Alexander L. George, and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and 
Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) 
Studies in International Security. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005): 252; Beach, and Pedersen. Process-
Tracing Methods: 155. 
171 The total number of negative outcome cases with the presence of positive values in the two key 
independent variables is 1,837. If the values of two key independent variables is absent and then the 
outcome of case is negative, there is no surprise about these cases and they are not relevant to a theory-
centric process-tracing. The purpose is to exclude such negative but irrelevant cases, and the total of 8,147 
cases were excluded. Mahoney and Goertz. “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in 
Comparative Research”: 657-658. 
172 Mahoney and Goertz. “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research”: 
654-655. 
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units, South Korea is located in East Asia like the Philippines, while Pakistan is located 
in West Asia. Therefore, I have chosen South Korea in the alliance with the U.S. from 
1987 to 2000 as a deviant and negative case for this study. I especially focus on the 
emergence of President Kim Dae-Jung, who was supported by a new liberal winning 
coalition different from those in the past, in 1998, and his policy toward the alliance with 
the United States.    
 
3.2.4. Testing a Case outside the Population  
               Following both positive and negative case studies analysis, this study also 
attempts to apply this proposed theory of alliance restructuring to a case outside the 
population of cases. A proposed theory of alliance restructuring has been built based on 
the data regarding alliances formed in the period between 1946 and 2000. This theory 
should be capable of explaining as many cases of a state’s alliance restructuring 
behaviors as possible in the same time period, but it has not yet necessarily presented 
whether this proposed theory of alliance restructuring is generalizable to a case outside 
the population of cases. In order to test the external validity of the proposed theory of 
alliance restructuring, this dissertation will conduct a third case study regarding the 
emergence of the Democratic Party of Japan in 2009, which is often characterized as a 
historical replacement of Japanese ruling parties, and its policy toward the U.S.-Japan 
alliance.       
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3.2.5. Testing a Proposed Causal Mechanism 
               Three case studies chapters test a proposed causal mechanism in the following 
three cases: (1) the Philippines in the alliance with the United States in 1992; (2) South 
Korea in the alliance with the United States in 1998; and (3) Japan in the alliance with the 
United States in 2009. The chapters of 6 to 8 will be organized in three main sections. In 
the first section I present quantitative evidence regarding whether the two key 
independent variables: (1) stronger capabilities to non-allied neighbors and external 
major powers; and (2) domestic regime change, have actually changed since the alliance 
formation, and how they have shifted over time.    
               In the second section I examine the first stage of a proposed causal mechanism. 
It is assumed that a state allies with another state in order to achieve a certain objective 
and as long as conditions, external or internal, at the time of alliance formation remain 
the same, a state will have no incentive to restructure the existing alliance. In order to 
identify whether a state leader changed security preferences on the combination of arms 
and allies, I present two sets of historical evidence. The first set focuses on what 
“objectives” a state leader at the time of alliance formation has sought to achieve, and 
what combination of its own arms and allied support a state leader at the time of alliance 
formation has expected in order to achieve the objectives. Then for the second set of 
historical evidence, this section presents whether and how the two key independent 
variables have changed the initial objectives in forming the alliances and the initial 
security preferences on the combination of arms and allies.   
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               The third section examines the second stage of a proposed causal mechanism: 
an alliance restructuring bargaining. The changes in an alliance objective and a state 
leader’s security preference are not straightforwardly equal to the actual outcomes of 
alliance restructuring. The actual outcomes of alliance restructuring will be the result of 
strategic interactions between the allies, and I consider these strategic interactions as 
bargaining. In this third section, I show whether a bargaining negotiation of alliance 
restructuring has occurred and how this bargaining process has played out between the 
allies until the negotiation completes either in the form of alliance restructuring or the 
status quo.  
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4. Quantitative Analysis 
               This chapter provides statistical evidence on the significant and substantial 
correlation between specific capabilities change and domestic political change variables 
and the state’s alliance restructuring. The first section focuses on capabilities change 
variables and shows which ones are statistically significant and substantial to the state’s 
alliance restructuring. The second section provides statistical evidence regarding the 
domestic political change variables’ effects on the state’s alliance restructuring. Lastly, 
the chapter summarizes the findings in conclusion. 
 
4.1. Results on Capabilities Change Variables 
4.1.1. Significant Effects of Capabilities Change 
               This section examines the correlation between six capabilities shift related 
variables and a state’s alliance restructuring with and without controlling variables. As 
shown in Table 4.1., three independent variables have asterisks or stars, after them. This 
means that this bivariate analysis has identified correlations between the state’s alliance 
restructuring and the following three independent variables at the statistical significant 
level: (1) percentage change of relative capabilities in comparison with the non-allied 
neighbors and external powers (Model 3); (2) an increase in relative capabilities in 
comparison with the non-allied neighbors and external powers (Model 4); and (3) 
increase in relative capabilities of allies in comparison with the non-allied neighbors and 
external powers (Model 6).   
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               For the first variable in Model 3, the coefficient of the percentage change of 
relative capabilities in comparison with non-allied neighbors and external powers is 
minus 0.15. This can be interpreted as that with each additional percentage change of 
relative capabilities in comparison with the non-allied neighbors and external powers the 
probability of a state’s alliance restructuring goes “down,” on average, by 0.15 points. 
This result is contrary to the theoretical direction expected in Hypothesis 2 (i.e., the 
probability of a state’s alliance restructuring goes “up.”). Also this coefficient has a 
single asterisk, indicating a coefficient whose p value is less than 0.10. This can be 
interpreted as that if the percentage change of relative capabilities in comparison with 
non-allied neighbors and external powers really has no effect on a state’s alliance 
restructuring, then the probability of finding a coefficient larger than 0.15 (or smaller 
than minus 0.15) is less than one in a ten.   
               The increase in relative capabilities in comparison with the non-allied neighbors 
and external powers in Model 4 is a dummy variable. The coefficient is plus 0.47, and 
this can be interpreted as that when a state becomes more powerful in comparison with 
non-allied neighbors and external powers since the alliance formation, this state likely 
restructures the existing alliance relationship approximately 0.47 points higher than when 
a state becomes more weakened.173 The coefficient has three asterisks, indicating a 
coefficient whose p value is less than 0.01, and this can be interpreted as that the being 
                                                          
173 For a dummy variable, how much it changes for a one unit increase in the independent variable simply 
means a one unit increase from 0 to 1. This implies that the coefficient can be interpreted as the average 
value of the dependent variable for all the allies with a value of 1 on the dummy variable minus the average 
value of the dependent variable for all the allies with a value of 0 on the dummy variable, controlling for 
the other variables in the model. See Paul David Allison, Multiple Regression: A Primer (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Pine Forge Press, 1999): 27-29. 
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coefficient is highly significant and there is strong evidence for a nonzero coefficient for 
this variable.174 If this variable really has no effect on a state’s alliance restructuring, the 
probability of finding a coefficient larger than 0.47 (or smaller than minus 0.47) is less 
than one in a hundred. The finding is also in the theoretically expected direction in 
Hypothesis 2 (i.e., the probability of a state’s alliance restructuring goes “up.”).   
               The increase in relative capabilities of allies in comparison with non-allied 
neighbors and external powers in Model 6 is also a dummy variable. The coefficient is 
plus 0.49, and this can be interpreted as that when state X’s ally Y becomes more 
powerful in comparison with the non-allied neighbors and external powers since the 
alliance formation, then state X likely restructures the existing alliance relationship 
approximately 0.49 points higher than when ally Y becomes more weakened. The 
coefficient has three asterisks (p value is less than 0.01), and this can be interpreted as 
that the coefficient is highly significant and there is strong evidence for a nonzero 
coefficient for this variable. The finding is shown in the theoretically expected direction 
in Hypothesis 3 (i.e., the probability of a state’s alliance restructuring goes “up.”).   
               As a result of the bivariate analysis, capabilities changes among the allies inside 
alliances are not significant to a state’s alliance restructuring (Hypothesis 1). The two 
capabilities change variables related to non-allied neighbors and external powers are 
statistically significant (Hypothesis 2). While the dummy variable’s coefficient is positive 
in the theoretically expected direction, the percentage change variable’s coefficient is 
negative and contrary to the theoretically expected direction. This result can be 
                                                          
174 Paul David Allison, Multiple Regression: A Primer (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1999): 14-
16. 
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interpreted as that a state is not likely to restructure the existing alliance relationship in a 
proportional way in that a state’s relative capabilities are becoming stronger in 
comparison with the non-allied neighbors and external powers, but a more favorable 
environment itself in terms of relative capabilities to non-allied neighbors and external 
powers gives a state greater incentive to restructure an alliance. For Hypothesis 3, only 
the dummy variable’s coefficient is positive in the theoretically expected direction. This 
can be interpreted as that the ally’s increasing power also nurtures a more favorable 
condition, which leads to a state’s alliance restructuring. 
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Table 4.1.: Capabilities change factors influencing the state's alliance restructuring-
without control variables, 1946-2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Capabilities  
change 
variables 
capabilities 
change to allies 
 
 
 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
     
       
stronger to 
allies 
 -0.06 
(0.15) 
    
       
capabilities 
change to 
neighbors 
  -0.15* 
(0.09) 
   
       
stronger to 
neighbors 
   0.47*** 
(0.16) 
  
       
capabilities 
change of allies 
to neighbors 
    -0.08 
(0.10) 
 
       
allies stronger 
to neighbors 
     0.49*** 
(0.15) 
       
Time 
dependence 
      
alliance years 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 0.12* 0.14** 0.11 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
       
spline1 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
spline2 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
spline3 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
Constant -4.44*** -4.42*** -4.43*** -4.60*** -4.43*** -4.63*** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.25) 
Observations 10197 10197 10197 10197 10197 10197 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4.2.: Capabilities change factors influencing the state's alliance restructuring-with 
control variables, 1946-2000 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 
13 
Capabilities  
change 
variables 
capabilities 
change to allies 
 
 
-0.00 
(0.10) 
      
        
stronger to allies  0.11 
(0.16) 
    -0.05 
(0.20) 
        
capabilities 
change to 
neighbors 
  -0.11 
(0.09) 
    
        
stronger to 
neighbors 
   0.75*** 
(0.17) 
  0.77*** 
(0.20) 
        
capabilities 
change of allies 
to neighbors 
    -0.11 
(0.12) 
  
        
allies stronger to 
neighbors 
     0.37** 
(0.17) 
0.36* 
(0.19) 
        
Individual ally 
state 
characteristics 
       
regime change 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
        
regime type 
level 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
        
Inter-allies 
relationship 
       
symmetric ally 1.18*** 1.20*** 1.21*** 1.11*** 1.26*** 1.04*** 0.96*** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) 
        
regime 
dissimilarity 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
        
alliance 
portfolio 
similarity 
-0.91*** 
(0.30) 
-0.90*** 
(0.30) 
-0.93*** 
(0.30) 
-0.81*** 
(0.30) 
-0.91*** 
(0.30) 
-0.87*** 
(0.30) 
-0.78** 
(0.31) 
        
Other 
International 
Relations 
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rivalry -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.16 -0.04 -0.17 -0.25 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) 
        
Cold War 0.48** 0.49** 0.42** 0.61*** 0.44** 0.53** 0.68*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) 
        
Alliance 
arrangement 
       
non-military 
cooperation 
0.26 
(0.24) 
0.27 
(0.24) 
0.26 
(0.24) 
0.38 
(0.24) 
0.26 
(0.24) 
0.30 
(0.23) 
0.41* 
(0.24) 
        
institutionalized 
level 
0.28** 
(0.12) 
0.28** 
(0.12) 
0.31** 
(0.12) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
0.29** 
(0.12) 
0.27** 
(0.12) 
0.21* 
(0.13) 
        
Alliance format        
treaty 0.26 0.26 0.20 0.28 0.19 0.27 0.28 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) 
        
total number of 
allies 
-0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.16*** 
(0.02) 
-0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.16*** 
(0.02) 
-0.17*** 
(0.02) 
        
wartime alliance -0.18 
(0.46) 
-0.18 
(0.47) 
-0.20 
(0.47) 
-0.16 
(0.51) 
-0.22 
(0.47) 
-0.10 
(0.47) 
-0.08 
(0.51) 
        
Time 
dependence 
       
alliance years 0.17** 0.17** 0.17** 0.14* 0.18** 0.16** 0.13* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
        
spline1 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 0.00** 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
        
spline2 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
        
spline3 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
        
Constant -4.88*** -4.94*** -4.83*** -5.34*** -4.89*** -5.01*** -5.47*** 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.53) (0.50) (0.50) (0.53) 
Observations 10197 10197 10197 10197 10197 10197 10197 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
               The statistical results in the bivariate analysis may be influenced by other 
factors, which possibly have an effect on the relationship between the capabilities change 
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variables and a state’s alliance restructuring. In order to control the potential factors, 
Table 4.2 (Models 7 to 13) incorporates the various control variables including the 
individual ally’s state characteristics, inter-allies relationship, other international relations, 
alliance arrangement, and alliance format.175 As a result, the coefficient of the percentage 
change of relative capabilities in comparison with non-allied neighbors and external 
powers loses statistical significance (i.e., no asterisk), as shown in Model 9. This can be 
interpreted as that the result in the bivariate analysis was disturbed by previously 
“uncontrolled” variables, and that the result of the multiple regression analysis including 
control variables revealed a more accurate relationship between the capabilities change 
variables and the state’s alliance restructuring.176  
               For the remaining two variables, even though the control variables are included 
in the models, the two variables: (1) state X that experienced stronger capabilities shift in 
comparison with non-allied neighbors and external powers (see Models 10 and 13); and 
                                                          
175 Before I run the models in the STATA (version 13), I checked if there is near-extreme multicollinearity 
(i.e., a highly, not perfect though, correlated relations) among the independent variables. The issue of near-
extreme multicollinearity is a matter of degree but if there is high degree of near-extreme multicollinearity 
among certain independent variables, the results of coefficient estimates become unreliable. I measured two 
indexes: (1) variance inflation factor (VIF); and (2) tolerance (TOL), for the multicollinearity diagnosis. If 
the VIF index is larger than 2.50 and the TOL index is smaller than 0.40, these indexes indicate an 
existence of near-extreme multicollinearity among independent variables. Appendix 3 shows the diagnostic 
result of near-extreme multicollinearity. In this data set, the highest value of VIF is 2.01 of the variable 
Alliance portfolio similarity in Models 11 and 13, and the lowest of TOL is 0.4968 of the variable Alliance 
portfolio similarity in Model 11. Therefore, I do not see a near-extreme multicollinearity in the data set and 
it is not necessary to exclude any independent variables listed. For the multicollinearity diagnosis, see Paul 
David Allison, Multiple Regression: A Primer (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1999): 141-142. 
176 If a regression equation is properly specified, we should not be able to find any additional significant 
independent variables except by chance. One kind of specification error is called a link error, which means 
that the dependent variable needs a transformation or “link” function to properly relate to the independent 
variables. The link test check by STATA (version 13) adds a new independent variable (i.e., the variable of 
squared prediction, _hatsq) to the equation that is especially likely to be significant if there is a link error. 
As the result of above link test, all values of _hatsq are not significant (i.e., over 0.100). In other words, the 
link test failed to reject the assumption that a model is properly specified. Appendix 4 shows the diagnostic 
result of model specification error, and the lowest value of _hatsq is 0.628 of Model 12. Therefore, the link 
test finds no specification error in Models 7 to 13. 
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(2) allies Y that experienced stronger capabilities shift in comparison with non-allied 
neighbors and external powers (see Models 12 and 13) remain statistically significant in 
the theoretically expected direction. While the latter variable shows a lower level of 
statistical significance (i.e., one and two asterisks) than the result of bivariate analysis 
(i.e., three asterisks), especially the first variable maintains three asterisks (p value is less 
than 0.01). This result can be interpreted as that the coefficient is highly significant and 
there is strong evidence for a nonzero coefficient for this variable.  
               The findings of these two capabilities change variables are important for the 
following two major reasons. First, the previous works have simply assumed that both 
capabilities increase and decrease have an equal effect on the last stage of alliances, 
however this study has revealed that the specific direction of capabilities change does 
matter. The analysis has provided strong evidence that an increase (not decrease) of 
capabilities in comparison specifically to the non-allied neighbors and external powers 
has an effect on a state’s alliance restructuring. Secondly, this study has identified that 
when a state restructures their existing alliance relationship, it does care about the power 
comparison with its neighbors and external major powers. The previous works were not 
clear whether capabilities change relative to the alliance partners or the neighbors has an 
impact on the last stage of alliances. These two findings can be used for the case selection 
procedures, to identify which cases of a state’s alliance restructuring are typical.      
               On the side of control variables, all coefficients of the regime change variable 
from Models 7 through 13 are statistically highly significant in the theoretically expected 
direction at the 0.01 level. It can be interpreted as that with each additional cardinal 
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change of domestic regime (whether democratization or authoritarianization) since 
alliance formation, the probability of a state’s alliance restructuring goes “up,” on 
average, by 0.12 to 0.13 points. The effects of the regime change variable are further 
examined in the section of domestic political change variables. 
               For the regime type level variable, this study did not find a strong correlation 
between the regime type level and the state’s alliance restructuring at the statistically 
significant level with the exception of Models 10 and 13. The positive coefficient of 
regime type level can be interpreted as that the more democratic the states, the more 
likely the states are to restructure their current alliances. Some previous works do provide 
strong evidence that democratic allies are more reliable in forming and maintaining 
alliances,177 while other works do not.178 The results of this study support the latter camp 
but the results themselves are not statistically significant.    
               The inter-allies relationship variables overall have a significant effect on the 
state’s alliance restructuring. First, the previous works found that the duration of a 
symmetric alliance is shorter than those of an asymmetric alliance.179 This study supports 
their arguments because the coefficients of the symmetric ally variable are positive and 
                                                          
177 Randolph M. Siverson, and Juliann Emmons. “Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and 
Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, 2 (1991): 285–306.; Kurt 
Taylor Gaubatz. “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations.” International 
Organization 50, 1 (1996): 109–39.; Brett Ashley Leeds, and Burcu Savun. “Terminating Alliances: Why 
Do States Abrogate Agreements?” Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1118–32. 
178 Alastair Smith. “To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
40, 1 (1996): 16–40.; Dan Reiter, and Allan C. Stam. Democracies at War. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2002); Erik Gartzke, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. “Why Democracies May Actually Be 
Less Reliable Allies.” American Journal of Political Science 48, 4 (2004): 775–95. 
179 James D. Morrow. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of 
Alliances.” American Journal of Political Science 35, 4 (1991): 904–33.; Brett Ashley Leeds, and Burcu 
Savun. “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?” Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 
1118–32.  
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statistically significant in all Models. Second, it has been previously found that the 
similar regime dyads (regardless of democracies or autocracies) cooperate more readily 
than mixed dyads between democracy and autocracy,180 but this study finds no statistical 
significant evidence on the regime dissimilarity variable. Lastly, this study found that a 
higher degree of alliance portfolio similarity reduces the probability of a state’s alliance 
restructuring at the statistically significant level in the theoretically expected direction in 
all models. 
               In the category of other international relations, the allies in a rivalry relation 
with other countries are less likely to restructure their existing alliance but this finding is 
not statistically significant at all. This study shares the results of previous works.181 For 
the Cold War variable, all models 7-13 show a statistically significant relationship with 
the state’s alliance restructuring. As the previous work reports,182 this study also found 
that alliance behaviors are different for years between the Cold War and the post-Cold 
War periods. 
               Both two variables for alliance management are contrary to the theoretically 
expected direction. At least it can be interpreted that non-military cooperation has no 
significant effect on alliance restructuring, while a higher degree of institutionalization is 
associated with the alliance restructuring at the statistically significant level.     
                                                          
180 Brett Ashley Leeds. “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International 
Cooperation.” American Journal of Political Science 43, 4 (1999): 979–1002. 
181 D. Scott Bennett. “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984.” American Journal of 
Political Science. 41, 3 (1997): 846–78.; Brett Ashley Leeds, and Burcu Savun. “Terminating Alliances: 
Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?” Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1118–32. 
182 Brett Ashley Leeds, and Michaela Mattes. “Alliance Politics during the Cold War: Aberration, New 
World Order, or Continuation of History?” Conflict Management and Peace Science 24, 3 (2007): 183–99. 
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               Lastly, for format control variables, only one variable, the total number of allies, 
is statistically significant in the theoretically expected direction through all models at the 
0.01 level. These results can be interpreted as that with each additional number of allies 
in the alliances since the formation, the probability of a state’s alliance restructuring goes 
“down,” on average, by 0.15 to 0.17 points, and supports the previous work’s finding.183 
The coefficient for the treaty variable is positive and contrary to the theoretically 
expected direction. The results indicate that the allies in ratified alliances are more likely 
to restructure the current alliance relationship than the allies in non-ratified alliances (e.g., 
executive agreements), but they are not statistically significant. The results of the wartime 
alliance variable suggests that a wartime ally is less likely to restructure the existing 
alliance relationship but these results are not statistically significant at all. 
 
4.1.2. Predicted Effects of Capabilities Change Variables  
               Tables 4.1 and 4.2 explore whether each independent variable is statistically 
significant in the theoretically expected direction. But it does not fully capture the degree 
of effect for each independent variable on a state’s alliance restructuring. Figure 4.1 
illustrates percent changes for each independent variable in Model 13 of Table 4.2 on a 
state’s alliance restructuring. The dark color portion of each bar shows the percentage 
increase or decrease from a shift in each independent variable from its 25th to its 75th 
percentile (or from 0 to 1 in the case of dummy variables), while holding all other 
variables constant at their means or medians. The light color portion of each bar 
                                                          
183 D. Scott Bennett. “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984.” American Journal of 
Political Science. 41, 3 (1997): 846–78. 
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represents the additional effect on a state’s alliance restructuring caused by a further shift 
from the 10th to 90th percentile. 
 
 
               As Figure 4.1 shows, the stronger capabilities shift in comparison with the non-
allied neighbors and external powers since the alliance formation has a substantial impact 
on the state’s alliance restructuring, while holding all other variables constant. When a 
state becomes more powerful relative to the non-allied neighbors and external powers, 
the expected probability of this state’s alliance restructuring increases by 115.8%. While 
ally Y’s capabilities increase has a relatively small effect (i.e., plus 43.5 %) on the state 
X’s restructuring behaviors, a direct capabilities balance between state X and ally Y has 
almost no impact (i.e., minus 5.4%) on the state X’s alliance restructuring.    
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               The regression analysis found that the following six control variables are 
statistically significant in all models of 7 to 13: (1) regime change; (2) symmetric ally; (3) 
alliance portfolio similarity; (4) Cold War; (5) institutionalized level; and (6) total 
number of allies. First, a change in regime type since the alliance formation from its 25th 
to its 75th percentile (from 0 to 3 in the scale of the POLITY IV) increases the probability 
of a state’s alliance restructuring by 44.5%. A further change from its 10th to its 90th 
percentile (from 0 to 9 in the scale of the POLITY IV) more than triples the predicted 
probability of a state’s alliance restructuring (i.e., 157.4%). It can be interpreted that even 
a small level of domestic regime change is significantly and substantially associated with 
the state’s alliance restructuring, and the effect increases proportionally when the 
domestic regime changes drastically. 
               Secondly, a symmetric alliance member is far more likely to restructure the 
current alliance by 162.9% than an asymmetric alliance member. Thirdly, when the 
alliance portfolio similarity variable increases from its 25th to its 75th percentile (from 
0.9 to 1 in the scale of the S score), the probability of the state’s alliance restructuring 
decreases by 10.8%. A further change from its 10th to its 90th percentile (from 0.5 to 1 in 
the scale of the S score) approximately doubles the predicted probability of a state’s 
alliance restructuring. This result can be interpreted as that when states have a similar 
portfolio of their allies, these states are less likely to restructure the current alliances, but 
the similarity of alliance portfolio has a limited effect (only 19.5%) on the state’s alliance 
restructuring. Fourthly, an individual ally during the Cold War period is approximately 
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97% more likely to restructure the existing alliance relationship than an individual ally 
during the post-Cold War period.  
               Fifthly, if an alliance increases the level of institutionalization from the non-
existence of such measures to a moderately institutionalized alliance (e.g., official 
military contacts, formal military coordination entity, military aids, or subordination of 
one military to another), the probability of alliance restructuring decided by an ally in 
such an alliance increases by 23.7%. A further deepening of the institutionalized level 
including the establishment of a joint military command, common defense policy, or 
troops’ deployment increases the probability of a state’s alliance restructuring by 29.2%. 
Lastly, an increase in the total number of allies in an alliance from its 25th to 75th 
percentile (from 2 to 20 allies) reduces the predicted probability of a state’s alliance 
restructuring by 94.8%, while a further increase from 2 to 31 allies reduces the predicted 
probability of a state’s alliance restructuring by only a further 1.5%. 
               All other control variables are not significant through the models or no 
significance at all. 
 
4.2. Results on Domestic Political Change Variables 
4.2.1. Significant Effects of Domestic Political Change 
               Table 4.3 shows that all three domestic political change variables are 
statistically significant in the theoretically expected direction. While the effect of winning 
coalition change seems unstable, the remaining two domestic political changes of 
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political regime and ruling government are significantly and stably associated with the 
state’s alliance restructuring.  
               For the regime change variable, the coefficients are plus 0.09 to plus 0.12. This 
can be interpreted as that with each additional cardinal change of domestic regime level 
since the alliance formation, the probability of a state’s alliance restructuring goes “up,” 
on average, by 0.09 to 0.12 points. These results support the theoretical direction 
expected in Hypothesis 4 (i.e., the probability of a state’s alliance restructuring goes 
“up.”). All these coefficients have three asterisks, indicating a coefficient whose p value 
is less than 0.01. This can be interpreted as that if the domestic regime change really has 
no effect on a state’s alliance restructuring, the probability of finding a coefficient larger 
than 0.09 to 0.12 (or smaller than minus 0.09 to 0.12) is less than one in a hundred. These 
results are highly statistically significant.   
               The variable of government change (both leadership and supporting coalitions) 
is a dummy variable. The coefficients are plus 0.57 to plus 1.05, and these results can be 
interpreted as that when a state experiences government change since alliance formation, 
this state restructures the existing alliance relationship approximately 0.57 to 0.89 points 
greater than when a state does not experience government change. The coefficient has 
three asterisks, indicating a coefficient whose p value is less than 0.01, and this can be 
interpreted as the coefficient being highly significant and there is strong evidence for a 
nonzero coefficient to this variable. If this variable really has no effect on a state’s 
alliance restructuring, the probability of finding a coefficient larger than 0.57 to 0.89 (or 
smaller than minus 0.57 to minus 0.89) is less than one in a hundred. The finding is in the 
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theoretically expected direction in Hypothesis 6 (i.e., the probability of a state’s alliance 
restructuring goes “up.”).   
               The variable of winning coalition size change is statistically significant except 
in Model 21, which includes all three domestic political change variables.184 In 
comparison with the regime change and government change variables, the winning 
coalition size change variable shows that the statistical results are slightly less stable.  
               The findings of these domestic political change variables are important for the 
following two reasons. First, the previous works did not differentiate in their study 
between the following two cases: (1) state X is more likely to restructure the existing 
alliance with ally Y because state X experienced a domestic political change; and (2) ally 
Y is more likely to restructure the existing alliance with state X because state X 
experienced a domestic political change.185 This study provides strong evidence 
supporting the former case. Second, contrary to a systemic or structural theory of 
alliances, the results of my study strongly suggest that international factors alone such as 
capabilities change are insufficient in explaining the state’s alliance restructuring and 
justify that domestic political change factors since the alliance formation must be 
included in order to construct a theory of alliance restructuring.     
                                                          
184 I checked if there is a near-extreme multicollinearity in the same manner as before. As I explained 
previously, if the VIF index is larger than 2.50 and the TOL index is smaller than 0.40, these indexes 
indicate an existence of near-extreme multicollinearity among independent variables. Appendix 5 shows 
that the highest value of VIF is 2.02 of the variable Alliance portfolio similarity in Models 19-21. The 
lowest of TOL is 0.4951 of the variable Alliance portfolio similarity in Model 21. Therefore, I do not see a 
near-extreme multicollinearity in the data set and it is not necessary to exclude any independent variables. 
185 Randolph M. Siverson, and Harvey Starr. “Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances.” 
American Journal of Political Science 38, 1 (1994): 145–61.; D. Scott Bennett. “Testing Alternative 
Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984.” American Journal of Political Science. 41, 3 (1997): 846–78.; 
Brett Ashley Leeds, and Burcu Savun. “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?” 
Journal of Politics 69, 4 (2007): 1118–32. 
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               On the sides of control variables, all coefficients of regime type level are 
positive and statistically significant. This result indicates that a more democratic state is 
likely to restructure the existing alliance relationship, but the fluctuation of the statistical 
significant level through the models from 0.10, 0.05 to 0.01 indicates that the effect of 
regime type level on the state’s alliance restructuring is not stable. 
               Among the capabilities change variables, only one variable is found statistically 
and stably significant. When state X grows more powerful relative to the neighbors and 
external powers since the alliance formation, the state is more likely to restructure the 
existing alliance relationship. This result supports Hypothesis 2.   
               The analysis in this section also identified that the following four control 
variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level at least through all models of 14 to 
21: (1) symmetric ally; (2) alliance portfolio similarity; (3) Cold War; and (4) total 
number of allies. As examined in the previous section, all four were also identified in the 
analysis of capabilities change. Therefore, it can be interpreted as that the effects of the 
four variables on the state’s alliance restructuring are very stable.186  
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
186 I checked if there is a specification error in Models 13 and 17 to 21, and Appendix 6 shows the link test 
results of these six Models. As a result of the above link test, all values of _hatsq except in Models 17, 18 
and 20 are not significant (i.e., over 0.100). In other words, the link test except in Models 17, 18 and 20 
failed to reject the assumption that a model is improperly specified. Therefore, the link test finds no 
specification error in Models 13, 19 and 21, while it finds a misspecification in Models 17, 18 and 20. 
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Table 4.3.: Domestic political change factors influencing the state's alliance restructuring, 
1946-2000 
 Model 
14 
Model 
15 
Model 
16 
Model 
13 
Model 
17 
Model 
18 
Model 
19 
Model 
20 
Model 
21 
Domestic 
political 
change 
variables 
regime change 
 
 
 
 
0.12*** 
   
 
 
 
0.12*** 
   
 
 
 
0.11*** 
  
 
 
 
0.09*** 
 (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)  (0.03) 
          
winning 
coalition 
change 
 1.34*** 
(0.34) 
  2.31*** 
(0.49) 
  1.95*** 
(0.46) 
0.57 
(0.72) 
          
government 
change 
  0.57*** 
(0.16) 
  0.89*** 
(0.20) 
0.59*** 
(0.21) 
0.67*** 
(0.21) 
0.57*** 
(0.21) 
          
Individual ally 
state 
characteristics 
         
regime type 
level 
   0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
          
Capabilities 
change 
variables 
         
stronger to 
allies 
   -0.05 
(0.20) 
0.07 
(0.20) 
0.08 
(0.21) 
0.00 
(0.20) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
          
stronger to 
neighbors 
   0.77*** 
(0.20) 
0.60*** 
(0.20) 
0.71*** 
(0.20) 
0.75*** 
(0.20) 
0.60*** 
(0.20) 
0.71*** 
(0.20) 
          
allies stronger 
to neighbors 
   0.36* 
(0.19) 
0.32* 
(0.18) 
0.29 
(0.19) 
0.40** 
(0.19) 
0.34* 
(0.19) 
0.39** 
(0.19) 
          
Inter-allies 
relationship 
         
symmetric ally    0.96*** 1.08*** 1.06*** 0.88*** 0.96*** 0.88*** 
    (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) 
          
regime 
dissimilarity 
   0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
          
alliance 
portfolio 
similarity 
   -0.78** 
(0.31) 
-0.87*** 
(0.29) 
-0.77** 
(0.33) 
-0.74** 
(0.32) 
-0.80** 
(0.31) 
-0.75** 
(0.32) 
          
Other 
International 
Relations 
         
rivalry    -0.25 -0.25 -0.35 -0.31 -0.32 -0.30 
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    (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
          
Cold War    0.68*** 0.55** 0.46** 0.69*** 0.56** 0.69*** 
    (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Alliance 
arrangement 
         
non-military 
cooperation 
   0.41* 
(0.24) 
0.47* 
(0.26) 
0.43* 
(0.26) 
0.50** 
(0.25) 
0.56** 
(0.27) 
0.52** 
(0.26) 
          
institutionalized 
level 
   0.21* 
(0.13) 
0.12 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
0.23* 
(0.13) 
0.14 
(0.13) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
          
Alliance format          
treaty    0.28 0.28 0.37 0.28 0.27 0.26 
    (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
          
total number of 
allies 
   -0.17*** 
(0.02) 
-0.17*** 
(0.02) 
-0.17*** 
(0.02) 
-0.17*** 
(0.02) 
-0.18*** 
(0.02) 
-0.17*** 
(0.02) 
          
wartime 
alliance 
   -0.08 
(0.51) 
-0.13 
(0.51) 
-0.55 
(0.54) 
-0.19 
(0.54) 
-0.25 
(0.53) 
-0.16 
(0.54) 
          
Time 
dependence 
         
alliance years 0.12* 0.13* 0.11 0.13* 0.15* 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
          
spline1 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
          
spline2 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
          
spline3 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
          
Constant -4.49*** -4.46*** -4.45*** -5.47*** -5.26*** -5.24*** -5.52*** -5.30*** -5.50*** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.53) (0.52) (0.52) (0.54) (0.53) (0.54) 
Observations 10197 10197 10197 10197 10197 10197 10197 10197 10197 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
4.2.2 Predicted Effects of Domestic Political Change 
               Figure 4.2 illustrates percent changes for each independent variable in Model 21 
of Table 4.3 on the state’s alliance restructuring. The dark collar portion of each bar 
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shows the percentage increase or decrease from a shift in each independent variable from 
its 25th to its 75th percentile (or from 0 to 1 in the case of dummy variables), while 
holding all other variables constant at their means or medians. The light collar portion of 
each bar represents the additional effect on a state’s alliance restructuring caused by a 
further shift from the 10th to 90th percentile. 
 
               As Figure 4.2 shows in the category of domestic political change, a regime 
change since the alliance formation from its 25th to its 75th percentile (from 0 to 3 in the 
scale of the POLITY IV) increases the probability of a state’s alliance restructuring by 
32.2%. A further change from its 10th to its 90th percentile (from 0 to 9 in the scale of the 
POLITY IV) triples the predicted probability. The dummy variable of government 
change since the alliance formation also has a substantial impact on the state’s alliance 
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restructuring, while holding all other variables constant. When a government change 
occurs, the state is more likely to restructure the existing alliance relationship by 77.3%. 
               Among the capabilities change variables, the dummy variable of stronger 
capabilities shift in comparison with the neighbors and external powers since the alliance 
formation has a substantial impact on the state’s alliance restructuring, while holding all 
other variables constant. When a state become more powerful relative to the neighbors, 
the expected probability of the state’s alliance restructuring increases by 103.2%.   
 
4.3. Conclusion 
               The empirical analysis of this chapter provides strong evidence that the stronger 
an ally becomes relative to its neighbors and external powers, the more likely this state 
will be to restructure the alliances in which it is currently involved (Hypothesis 2). Also 
when a state experiences the domestic regime change, the state is more likely to 
restructure the existing alliances (Hypothesis 4). The government change is statistically 
significant and substantial as Hypothesis 6 predicts. These results are statistically 
significant and most consistent through the models which this chapter has tested. 
               For the other hypotheses, the capabilities change among allies has no significant 
effect on the state’s alliance restructuring, therefore Hypothesis 1 was dismissed. The 
statistical results of the winning coalition size change (Hypothesis 5) are mixed. When 
ally Y becomes more powerful since the alliance formation in comparison with neighbors 
and external powers, state X, an ally of Y, is more likely to restructure the existing 
 108 
 
alliances with ally Y in most of the models, however the degree of the significance is 
unstable (Hypothesis 3).  
               These results refine the current knowledge regarding alliance behaviors in the 
following points. First, the statistical results presented in this chapter strongly suggest 
that both the international factor (i.e., capabilities change) and domestic factor (i.e., 
domestic political change) influence the state’s alliance restructuring. In order to 
investigate the dynamics of alliance restructuring, researchers must analyze both factors. 
Second, the previous works have explained that when a state experienced capabilities 
change, regardless of strengthening or weakening, since the formation, the state is more 
likely to change the current alliance. This study provides strong evidence of this as “not” 
the case. Only the cases of increase (not decrease) capabilities are associated with the 
state’s alliance restructuring. Thirdly, the previous works have had a consensus simply on 
the importance of capabilities change, however, this study provides strong evidence that 
the state takes an interest in the capabilities balance relative to the neighbors and external 
major powers. In order to test whether the proposed causal mechanism really exists, we 
need to conduct further research by giving great attention to the case studies. The 
following three chapters will provide an in-depth analysis of the causal mechanisms. 
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5. Case Studies: U.S.-Philippines Alliance 
5.1. Introduction 
               After the end of the Second World War, the United States acknowledged an 
independent Philippines and in 1947 the two countries signed the Military Bases 
Agreement (MBA) which was followed by the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in 1951. 
The U.S.-Philippines alliance is now one of the oldest U.S. formal alliances in Asia. 
Throughout the years these two allies have continuously examined why and to what 
extent the presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines is necessary for the alliance. While 
the two countries decided to maintain the MDT in 1992, the Philippines’ decision to 
terminate the 1947 MBA significantly changed the existing alliance framework. This 
chapter traces the case of the 1992 Philippines’ alliance restructuring and tests a proposed 
theory of alliance restructuring to this historical event as a typical case. 
               My study argues that when the Philippines initially formed the alliance with the 
United States after the end of WWII, they placed greater value on the U.S. defense 
commitment than their own capabilities. The maintenance of U.S. military bases was 
welcome as a vital tool for the Philippines’ national security even though the existence of 
foreign troops was inconsistent with their sense of dignity as a newly independent nation. 
Since the formation, the Philippines grew more powerful relative to neighboring states 
and extra-regional threatening powers, and also experienced domestic political regime 
changes at the same time. These two external and internal factors caused the Philippines 
to shift their security preference between own arms and allied support. Over time, the 
Philippines shifted and placed lesser value on the U.S. defense commitment than at the 
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time of alliance formation, and renegotiated the existing alliance conditions to meet their 
new preference. In the end, the Philippines asked for the removal of U.S. bases from their 
country in 1992 by terminating the 1947 MBA. 
               This chapter is organized in four main sections. The first section explains the 
objectives that the Philippine leaders had hoped to achieve at the time of alliance 
formation, and what combination of arms and allied supports they preferred in order to 
achieve those objectives. At the same time, this section examines the U.S. objectives on 
the other side. This supplementary information will help us understand the actual 
bargaining process at the time of the restructuring which will be traced in the third 
section. The second section provides quantitative evidence for both the changes in 
Philippine’s capabilities and domestic regime since the formation. The third section 
examines whether the initial Philippine objectives for forming the alliances and the initial 
security preferences on the combination of arms and allies have changed or not. Also the 
section tests the proposed causal mechanism of alliance restructuring bargaining, which 
will be the result of strategic interactions between the allies. Lastly, the 1992 alliance 
restructuring terminated the 1947 MBA, but the 1951 MDT remains in full effect today. 
For more than six decades, the MDT has been tested on several occasions in Philippines 
territorial disputes with neighbors. The last section explores the U.S. response under the 
MDT to the Philippine territorial disputes with Malaysia and China. 
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5.2. Objectives and Preferences at the Time of Alliance Formation 
               There were three formal agreements initially drawn up in order to stipulate the 
U.S.-Philippines alliance: (1) Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947; (2) Military 
Assistance Agreement (MAA) of 1947; and (3) Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 
1952.187 The United States did not consider the MBA/MAA sufficient enough to claim 
the bilateral relationship as an alliance, as described later on, but the Philippines believed 
that the alliance had already started in 1947 when the MBA/MAA were signed. In order 
to understand the exact origin of the MDT, it is necessary to examine the MBA/MAA as 
a background toward the MDT of 1952.188 
 
5.2.1. Military Bases Agreement of 1947 
               The Philippines had endured an invasion by the Japanese imperial military and 
suffered tremendous damage during WWII. From their viewpoint, a lack of the mighty 
U.S. military capabilities in the Philippines was the main source for its failure to repel 
Japanese aggression. The issue of national security in the post-independence era 
developed as the primary focus of Philippine leaders. Following the victory of the first 
presidential election in the aftermath of independence, President-elect Manuel Roxas 
visited Washington, DC in May 1946. During his trip, Roxas remarked, “We will 
welcome the existence of your naval, air, and Army bases on such of our soil as is 
                                                          
187 I appreciate Renato Cruz De Castro making this point when I was researching as a visiting scholar in the 
Yuchengco Center, De La Salle University (Manila, Philippines) in February 2013.  
188 In the data collected for the quantitative analysis, the U.S.-Philippines alliance began in 1951 when the 
two states signed the MDT (and it took in effect in 1952). 
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mutually agreeable for the common protection of the United States and the 
Philippines.”189 
               Roxas also received the first draft for the bases in the Philippines prepared by 
the United States, and negotiations had begun. Roxas appointed a bipartisan delegation 
headed by Vice President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Elpidio Quirino. The 
delegation shared a common view for the necessity to maintain U.S. bases, but as a newly 
independent country, the Philippine leaders were highly sensitive to the issue of 
sovereignty. The Philippines strongly desired to revise the U.S. draft in the following two 
ways that: (1) the Philippines maintain a criminal jurisdiction outside the bases for off-
duty U.S. personnel who commit crime; and (2) the U.S. bases should be withdrawn from 
the metropolitan area of Manila.190 Clearly the Philippine leadership was in search of the 
fine line between security and sovereignty. Roxas responded in October 1946: 
Were we to withdraw from the base agreement with the United States, 
we would be sacrificing our national security on the altar of a mistaken 
sense of dignity. We could then be faced by the problem of assuming 
alone our national security.191 
 
                                                          
189 United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands. “Seventh and Final Report of the United 
States High Commissioner to the Philippines: Message from the President of the United States 
Transmitting the Seventh and Final Report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine 
Islands Covering the Period From September 14, 1945, To July 4, 1946”. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1947): 86. 
190 Elpidio Quirino, The Memoirs of Elpidio Quirino. (Manila, the Philippines: National Historical Institute, 
1990), p. 219; United States Department of State. “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Secretary of State, [Washington,] June 6, 1946.” In Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1946. The Far East, VIII (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971): 
880-881: 881. 
191 Philippines Free Press, October 16, 1946: 25, cited in Teodoro Villamor Cortes. “Interaction Patterns in 
a Big Power-Small Power Relationship the United States-Philippine Experience, 1946-1971”. PhD 
Dissertation, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1972): 73. 
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               Until the fall 1946, the U.S. continued to place great strategic value on the 
Philippines,192 but the wartime defense budget reduction debates going on in the U.S. 
Congress forced the Truman administration to review the overseas military deployment 
policy. The U.S. Congress reduced the military budget from $82 billion in 1945, to $14 
billion in 1947. To meet the budgetary demands, the U.S. military reduced the number of 
active military personnel from 12 million in 1945, to 1.6 million in 1947.193  
               In October 1946, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 
agreed that the U.S. retain only minimal, essential armed forces in the Philippines during 
peacetime.194 In a further review, the U.S. Navy revealed its new base plan in the Pacific, 
drastically reducing the U.S. naval facilities in the Philippines. The major U.S. naval 
bases in the Pacific were planned to be in Hawaii, the Guam-Saipan-Tinian area, and 
Okinawa.195 The U.S. Army offered a drastic proposal including the withdrawal of all 
soldiers in the Philippines. Secretary of War Robert Patterson agreed that War 
Department responsibilities should not be greater than their means in manpower and 
                                                          
192 The United States passed the Military Assistance to the Philippines Act, a U.S. domestic law, in June 
1946 and started to nurture the Philippine military capabilities even before the independence (July 1946). 
See “Plans Philippine Defense: Tydings-Bloom Bill Proposes Broad Military Assistance.” New York Times, 
May 26, 1946: 14.; “Named Ambassador: M’nutt Nominated Envoy To Manila Will Be First Ambassador 
to Republic-Military Aid Bill Is Set, New Property Act Drawn.” New York Times, June 15, 1946: 9. 
193 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 
1955. 76th annual edition. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955): 222-226. 
194 United States Department of State. “The Acting Secretary of States to the Ambassador in the Philippines 
(McNutt), Washington, October 15, 1946-3 P.m.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. The Far 
East, VIII (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971): 921-922. 
195 If the abandonment of the Leyte-Samar bases was approved, the U.S. Navy planned to retain only a 
submarine base at Subic Bay, an airfield at Sangley Point, and an anchorage at Tawi Tawi. Hanson W. 
Baldwin, “Navy Sharply Cuts Pacific Base Plans; Economy A Factor: Leyte-Samar Area Would Be 
Abandoned, Budget for Guam Reduced, Kodiak Increased Army In Modification, Too May Move From 
Philippines to Okinawa--Disturbing Manila Political Situation Cited.” New York Times, November 18, 
1946: 1. 
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money, and that U.S. commitments in Germany, Japan, Korea, Austria and Italy would 
take all resources at present and for the foreseeable future. Frankly Patterson remarked: 
“We cannot afford, in my opinion, to waste our strength by 
maintenance of a force of any considerable size in the Philippines.” 196   
 
               In December 1946, the U.S. officially informed the Philippines that if they did 
not want the presence of the U.S. forces in their country, the United States was ready to 
withdraw its forces at that time.197 The U.S. also accepted the two conditions that the 
Philippines had continuously requested for in the negotiations. Considering the new value 
assessment of bases in the Philippines, these matters were of less importance to the U.S.  
               Roxas became greatly upset with a possible withdrawal of U.S. forces. This 
meant to him national dignity without national security, and he told the U.S. Ambassador 
Paul V. McNutt that the Philippines did indeed desire maintenance of U.S. military bases 
and retention of U.S. forces.198  In January 1947, the United States accepted the 
Philippine request regarding the maintenance of U.S. bases, and also accepted the 
Philippine demands on the criminal jurisdiction and the withdrawal of U.S. bases from 
the metropolitan area in Manila.199    
                                                          
196 United States Department of State. “The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State, 
Washington, November 29, 1946.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. The Far East, VIII 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971): 934-935. 
197 United States Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Philippines 
(McNutt), Temporarily in Washington, Washington, December 13, 1946.” In Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1946. The Far East, VIII (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971): 936-
937. 
198 United States Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of 
State, Manila, December 23, 1946-4 P.m.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. The Far East, 
VIII (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971): 939-940. 
199 United States Department of State, “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, 
Washington, January 14, 1947-Noon.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. The Far East, VI 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972): 1102-1103. 
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               On January 27, 1947, President Roxas spoke in Manila of the ongoing military 
bases negotiation with the United States as follows: 
“….the United States recently expressed herself as perfectly willing to 
withdraw all military forces from the Philippines, unless we desired 
otherwise….I advised the American Government that the Philippine 
Congress by unanimous resolution had agreed to the establishment of 
American bases here, and that the Filipino people desired the retention 
of these bases…I cannot, in good conscience, overlook the absolute 
necessity of guaranteeing our security by every and all means available 
to us….The establishment of these bases, not for aggression but for 
defense, will guarantee our own safety….”200 
 
In March 1947, the United States and the Philippines signed the MBA in Manila, and the 
Philippine Senate unanimously ratified it in the same month.201 Roxas often emphasized 
that the MBA would secure a “common protection” of the two allies, and domestically 
advertised to the Filipinos the MBA as a military alliance.202 The Philippines fully 
expected the U.S. to deploy sufficient capabilities and to come to their defense whenever 
it becomes involved with war in future.203  
                                                          
200 United States Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of 
State, Manila, January 27, 1947.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. The Far East, VI 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972): 1103-1105. 
201 Three senators abstained. Philippines Congress, Senate. “First Congress of the Republic, Second Session, 
March 26, 1947.” Republic of the Philippines Congressional Record, Senate II, 24 (1947). 
202 United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands. “Seventh and Final Report of the United 
States High Commissioner to the Philippines: Message from the President of the United States 
Transmitting the Seventh and Final Report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine 
Islands Covering the Period From September 14, 1945, To July 4, 1946”. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1947): 86.; The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Manila, January 25, 1947, 
United States National Archives Record Group (RG) 59, 811.24596/1-2547, cited in Yuko Ito, “Firipin no 
gunji senryakuteki juyosei no henka to senkyuhyakuyonjunana nen beihigunjikichikyotei no seiritu katei 
[The Transformation of the Strategic Importance of the Philippines and the Formulation of the U. S.-
Philippine Military Bases Agreement of 1947].” Kokusaiseiji, Nihon kokusaiseiji gakkai [International 
Politics, Japan Association of International Relations] 117 (March, 1998): 220. 
203 For example, during the ratification debate in the Philippine Senate, Tomas V. Confesor from 
Nacionalista Party made a remark: “…we may use this Agreement later on to secure the cooperation of the 
United States in fighting for us in the event that we become involved in a war of our own making.” 
Philippines Congress, Senate. “First Congress of the Republic, Second Session, March 26, 1947.” Republic 
of the Philippines Congressional Record, Senate II, 24 (1947): 220. 
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               The MAA was also designed to help better equip and train the Philippine armed 
forces. The Philippine leaders had hoped that the MBA and MAA would be enough to 
defend national security and believed that the deployment of U.S. forces in the Philippine 
homeland was an acceptable expense. The U.S. accepted the retention of U.S. forces 
upon Philippine request but only at a minimum necessity level. The strategic value of the 
U.S. bases in the Philippines was significantly downgraded in the end. 
                               
5.2.2. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1952 
               The international and domestic developments of the Philippines in 1948-1950 
produced the spread of doubt on their expectation that the MBA/MAA would be a 
sufficient framework for national security. The international environment in Asia had 
dramatically changed since the signing of the MBA/MAA in 1947. In October 1949, the 
Chinese Communist Party defeated the Kuomintang in the Chinese Civil War. In June 
1950, North Korea invaded the South. In Vietnam, China also began to militarily assist 
Ho Chi Minh in 1950.204 These external developments initiated a growing Philippine 
concern of the Chinese Communist penetration inside their country.205 
               At the same time the Philippines faced internal security challenges. Elpidio 
Quirino, the new president after the death of Roxas, attempted a peace negotiation with 
the Hukbalahap, a communist armed insurgency in Central Luzon with 15,000 soldiers 
                                                          
204 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2000), especially chapter 1. 
205 “Philippines Worried Over China Red Gains.” New York Times, February 10, 1949: 9. 
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and failed to reach an agreement in 1948.206 The Hukbalajap was believed to have 
international connections with Chinese Communists.207 Furthermore, the Philippines 
began to realize that the insufficient quality and quantity of U.S. military assistance and 
the very slow process greatly hindered the building of their capabilities for dealing with 
the Huks.208 
               In fact, along with a new base policy, the United States provided the Philippines 
entirely with equipment from its own inventory inside the Philippines, and urged them to 
take financial responsibility for their own armed forces.209 The Philippines officially 
requested U.S. military assistance in May 1947, but in November, the SWNCC judged 
that it is impossible to accede to the full Philippine request, and said: 
“Philippine Government and Filipino people in general have gained a 
most mistaken idea regarding the extent to which this Government 
[United States] is committed to extending military assistance to the 
Philippines. It is considered altogether undesirable and unwise that 
such a feeling of utter and complete dependence on the United States 
should be allowed to persist….since the Republic [of Philippines] 
desires to have an army, the most feasible plan is to develop a small 
military organization within the financial capabilities of the Republic, 
which can train a reserve civilian army capable of conducting 
                                                          
206 Walter C. Ladwig III, “When the Police are the Problem: the Philippine Constabulary and the Huk 
Rebellion.” In Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents, edited by C. Christine Fair and Sumit 
Ganguly, The Oxford international relations in South Asia series. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 
19-45: 24. 
207 Ford Wilkins. “Philippines’ Economy Is Near A Breakdown: Thus Far the Government Has Failed To 
Check Progressive Decline.” New York Times, August 20, 1950: l20. 
208 Elpidio Quirino, The Memoirs of Elpidio Quirino. (Manila, the Philippines: National Historical Institute, 
1990): 249. 
209 “United States Military Assistance to the Philippines,” February 10, 1947, JCS 1519/3, United States 
National Archives Record Group (RG) 218, CCS686.9, Sec.5., cited in cited in Yuko Ito, “Firipin no gunji 
senryakuteki juyosei no henka to senkyuhyakuyonjunana nen beihigunjikichikyotei no seiritu katei [The 
Transformation of the Strategic Importance of the Philippines and the Formulation of the U. S.-Philippine 
Military Bases Agreement of 1947].” Kokusaiseiji, Nihon kokusaiseiji gakkai [International Politics, Japan 
Association of International Relations] 117 (March 1998): 220. 
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resistance to any aggression, pending aid from the United Nations or 
other friendly powers.”210     
 
               The Philippine leaders were beginning to understand that the U.S. defense 
commitment was not as firm as they initially expected, and that the U.S. strategic priority 
in Asia was shifting from the Philippines, a former U.S. territory, to Japan, a former 
aggressor.211 Under the circumstances, Quirino desired to formalize the U.S. defense 
commitment. In response in early 1950, U.S. officials verbally expressed their views for a 
defense commitment. The most famous was in a speech by Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson at the National Press Club in January. Acheson described a defensive perimeter 
running through the Aleutians, Japan and the Ryukyu Islands to the Philippines, and also 
remarked as follows: 
“We are in no doubt about that, and it is hardly necessary for me to say 
that an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated 
by the United States. But I hasten to add that no one perceives the 
imminence of any such attack.”212 
 
                                                          
210 United States Department of State. “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, 
Washington, November 17, 1947.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. The Far East, VI 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972): 1117-1120. 
211 “Quirino Appeals To U.S.: He Stresses Idea of Philippine Priority Over Japan for Aid.” New York Times, 
March 24, 1951: 5. 
212 United States Department of State Office of Media Services, United States Department of State Office 
of Public Communication. “Crisis in Asia-An Examination of U.S. Policy, Remarks by Secretary Acheson, 
Made before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., on January 12, 1950.” In The Department of State 
Bulletin, XXII: No. 551. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950): 111-118: 116. 
Another occasion for reassurance of the U.S. commitment was the summit talks in February 1950. Truman 
said that the two states regarded their security as “mutually inter-dependent,” and the U.S. would not 
tolerate an armed attack upon the Philippines. See United States Department of State. “Memorandum of 
Conversation, by the Secretarty of State, [Washington,] February 4, 1950.” In Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1950. East Asia and the Pacific, VI (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1976): 1412-1416. 
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               While U.S. officials continued to verbally reassure their defense commitment in 
early 1951,213 the United States began to seriously consider the issue of a peace 
settlement with Japan, and greatly needed to gain broad international support, from 
countries such as the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.214 The Philippines 
especially suffered tremendous destruction from Japanese aggression, and the leaders still 
felt a potential threat from Japan as a resurgent independent military power in the future.  
               The answer to meet these regional security concerns was found in the U.S. draft 
plan of the Pacific Pact, which included the U.S., Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and 
New Zealand. In this multilateral alliance framework, the United States stood ready to 
provide its formal defense commitment to the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Japan from external aggression, and from the first three countries’ perspectives, the U.S. 
would defend them from a resurgent Japan in the future as well.215 From the U.S. point of 
view, a Pacific Pact was designed to relieve opposition from the Philippines, Australia, 
and New Zealand towards a peace settlement with Japan. In addition, the U.S. believed 
that a Pacific Pact could be used as a vehicle for a future Japanese rearmament with U.S. 
                                                          
213 For example, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Myron Cowen said in January 1951 that the United 
States “assumes complete responsibility for the defense of the Philippines against external aggression.” See 
“Philippine Congress Fails to Fill Tax Needs; New Session Monday Must Tackle Job Anew: U.S. 
Responsibility Affirmed.” New York Times, January 20, 1951: 3. 
214 United States Department of State. “Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretarty (Howard) 
to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), [Washington,] March 9, 1950.” In 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. East Asia and the Pacific, VI (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1976): 1138-1149. 
215 United States Department of State. “Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Consultant (Allison) 
to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), [Washington,] January 4, 1951.” In Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in Two Parts), VI, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977): 132-134. 
 120 
 
assistance and to utilize the Japanese military capabilities to defend the free world in 
future.216  
               In response, Australia and New Zealand showed no interest in becoming an ally 
with Japan in January 1951,217 and asked for a trilateral security treaty with the United 
States. While the United States was making a trilateral security treaty draft with Australia 
and New Zealand, the U.S. hesitated to proceed such a coordination with the Philippines 
and did not inform them of progress regarding a trilateral security pact.218 One reason 
was that the Department of Defense and the JCS strongly opposed a formal bilateral pact 
with the Philippines. From a U.S. military perspective, the possibility of external 
aggression to the Philippines was low, and the existing security agreements were 
sufficient. In the end, Truman officially announced in April 1951 that the United States 
would establish a new security treaty with Australia, New Zealand, and another, 
separately with Japan, while maintaining the existing security arrangements with the 
Philippines.219 
                                                          
216 United States Department of State. “Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, [Washington,] December 28, 1950.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. East Asia 
and the Pacific, VI (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976): 1385-1392. 
217 United States Department of State. “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs (Perkins) to Mr. John Foster Dulles, the Consultant to the Secretary, [Washington,] January 15, 
1951.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in Two Parts), VI, Part 1 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977): 140-141.; United States Department of State. 
“Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Burton Kitain of the Office of the British Commonwealth and 
Northern European Affairs, [Washington,] February 8, 1951.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1951. Asia and the Pacific (in Two Parts), VI, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977): 147-149. 
218 United States Department of State. “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy to the Consultant 
(Allison) at the Malacanan Palace, 10:45 A.m., Manila, February 12, 1951.” In Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in Two Parts), VI, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977): 152-154. 
219 “Text of Truman’s Statement.” New York Times, April 19, 1951: 5. 
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               At that time, the Philippines was seeking two goals simultaneously regarding a 
peace settlement with Japan: (1) formalizing a U.S. defense commitment; and (2) 
securing reparations through a peace settlement with Japan.220 Truman’s announcement 
greatly disappointed the Philippines. Quirino complained to the U.S. Ambassador Myron 
Cowen saying that the U.S. did not regard the Philippines as a sovereign state, and that a 
security pact with Australia and New Zealand excluding the Philippines provoked 
domestic opposition against him. For example, Opposition Nacionalista Senator Claro 
Recto, one of the toughest critics of Quirino, had said: 
“Australia and New Zealand have been given treaties of alliance and 
mutual defense with the United States. Even Japan will be given such 
a treaty. The Philippines have been ignored and we are confronted 
with the possibility that the United States will be Japan’s ally, but not 
ours.”221   
 
The Philippines sent a diplomatic note to the U.S. and expressed their regret towards the 
U.S.-Australia-New Zealand mutual defense pact, and also added: 
“Philippines Government recognizes the immediate threat to the 
security of the Philippines that a remilitarized Japan would pose. It 
would like, therefore, to urge on the US Government the inclusion in 
the Japanese peace treaty of provisions establishing adequate 
safeguards against the resurgence of Japan as a military power…”222                  
 
                                                          
220 United States Department of State. “The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of 
State, Manila, March 15, 1951-6 P.m.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the 
Pacific (in Two Parts), VI, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977): 179-180. 
221 United States Department of State. “The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of 
State, Manila, July 17, 1951-4 P.m.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific 
(in Two Parts), VI, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977): 223. 
222 United States Department of State. “The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of 
State, Manila, July 20, 1951-Noon.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific 
(in Two Parts), VI, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977): 226. 
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The Philippines remained in a very tough position on the reparations issue and continued 
to seek $8 billion from Japan as a result of a peace settlement.223 In July 1951, Quirino’s 
consultative committee even suggested that the Philippines would refuse to sign a peace 
treaty with Japan.224   
               As a result of an inter-branch policy coordination in summer 1951, the United 
States reached an internal consensus to a bilateral mutual defense treaty with the 
Philippines on the basis of the following principle, “an additional commitment but an 
expression of our present commitments in a new piece of paper.”225 The U.S. policy 
makers shared the following points: (1) any additional security agreement must not 
disturb in any way existing bilateral security arrangements;226 (2) an additional security 
arrangement should not include any provision for consultation between the U.S. and 
Philippine military establishments because there is no external threat to the Philippines 
and there is nothing to consult;227 and (3) the Philippines must not use the mutual security 
pact for internal uprisings, and bilateral consultation will be applied only to cases of 
                                                          
223 “Philippines Firm In Reparation Bid: Won’t Ease Demand on Japan for $8 Billion-U.S. Aide Is Hopeful 
on Peace Treaty.” New York Times, June 24, 1951: 8. 
224 “Philippines Scores Japan Pact Draft: 15-Man Group Says Plan Would Too Quickly Restore Nation to 
Dominance in Asia.” New York Times, July 14, 1951: 3. 
225 United States Department of State. “Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of 
State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, [Washington,] July 25, 1951-11 A.m.” In Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in Two Parts), VI, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977): 229-230. 
226 United States Department of State. “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, 
Washington, July 27, 1951-4 P.m.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific 
(in Two Parts), VI, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977): 231. 
227 United States Department of State. “The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall), 
Washington, August 2, 1951.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in 
Two Parts), VI, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977): 232-237. 
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threats from external sources.228 By August 1951, the Philippines reached a consensus 
with the U.S., formalizing the existing bilateral security agreements and gained the right 
to negotiate reparations issues with Japan separately from a peace settlement in San 
Francisco.229 
               In summary, the Philippines sought protection from possible external aggression 
from a resurgent Japan and Chinese Communist penetration to aid communist insurgents 
inside their country through a U.S. defense commitment. Initially the Philippines was 
confident that the maintenance of U.S. bases and military assistance would be sufficient. 
But when the Philippines saw the U.S. strategic priority shifting from the Philippines to 
Japan, a former enemy and saw the growing communist activities inside their country, the 
existing security arrangements seemed insufficient. The goal was to formalize the U.S. 
commitment. As a newly independent state, the Philippines dedicated themselves to 
issues involving sovereignty. While recognizing its lack of sufficient resources to build 
up its own capabilities, the Philippines placed great value on the U.S. defense 
commitment.     
               The United States, until 1946, planned to deploy a large number of armed forces 
in the Philippines. But a drastic reduction in the postwar defense budget forced the 
United States to reexamine the previous assessment. The United States had several 
alternatives for host states for bases, and these alternatives (especially Japan and 
Okinawa) were considered much more attractive than the Philippines in terms of political 
                                                          
228 United States Department of State. “The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State, 
Washington, August 8, 1951.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in 
Two Parts), VI, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977): 238-239. 
229 “Filipinos Expect U.S. Pact: Say Mutual Defense Accord Will Be Signed Next Month.” New York Times, 
August 12, 1951: 5.; Henry R. Lieberman, “Split In Philippines.” New York Times, August 26, 1951: B5. 
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stability, location, and economic potential. The establishment of the 1947 MBA was the 
result of a Philippine request, not the forceful U.S. demand.  
               The United States continued to assess the possibility of external aggression 
towards the Philippines as remote, and decided to retain the armed forces at only a 
minimum necessity level. If the Philippines accepted a U.S. sponsored generous peace 
settlement with Japan and the Japanese rearmament under U.S. guidance, the United 
States might have been able to show solidarity in the West to the Soviet bloc and might 
have convinced more easily other countries to accept a U.S. sponsored peace settlement. 
The MDT was the result of a U.S. decision to gain such Philippine support. From the U.S. 
perspective, the MDT did not add any new defense obligations to the Philippines, and 
simply formalized the previous security agreements (i.e., MBA and MAA) and verbal 
and written statements by the U.S. officials with an aim to reassure the Philippines 
politically and psychologically.      
 
5.3. Changes in Capabilities and Domestic Regime 
               This section provides the quantitative evidence of the changes in the Philippine 
capabilities and domestic regime and briefly describes the country’s developments in 
both capabilities and domestic politics.  
 
5.3.1. Capabilities Change 
               As demonstrated in the previous quantitative chapter, when a state becomes 
more powerful relative to the neighbors/external powers and experiences domestic 
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regime change, this state is more likely to restructure the existing alliance relationship. 
As previously mentioned, the capabilities change was measured by the COW CINC. The 
CINC is calculated by six material indicators: (1) energy consumption; (2) iron and steel 
production; (3) military expenditure; (4) military personnel; (5) total population; and (6) 
urban population. As Figure 5.1 shows, the Philippines’ power position to a set of 
neighbors and external major powers had begun to improve since 1971 and continued 
until 1992, when the Philippines ultimately decided to remove the U.S. bases from the 
Philippines. The graph shows the capabilities change plummets in 1992, because Figure 
5.1 recalculates the Philippines’ power position as a new fresh start after the alliance 
restructuring.  
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               There are two main reasons for the improvement in the Philippines’ power 
position in terms of CINC capabilities index over time. First, the Philippines’ capabilities 
had steadily increased.230 Table 5.1 represents military expenditures and presents 
historical data of the Philippines and major neighbors and external powers. As the Table 
shows, the Philippine military expenditures were $47 million in 1951 and $1,100 million 
in 1992. In the early 1970s, the Philippines faced outbreaks of Muslim secessionist 
insurgents but the United States was reluctant to provide them with sufficient 
counterinsurgency arms. Therefore, the Philippines began attempting to develop their 
own capabilities autonomously to address internal security, which is reflected in the 
increase in military expenditures in the late 1980s.231 The second reason is more 
significant, which was the decline of the Soviet/Russia’s capabilities.232 The Soviet 
Union’s military expenditures were $20.1 billion in 1951, reaching $317.9 billion in 1988, 
but in 1992 declined more than 85% in 1988 for military expenditures. Table 5.2 shows 
the real gross domestic product (GDP) data, which is not a part of the CINC index, and 
the trend of real GDP is almost identical.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
230 According to the CINC data, the Philippines’ capabilities share in the total international system was 
0.039% in 1971 and had increased to 0.053% in 1992. 
231 Renato Cruz De Castro. “Philippine Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back 
to the Alliance?” Pacific Affairs 78, 3 (2005): 403–422: 406-408. 
232 The Soviet Union/Russia’s capabilities share in the total international system was 17.4% in 1971 and 
drastically decreased to 6.5% in 1992. 
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Table 5.1. Historical military expenditures data of the Philippines and major neighbors 
and external powers, 1951-2000 (in millions of US dollars) 
 Philippines USA Japan China Russia Malaysia Vietnam 
1951      47   33,398 NA   3,094   20,126 NA NA 
1961      52   47,808       508   7,953   43,663      36    175 
1971    121   74,862    2,252 21,600   82,700    190    300 
1981    798 169,888 11,624 30,500 221,000 2,038 NA 
1986    515 265,480 20,930   5,830 287,600 1,010 2,406 
1987    725 273,966 25,420   5,640 303,000    853 NA 
1988    858 281,935 28,406   5,860 317,900 1,612 2,540 
1989 1,280 294,880 30,090   6,670 119,440 1,384 2,320 
1990    979 289,755 28,730   6,060 128,790 1,560    723 
1991    968 262,389 32,680 18,790 133,700 1,740 1,870 
1992 1,100 286,892 38,600 24,300   47,220 2,500    720 
1993 1,200 297,600 41,730 27,400   29,120 2,600    358 
1994 1,117 293,214 46,639 28,945   96,693 3,142    992 
1995 1,361 277,834 50,219 32,929   82,000 3,514    910 
1996 1,520 277,254 45,502 36,176   73,990 3,695    970 
1997 1,422 276,324 40,891 36,551   64,000 3,377 1,004 
1998 1,521 279,702 38,482 38,191   57,107 1,891    943 
1999 1,627 292,147 40,383 39,889   56,800 3,158    890 
2000 1,357 303,136 45,316 42,000   52,000 2,579 2,303 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 128 
 
Table 5.2. Historical real GDP data of the Philippines and major neighbors and external 
powers, 1951-2000 (in billions of 2005 US dollars)233 
 Philippines USA Japan China Russia Malaysia Vietnam 
1951   25   2,110    210 NA NA NA NA 
1961   47   2,846    464    424 NA   19 NA 
1971   78   4,382 1,164    935 NA   40   34 
1981 141   5,999 1,959 1,502 NA   90   53 
1986 142   7,010 2,194 2,571 NA   94   65 
1987 156   7,231 2,351 2,666 NA 101   67 
1988 173   7,523 2,591 2,648 NA 110   70 
1989 189   7,790 2,794 2,484 NA 121   68 
1990 207   7,912 3,021 2,556 2,748 135   71 
1991 211   7,875 3,214 2,718 2,947 149   80 
1992 221   8,161 3,341 2,983 2,293 158   86 
1993 235   8,420 3,451 3,401 1,966 172   98 
1994 263   8,798 3,583 3,609 1,675 189 104 
1995 291   9,034 3,753 4,008 1,571 210 113 
1996 319   9,402 3,812 4,164 1,210 230 128 
1997 319   9,850 3,833 4,344 1,168 234 135 
1998 290 10,296 3,734 4,305 1,054 204 140 
1999 283 10,792 3,727 4,566 1,019 219 139 
2000 292 11,253 3,834 4,863 1,150 257 151 
 
5.3.2. Domestic Regime Change 
              Figure 5.2 shows how the Philippines’ domestic political regime type level has 
shifted since the alliance formation.234 The Philippines’ domestic political regime type 
                                                          
233 Robert C. Feenstra, Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. Timmer. “The Next Generation of the Penn World 
Table.” American Economic Review 105, 10 (2015): 3150–82. 
234 As demonstrated in the previous quantitative chapter, this study annually measured whether and to what 
extent the domestic regime type level shifts since the alliance formation, by using the democracy-autocracy 
composite regime level data set of the POLITY IV Project. The democracy-autocracy composite regime 
type level data ranges from plus 10 (full democracy) to minus 10 (full autocracy). Based on the POLITY IV 
data, this study annually calculated the absolute value of difference in the regime type level of the 
Philippines. Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009 (version 2012). 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm: Center for Systemic Peace. 
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level began to shift in 1969 and continued until 1992, when the Philippines finally 
decided to remove all U.S. military bases. 
 
               After the independence in 1946, there were two major political parties (Liberal 
Party and Nacionalista Party) competing in Philippine politics. Under the new system, the 
President was democratically elected from major contenders of these two political parties 
until Ferdinand Marcos, a Nacionalista presidential candidate took office in 1965.235 
Marcos established strong ties with the United States. For example, the U.S. aid of $7 
million was used to establish up to ten engineer construction battalions, but in exchange, 
                                                          
235 For the political parties and leaders in the Philippines in the pre-Marcos era, see Carl H.  Landé, Leaders, 
Factions, and Parties; the Structure of Philippine Politics. Monograph Series (Yale University. Southeast 
Asia Studies) 6. (New Haven, CT: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University; [distributor: Cellar Book Shop, 
Detroit], 1965); Dapen Liang, Philippine Parties and Politics: A Historical Study of National Experience in 
Democracy. (San Francisco, CA: Gladstone Co., 1971); Arthur Alan Shantz, “Political Parties: The 
Changing Foundations of Philippine Democracy”. PhD Dissertation, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan, 1973) 
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the Philippines dispatched the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) to Vietnam in 
order to assist the U.S. war efforts.236 
               After his reelection in 1969, Marcos was soon faced with a series of social 
unrests including student movements against corruption, public protests against economic 
decline, and anti-government activity by the New People’s Army, an armed wing of the 
Philippine Communist Party. In order to obstruct these movements, Marcos declared 
Martial Law in 1972 and maintained it until 1981. He continued to maintain an 
authoritarian rule, relying on military and police forces until he was ousted by the People 
Power Revolution in 1986.237 Under the Marcos regime, the two party system collapsed 
because both the Liberal Party and the Nacionalista Party fell apart into a number of pro- 
and anti-Marcos political groups. Later Marcos founded a new political coalition group of 
Marcos loyalists from the two parties, called New Society Movement of United 
Nationalists, Liberals, et cetera (KBL), which remained a dominant political force in the 
Marcos era.238 
               In the 1986 Presidential election, a coalition of anti-Marcos leftist and liberal 
groups (the Philippine Democratic Party-People's Power: PDP Laban) nominated 
                                                          
236 Albert Francisco Celoza. “The Rise of an Authoritarian Regime in the Philippines.” PhD Dissertation, 
(Claremont, CA: Claremont Graduate University, 1987): 68-69. 
237 For the Marcos authoritarian rule era, see José Juan Bautista, “A Theoretical Model on the Dynamic 
Impact of Influence on Two Party Political Systems”. PhD Dissertation, (New Orleans, LA: Tulane 
University, 1987); Albert Francisco, Celoza, “The Rise of an Authoritarian Regime in the Philippines”. 
PhD Dissertation, (Claremont, CA: Claremont Graduate University, 1987); Benjamin Navarro Muego, 
“The ‘New Society’ of the Philippines: A Case Study of a Developmental Movement Regime”. PhD 
Dissertation, (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1976); Tae Hoon Kang, “The 
Uses and Abuses of Crisis Government in the Philippines, 1972-1981”. PhD Dissertation, (New York, NY: 
New York University, 1982) 
238 Gwendolyn G. Bevis, “Building Programmatic Parties in a Patronage-Dominated System: Akbayan and 
the Liberal Party in the Post-1986 Philippines”. PhD Dissertation, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 2006): 98. 
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Corazon Aquino, the widow of the prominent anti-Marcos leader Benigno Aquino, Jr. 
who was assassinated in 1983, as their presidential candidate. Alleged fraud in the 
presidential election brought about massive student protests and the People Power 
Revolution ultimately led to President Marcos’s exile into Hawaii. Aquino then took over 
the presidency. These new political developments transformed the two party system of 
the pre-Marcos era into a new multi-party system (Liberals, Nacionalistas, KBL, PDP-
Laban, etc.) which emerged at the time of alliance restructuring.239  
 
5.4. Alliance Restructuring 
               On September 16, 1991, the Philippines Senate refused to ratify the U.S-
Philippines Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security, which was supposed to 
replace the 1947 MBA. The new treaty stipulated renewed compensation for the U.S. use 
of Subic Naval Base and a ten year extension for the gradual reduction of U.S. forces in 
the Philippines. Following exploratory talks in Manila (May 14-18, 1990), the formal 
bilateral negotiations started on September 18, 1990 and ended on July 17, 1991. This 
section has two main parts. The first section focuses on the pre-formal negotiation phase 
(i.e., before September 18, 1990), and examines whether the Philippines’ objectives and 
preferences on the combination of allied support and its own arms had changed since the 
alliance formation, and at the same time the U.S. objectives and preferences are also 
                                                          
239 For the political parties in the Philippines in the post-Marcos era, see Carl H. Landé, Post-Marcos 
Politics: A Geographical and Statistical Analysis of the 1992 Presidential Election. (New York; Singapore: 
St. Martin’s Press; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996); Allen Hicken, Building Party Systems in 
Developing Democracies. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
 132 
 
analyzed. Then the second section examines the bargaining of alliance restructuring and 
traces the formal negotiation phase (September 18, 1990 to July 17, 1991). 
 
5.4.1. Shifts in Alliance Objectives and Preferences 
5.4.1.1. Philippines 
               At the time of the 1947 alliance formation, the Philippines as a newly 
independent nation believed that national security could not be achieved independently. 
Therefore, the Philippine leaders sought allied protection against possible external 
aggression from a resurgent Japan and Chinese Communist penetration through internal 
communist insurgency by requesting the retention of U.S. forces. The maintenance of 
U.S. forces was considered a symbol of the U.S. commitment. The Philippines greatly 
valued the issue of sovereignty but regarded national security over dignity, and chose U.S. 
security support over its own arms in the end. 
               To measure a change in the Philippines’ alliance objectives, this section asks the 
following five questions: (1) Did the Philippines perceive possible external aggression in 
the 1980s and early 1990?; (2) During the same period, did the Philippines still perceive 
the role of U.S. forces as a symbol of the U.S. defense commitment?; (3) Did the 
Philippines consider new factors that they did not take into account at the time of alliance 
formation?; (4) What goals did the Philippines try to achieve in the upcoming formal 
negotiation with the United States?; and (5) Why did the Philippines not restructure the 
alliance with the United States even earlier because the Philippines had already 
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experienced a domestic regime change and had grown for some time relatively more 
powerful?  
               Regarding the first question, the Philippines no longer believed in the existence 
of a serious external threat. In August 1989, President Corazon Aquino established a 
panel to prepare for formal negotiations and this panel later became a negotiation team.240 
The members of the Philippine Panel included Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus 
as Chair and Health Secretary Alfred Bengzon as Vice Chair. In November 1989, Aquino 
launched another group called the President’s Committee on the Bases (PCB) in her 
office and the PCB played a role in preparing the government to implement the decisions 
reached by the upcoming exploratory talks with the U.S.241  
               In this preparatory stage, the members of both Panel/PCB produced various 
documents upon presidential request. Based on these documents, there was no evidence 
suggesting that the Philippines had perceived any external threats at that time. In August 
1989, Bengzon proposed a framework document discussing how to approach the formal 
negotiations. This document highlighted the following points: (1) trends towards the 
U.S.-Soviet rapprochement; (2) the decline of ideological passions; and (3) from bipolar 
                                                          
240 Interview with Allan Quiz, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Research, National Security Council, 
and member of the technical committee for the Philippines negotiating panel, August 4, 1994, cited in Josie 
H. De Leon, “United States Base Closures in the Philippines: A Study in International Negotiation and 
Decision Making”. PhD Dissertation, (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Queen’s University, 1996): 166. De 
Leon conducted an interview with the negotiation team members in the United States and the Philippines. 
241 Josie H. De Leon, “United States Base Closures in the Philippines: A Study in International Negotiation 
and Decision Making”. PhD Dissertation, (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Queen’s University, 1996): 167. 
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to multipolar relations.242 National Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos (a member of the 
PCB) also replied from a national security perspective: 
“First of all, we must realize that there are two serious problems facing 
the country today, economic and internal threats of communist 
insurgency, Muslim secessionism, and the ultra-rightists. Without 
these problems, we can easily say that the bases must go on the date of 
its termination….On top of this [economic problem] is the possibility 
of foreign investments being scared and pulling out once the US 
leaves.”243 
 
National Security Adviser Rafael Ileto (a member of the PCB) suggested the possibility 
that Japan would fill up the security vacuum created by the immediate withdrawal of U.S. 
bases, which were the only U.S. bases in Southeast Asia. But this view was expressed 
only by Ileto and did not seem to be shared by the Panel/PCB members.244 Secretary 
Ramos also articulated by radio interview that “the Philippines faced no external enemies 
or threats and that threats arising from both the communists insurgency and right-wing 
military rebels could not even be addressed by the U.S. military presence in the 
country.”245  
                                                          
242 Marita Castro-Guevara, ed. “Proposed Framework for Approaching the RP-US Talks on the US Military 
Facilities, Sec. Alfred R.A. Bengzon, Manila, Presented to President Aquino on 16 August 1989, and To 
An Expanded Audience on 24 August 1989.” In The Bases Talks Reader: Key Documents of the 1990-91 
Philippine-American Cooperation Talks, (Manila, the Philippines: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1997): 9-15: 11. 
243 Marita Castro-Guevara, ed. “Replies of the Members of the Panel/PCB to President Aquino’s 13 March 
1990 (Excepts and Summaries).” In The Bases Talks Reader: Key Documents of the 1990-91 Philippine-
American Cooperation Talks, (Manila, the Philippines: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1997): 27-36: 33-34. 
244 Ibid: 32. 
245 In this radio interview, Secretary Ramos also remarked that the U.S. bases in the Philippines were 
important in terms of regional security but it was secondary. What was important to Ramos was economic 
development, which really enabled the Philippine government to address such internal threats as 
communist insurgency. GMA 7 Radio-Television Arts Network March 13, “Ramos Interviewed on 
Cagayan, U.S. Bases,” FBIS-EAS-90-051 (March 15, 1990): 45, cited in Renato Cruz De Castro, “Special 
Relations and Alliance Politics in Philippine-U.S. Security Relations, 1990-2002.” Asian Perspective 27, 1 
(2003): 137-164: 144 note 20. 
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               The Philippines had been addressing territorial disputes with China, Vietnam, 
Malaysia and Taiwan since the middle 1950s, but external treat perception among the 
Philippine leaders was fairly relaxed in the late 1980s and early 1990s.246 While China 
and Vietnam exchanged gunfire in Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands in March 
1988,247 Philippine President Aquino visited China the very next month and the Chinese 
leader Deng Xiaoping promised along with her, to shelve the sovereignty issue, engage in 
joint exploration of maritime resources, and work towards a peaceful resolution of the 
territorial disputes with the Philippines.248 In 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos, a successor 
of Corazon Aquino, stated that a country as big and powerful as China is entitled to have 
a highly efficient military, and Ramos’s Foreign Minister Roberto Romulo added that 
China did not exhibit any hegemonic tendencies and its military buildup was just part of 
the larger modernization process.249 These periods of relaxed external threat perception 
continued until President Ramos himself discovered a Chinese military base at Mischeef 
Reef, deep inside the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in February 1995.250   
               To the second question, the U.S. bases were perceived by the Filipinos as a 
symbol of an unequal bilateral relationship, rather than a symbol of the U.S. defense 
commitment. Prior to the 1990-91 in formal negotiations, Vice Chair Bengzon described 
the U.S. bases in the Philippines as follows: 
                                                          
246 New York Times. “Communist China Warns Philippines on Islands,” May 30, 1956: 6. 
247 New York Times. “China and Vietnam Skirmish Over Disputed Island Chain,” March 16, 1988: A13. 
248 Ian James Storey. 1999. “Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea 
Dispute.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, 1 (1999): 95–118: 97. 
249 William E. Berry, Jr. Threat Perceptions in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore. ([Colorado 
Springs], Colo.: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy): 22. 
250 Philip Shenon. “Manila Sees China Threat On Coral Reef: By Raising Its Flag Beijing Raises Fears.” 
New York Times, February 19, 1995: 9. 
 136 
 
“From the viewpoint of the Americans, the U.S. Military Bases is at 
the core of Philippine-American relations. For OUR viewpoint, the 
whole array (horizontal and vertical) of Philippine-American relations 
is an important and pervasive element in our national life. It is 
unhealthy for us to be so heavily influenced by a single country.”251 
 
Furthermore, Manglapus during the exploratory talks (May 14-18, 1990) also stated that 
the Philippines had considered that the role of U.S. forces was to engage the enemy far 
out before the war reached the U.S. homeland.252 His words suggested that the main role 
of the U.S. bases was not to defend the Philippines. From the Philippine viewpoint, the 
credibility of the U.S. defense commitment had reached a very low point.                           
               To the third question, the Philippines perceived that U.S. bases could be used as 
a tool to gain a compensation package from the United States. This Philippine idea did 
not exist at the time of alliance formation because retention of the bases was solely a 
Philippine request, and for the first time, U.S. President Jimmy Carter agreed with 
President Marcos in 1979 and pledged his best efforts to secure $500 million from the 
U.S. Congress during the period of 1980 to 1984 (i.e., $100 million per year).253 In 1983, 
U.S. President Ronald Reagan pledged to Marcos $900 million for the period of 1985-
1989 (i.e., $180 million per year).254 In 1988, the Reagan administration negotiated with 
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President Aquino for a new bases compensation package. Secretary Manglapus 
demanded $1.2 billion per year for the period of 1990-1994, but the two states settled on 
$962 million for two years (1990-1991: $481 million per year).255 From the Philippine 
viewpoint, this was a rent. The Philippines now recognized there were no external threats, 
and the U.S. bases existed not for the Philippines’ security, but for a U.S. security 
strategy in Asia. If the U.S. wished to maintain the bases, the Philippines were entitled to 
charge rent to the U.S. 
               Fourthly the Philippine goal was to redefine the bilateral relationship beyond the 
conventional base talks. Just a day before the formal negotiation began, President Aquino 
stated that, “While the impetus for the talks comes from a mutual desire to decide the fate 
of US military facilities in the Philippines after 1991, our Government shall in these talks 
operate within the larger framework of redefining RP-US relations; defense and security 
issues shall only be one among many other important considerations.”256 Describing the 
end of the Cold War and a changed international environment in Eastern Europe and the 
Middle East, Aquino further stated that “the decades-old parameters of the RP-US 
relationship no longer hold. The old cannot continue; the new must now be born.”257 
Then, Aquino expressed that her government was seeking an eventual withdrawal of the 
U.S. bases in the Philippines: “It is now necessary for our government to work with the 
United States for arrangements regarding the orderly withdrawal of their forces from our 
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country.”258 The Philippine leaders were on the same page regarding an eventual 
withdrawal of U.S. bases. 
               Last is the question of the timing of Philippine alliance restructuring. The 1947 
MBA was initially set for a period of 99 years (until 2046) and subject to extension 
thereafter as agreed by the two countries, while the 1951 MDT was set for an indefinite 
term. In 1966, the United States and the Philippines agreed to revisions that the MBA 
will remain in force for a period of 25 years from September 16, 1966 (until 1991), 
subject to an extension by mutual agreement.259 Therefore, the effects of Philippine 
capabilities increase and domestic regime change prior to the year of 1991 did not 
directly lead to the Philippines’ alliance restructuring behavior. The treaty term of an 
alliance is an important factor in the timing of alliance restructuring but this variable is 
missing in the quantitative analysis. In 1990, the United States and the Philippines began 
to negotiate for a possible extension and their failure to reach mutually agreeable terms 
led to the alliance restructuring in the end.  
               In summary, at the time of alliance restructuring, the Philippines felt assured 
that there were no external threats, and that U.S. bases existed for the purpose of solely 
favoring the U.S. security strategy. For these reasons, the Philippines believed that they 
had the right to seek rent from the United States. In addition, the U.S. bases were a 
symbol of unequal and unhealthy bilateral relations, which the Philippines desired to 
change.       
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5.4.1.2. United States 
               There were two main bases in the Philippines: Clark Air Base (CAB) and Subic 
Naval Base (SNB), and during the Cold War, CAB, the largest U.S. air base in East Asia, 
functioned as the air logistics and transit hub from the Western Pacific, to the Middle 
East. CAB was also home to two F-4 fighter squadrons. SNB was the largest supply 
depot and the most sophisticated overseas ship repair facility, which could handle 20 to 
25 ships at one time. These functions were primarily available to the U.S. Seventh Fleet 
stationed in Yokosuka, Japan. From SNB, the P-3 anti-submarine aircraft patrolled the 
South China Sea.260 Following the deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s, 
the value of U.S. bases in the Philippines began to grow again over time. After the 
Vietnam War, the Soviets secured Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam as a naval base. The U.S. 
bases also played a counterbalancing role to this new Soviet base, in which the Soviets 
deployed 15 bombers, two attack submarines, a frigate, and a destroyer.261      
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Figure 5.3. Locations of U.S. Bases in the Philippines262 
 
                                                          
262 Comptroller General of the United States, United States Department of State, and United States 
Department of Defense. Report to the Congress: Military Assistance and Commitments in the Philippines. 
(Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1973): 40. 
 141 
 
               In the late 1980s the U.S. reexamined the security strategy due to a new Soviet 
administration led by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. In 1988 Gorbachev offered 
to abandon the Soviet base in Cam Ranh Bay if the United States removed the bases in 
the Philippines.263 By January 1990, a U.S. Department of Defense official confirmed 
that the Soviets had withdrawn all fighters and about half of its bombers from Cam Ranh 
Bay.264 With the sense of Soviet threat in decline, a new U.S. assessment on the 
international environment was required. 
               Upon congressional request, the Pentagon produced a long term Asia Pacific 
strategic document, called “A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim” (East Asia 
Strategy Initiative: EASI), in April 1990. The EASI reconfirmed a continuing defense 
commitment through a forward-based defense posture in East Asia.265 But following the 
diminishing Soviet threat and the U.S. budgetary restraint, the EASI announced a 10-year 
strategic plan which included the reduction of 14,000-15,000 personnel by 1993 from the 
total of 135,000 forward deployed forces in Asia in 1990.266 As shown in Table 5.3, the 
United States actually reduced the military budget from $303.6 billion in 1989, to $273.3 
billion 1991. To meet the size of the budget, the U.S. military reduced the number of 
active military personnel from 2.1 million in 1989, to 1.9 million in 1991.267  
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Table 5.3. U.S. military budget (excluding veterans’ services and benefits) and active 
military personnel, 1989-1993 
Years ending June 30 U.S. military budget (in 
millions of dollars) 
U.S. active military 
personnel (as of end of 
fiscal year) 
1989 303,600 2,130,000 
1990 299,300 2,044,000 
1991 273,300 1,986,000 
1992 298,400 1,807,000 
1993 291,100 1,705,000 
 
               In the meantime, Richard Armitage, former Assistant Defense Secretary, was 
appointed by President George H. W. Bush as Special Negotiator for the new 
negotiations. In summer 1990, Armitage expressed his view on the U.S. approach for 
upcoming base negotiations with the Philippines in his article, and stated that: 
While negotiating in good faith to maintain the ability to use the 
facilities in the future, the U.S. should diversify rapidly and think 
about dispersing the capability of our Philippine facilities to other 
appropriate and politically feasible locations. We won't stay in the 
Philippines if we are not wanted, and money alone, even if the U.S. 
were willing to pay what the Philippines may ask for the bases, cannot 
cement friendship or confirm alliances. For the U.S., however, much 
more important than the use of the Philippine bases is the continued 
development of this country as a democratic nation. If we cannot live 
together as strategic partners, we should part as good friends. It is 
imperative that whatever decision is reached fully reflects the will of 
the Philippine people and is conducive to the continued development 
and westward orientation of the nation.268 
 
               While planning the reduction of the U.S. forces’ level, the United States placed 
its first preference on the retention of U.S. bases for the mid-term as long as the rent was 
reasonable. This concept was later referred to as “phasedown” (i.e., gradual reduction of 
U.S. forces) during the negotiations, in contrast to the Philippine approach of “phaseout” 
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(i.e., eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces). The United States had also begun preparing for 
a worst case scenario and searched for Plan B, in the event that negotiations broke down. 
Viable alternatives were Singapore and Japan. 
               A wide gap between the two countries prevailed before the formal negotiations. 
By the late 1980s-early 1990s, the Philippines placed a much lower value on the U.S. 
security commitment. For the United States, the value of the U.S. bases in the Philippines 
was secondary to the overall security strategy except during the Vietnam War and during 
the existence of Soviet naval bases in Vietnam. The Philippines now had a new security 
preference on the balance between arms and allied support, and great incentive to 
restructure the existing alliance. The following section traces the bargaining process in 
base negotiations, and explains how a new treaty for the bases developed and later failed 
to ratify in the Philippine Senate, which led to the withdrawal of U.S. forces.     
 
5.4.2. Bargaining Process of the 1990-91 U.S.-RP Base Talks 
               Formal negotiations, officially called the Philippine-American Cooperation 
Talks (PACT), began on September 18, 1990. Before the two states signed the Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Security on August 27, 1991, they held a total of seven 
rounds of negotiations.269 The Philippines had aspired to redefine the bilateral relations in 
a broader context by going beyond military bases.270 However, the military base issue 
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remained at the core of negotiations, especially in the following points: (1) How long the 
U.S. bases will continue to exist; and (2) While remaining in existence, how much the 
U.S. should pay in a compensation package? This section focuses on these two points. 
 
5.4.2.1. The Issue of Duration 
               In PACT I, the U.S. hoped to achieve the following two goals: (1) a new 
agreement towards a phased reduction (i.e., phasedown) of the forces for 10-12 years 
while maintaining operational flexibility; and (2) following the expiration of this new 10-
12 years agreement, the U.S. be allowed appropriate access and use of Philippine 
facilities, possibly combining with a U.S. military presence at a mutually agreed level.271 
In response, the Philippines urged an orderly withdrawal (i.e., phaseout) of the U.S. bases 
for the near future, and also requested that no U.S. combat troops/equipment/squadrons 
for fighter and special operations be allowed after September 17, 1991. The Philippines 
would however consider the U.S. use of the Philippine facilities for transport and repair 
purposes on a commercial basis after the expiration of the new agreement.272  
               Before PACT II, Vice Chair Bengzon publicly outlined three historical facts 
from the Philippine viewpoint: (1) the facilities were in the Philippines to serve US 
interests, not the Philippines’s; (2) for decades US policy toward the Philippines had been 
centered on the bases; and (3) the history of U.S.-Philippine relations was one of 
inequality and onerous term, to the Philippines’ long-standing disadvantage. Bengzon 
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emphasized that the Philippines set a guideline for a new arrangement with the United 
States.273 In a public speech made by the leading negotiator, the Philippines made it clear 
that they would place a greater value on national sovereignty and less on allied support.  
               In the following rounds, the two countries widened the consensuses in the 
agreed points. In PACT II, the Philippines submitted a draft for the new treaty and the 
U.S. accepted it as a basis for discussion.274 The United States agreed to relocate 48 
fighters and 1,800 military personnel into Alaska. The Philippines was willing to accept 
the U.S. request for using the 13th Air Force Headquarters in Clark and for maintaining a 
Special Operations Squadron during the term of a new agreement.275 The new agreement 
represented a phaseout period from the Philippine viewpoint, and a phasedown period 
from the U.S. viewpoint. Since there was no consensus on the duration, the U.S. also 
prepared for Plan B and signed an agreement with Singapore allowing greater U.S. 
military access to the Singaporean facilities.276               
               PACT III, IV, and V focused on the topics of security and bases and discussed 
in detail the U.S. military presence issue after the expiration of the 1947 MBA. One 
major question was the “purpose” of U.S. military presence in the Philippines. The 
original U.S. position required only prior “consultation” (not prior approval) from the 
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Philippines if U.S. forces were to launch an attack from Philippine territory against any 
third country. Due to a new Philippine request, the U.S. agreed to Philippine “approval” 
in such cases during the phaseout or phasedown period under a new agreement.277  
               Regarding the duration of U.S. military presence under the new agreement, the 
Philippines proposed a five-year phaseout period in the PACT VI, and with President 
Aquino’s approval, a seven-year term in the PACT V. The Philippines had hoped that this 
concession would be favorable to them in the ongoing compensation package talks.278 
From the U.S. viewpoint however, a 5-7 years period was too impractical to relocate such 
a large military facility. The United States maintained its position of a 10 to 12 years 
duration and the possibility of access to the Philippine facilities after the expiration of a 
new agreement, causing this issue to be carried over to the next round. 
               In PACT VI, the United States made a new offer for a seven-year duration plus 
a two-year withdrawal period (i.e., a total nine-year military presence), and accepted a 
total amount of $825 million in a compensation package proposed by the Philippines,279 
as the next section describes in detail. Now the difference in duration was two years, but 
the Philippines decided to stay firm on their position. Aquino told the Philippine panel 
that she was willing to accept a compensation package of less than $825 million, if the 
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United States agreed to a seven-year duration.280 She also publicly cleared her position in 
her press statement and said that: 
We have no obligation to the continued military presence of the United 
States in Asia and the Pacific. What we have made clear is that if the 
US will have a military presence in the Philippines, it will have to be 
under our terms and under a properly negotiated treaty.281 
 
               As the stalemate continued, some voices seeking a more accommodating 
position to the U.S. request were raised from the Cabinet members in charge of financial 
and defense affairs outside the negotiation team.282 The Philippines were in deep foreign 
debt of $29 billion,283 and some Aquino administration officials counted on the U.S. 
compensation package in order to save the country from the economic crisis. However, 
the Philippine panel insisted that Aquino should stay firm along with the original position. 
In June 1991, Aquino finally decided to change her position from a seven-year duration 
to a seven-year duration plus one-year withdrawal period (i.e., total eight-year duration), 
but the United States still did not agree.284 Changes in Aquino’s position caused leading 
negotiator Bengzon great dissatisfaction and frustration, and he ultimately resigned from 
his post.                    
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5.4.2.2. The Issue of Compensation 
               In PACT IV, the Philippine panel set the following four principles regarding the 
compensation package talks: (1) the level of compensation should be responsive to the 
Philippines’ economic needs; (2) the pay arrangement should be secure and no longer on 
a “best-efforts” basis; (3) official economic development assistance from the U.S. should 
be excluded as compensation for the base facilities; and (4) other U.S. allies benefiting 
from the U.S. bases in the Philippines should share the burden of cost.285  
               The Philippines hoped to secure a minimum annual compensation package of 
$825 million (FY 1990-91 compensation package of annual $481 million), which was 
categorized into $400 million in appropriated funds and $425 million in non-budgetary 
forms of assistance (e.g., guaranteed trade access, and external debt reduction).286 The 
U.S. made a counter proposal of $520 million for FY 1992, which included $320 million 
in appropriated funds and $200 million in economic developmental assistance (i.e., not as 
a direct compensation to the base facilities).287 From the Philippine viewpoint, non-base 
related assistance or aid should not be counted as a part of the base compensation 
package. The U.S. proposal of $520 million only meant $320 million to the Philippines, 
and this $320 million was much smaller than the current compensation of $481 million.               
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               The United States offered a seven-year duration plus a two-year withdrawal 
period (i.e., a total nine-year military presence), and accepted $825 million in a 
compensation package proposed by the Philippines on the condition that the Philippines 
accept a longer than seven-year duration.288 But the Philippines decided to stay firm on 
their position on the duration, and rejected the U.S. proposal. 
 
5.4.2.3. Eruption of Mt. Pinatubo and PACT VII 
               PACT VI failed to bring an agreement. With only four months left for the MBA 
to expire, a natural disaster occurred. The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo on June 9, 1991 
greatly affected the upcoming PACT VII (July 15-17, 1991).289 Volcanic ash and sand 
piled in the CAB and the SNB, forcing 20,000 U.S. servicemen and their families to 
evacuate from the bases.290 The United States assessed the cost of clean-up and 
reconstruction for both the CAB and SNB. For the former, the U.S. Air Force estimated 
$521 million and assessed that the continuous emission of volcanic ash over 5 to 25 years 
would make flying very dangerous.291 For the SNB, the estimated reconstruction cost was 
$250 million because the SNB had no significant impact from the continuous volcanic 
activities due to the base location being away from the route of mudflow.292 This new 
situation caused the U.S. to reassess its position in the negotiations, which lead to a 
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greater incentive to leave the CAB as soon as possible and maintain the SNB during the 
term of a new agreement with as little cost as possible.293 For the Philippines’ side, the 
Aquino government would need at least P10 billion for the total reconstruction 
program,294 and now needed money from anywhere as soon as possible.  
               Two days after PACT VII started, the two countries reached an agreement. The 
United States would immediately start clean-up and withdrawal operations in the CAB 
and turn it over to the Philippines by September 16, 1992.295 For the SNB, the United 
States would restore the facilities and maintain operations in a ten-year duration, 
beginning on September 17, 1991. Following the end of the tenth year, the withdrawal 
period would begin.296 Regarding the compensation package, the Bush administration 
asked the U.S. Congress for $362.8 million for FY 1992, and would ask no less than $203 
million starting on from FY 1993.297  
               On August 27, 1991, Foreign Secretary Manglapus and U.S. Ambassador Frank 
Wisner II signed the U.S.-Philippines Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security, 
replacing the 1947 MBA.298     
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5.4.2.4. Failure of Treaty Ratification in the Philippine Senate and Its Aftermath 
               Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution stipulated the Philippine Senate had the 
sole authority to ratify a treaty. The Treaty signed by the two states on August 27, 1991 
was immediately submitted to the Senate on the same day. Article VII of the Constitution 
provided that no treaty shall be valid and effective unless concurred by at least two-thirds 
of all members of the Senate. There was a total of 23 senators at that time, therefore eight 
senators were left able to reject the treaty. 
               The Aquino administration organized a mass rally in support for the treaty in 
Manila and approximately 150,000 people gathered especially from the provinces where 
the bases were located. After the rally, Aquino marched to the Senate with the group, 
demanding the ratification.299 Pro-base senators supported the treaty from an economic 
viewpoint,300 but the senatorial debate had a strong nationalistic mood. Anti-base senators 
complained that the new compensation package was unacceptably low and that it was a 
sign of American arrogance.301  On September 16, twelve senators voted against the 
treaty, which finally failed to be ratified.302 
               The Aquino administration initially sought a national referendum in order to 
overturn the Senatorial decision, but gave up on the idea by the end of September and 
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accepted the result.303 The United States kept its distance from Aquino’s referendum 
plan.304 While the United States maintained a wait and see attitude towards developments 
in the Philippines, the Pentagon already started talks with Singapore and Japan for 
relocating the functions of ship-repair, maintenance yards, and supply depots from the 
SNB.305 The United States formally turned over the CAB in November 1991 and the 
SNB in November 1992, respectively.306 Before the turnover of the SNB, the United 
States and the Philippines military commanders agreed to continued military cooperation. 
Based on this new military-to-military level agreement, the United States and the 
Philippine military branches continued joint training and exercises, the exchange of 
information, and logistic cooperation and coordination. To achieve these objectives, 
United States naval ships secured access to the Subic Bay.307  
   
5.5. Conclusion 
               This chapter tested a proposed theory of alliance restructuring by examining the 
Philippines’ decision of restructuring the alliance with the U.S. in 1992 as a “typical 
case.” It demonstrated the explanatory power of the theory. When the Philippines formed 
the alliance with the U.S. in 1947, potential external aggression and internal penetration, 
by a resurgent Japan and Communist China, was a primary concern for the Philippine 
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leaders. They valued sovereignty but also realistically placed greater value on the U.S. 
security support over their own arms, and expected the maintenance of U.S. bases to 
defend their countries.  
               Since the alliance formation, the Philippines’ capabilities grew more powerful 
in comparison to its neighbors and external powers, and the country also experienced 
domestic political regime change. By the early 1990s, the original Philippines’ 
preferences on the combination of own arms and allied support had changed. The Sino-
U.S. relations had already become normalized. The U.S. and the Soviets ended the Cold 
War. Japan recovered its economic strength but underperformed in the international 
security arena. These international environmental changes allowed the newly 
democratically elected Philippine leaders to underestimate the value of U.S. bases in their 
country. The new Philippine leaders no longer feared external threats, and in their 
viewpoint, the U.S. bases only existed in order to serve the U.S. global strategy, not the 
Philippines’ national interests. The Philippines no longer felt the need to depend on U.S. 
bases for its external security.   
               The only benefit for keeping U.S. bases was economic. Prior to the expiration of 
the MBA in 1991, the base talks of 1990-1991 had begun between the two countries. The 
Philippines attempted to achieve two goals: (1) a withdrawal of U.S. forces in 5-7 years; 
and (2) larger compensation packages in this 5-7 years than in the previous years, but 
they failed to achieve both of them. In the end, the two countries agreed to: (1) 
maintenance of only the SNB for ten years; and (2) a $203 million compensation package 
starting on FY 1993.  
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               After the Philippine Senate refused to ratify the new treaty, the United States 
turned over the bases back to the Philippines in 1992, and was no longer required to pay 
compensation packages. But the U.S. successfully secured access to the Philippine 
facilities by reaching a deal with their military counterpart. The 1947 MBA finally 
expired and the U.S.-Philippines alliance was transformed into a mutual defense alliance 
without the permanent deployment of foreign troops. 
 
5.6. Postscript: U.S. Defense Commitment on the Philippines Territorial Disputes 
               The 1992 alliance restructuring terminated the 1947 Military Bases Agreement 
(MBA), but the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) remains in full effect today. For 
more than six decades, the MDT has been tested on several occasions in Philippines 
territorial disputes with neighbors. This section explores the U.S. response under the 
MDT to the Philippine territorial disputes including the Sabah dispute with Malaysia and 
three South China Sea territorial dispute incidents with China (Mischief Reef in 1995, 
Second Thomas Shoal in 1999, and Scarborough Shoal in 2012).  
               The MDT stipulates that the two countries commit to settle any international 
disputes in which they may be involved through peaceful means (Article I), and will 
maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack 
separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid (Article II). If territorial integrity, 
political independence or security of either of the two countries is threatened by an 
external armed attack in the Pacific, the two countries will consult each other regarding 
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the implementation of MDT (Article III). Articles IV and V are essential for a U.S. 
defense commitment with the Philippines. 
Article IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific 
Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and 
safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in 
accordance with its constitutional processes…. 
 
Article V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of 
the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan 
territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its 
jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or 
aircraft in the Pacific.308 
  
In the last five decades, terms such as “metropolitan territory” and “Pacific” have been 
better interpreted and the geographical scope of the MDT has also been clarified. In 
accordance with the MDT, in times of Philippine territorial disputes with neighbors, the 
two countries have consulted each other and have developed a capacity to resist armed 
attack separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid. But what the United States 
would do “exactly” if the Philippines comes under attack, still remains ambiguous even 
today.       
 
Sabah Dispute with Malaysia 
               In 1968, the Sabah territorial dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia 
regarding a northern part of Borneo Island became the first potential test of the MDT. 
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos demanded U.S. security assurance “from 
aggression from whatever source.” In this case, the U.S. declared neutrality and urged the 
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two countries to resolve through peaceful negotiations. In the end Marcos showed “no 
intension to forcibly take Sabah or physically incorporate it by force.”309 The United 
States was not required to clarify under what conditions specifically the MDT would be 
applied and what the United States would do during this type of circumstance. 
 
Figure 5.4. Sabah territorial dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia310 
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Spratly Islands Sovereignty Declaration and the 1979 Vance-Romulo Letter  
               In 1978, the Philippines declared its sovereignty over the Spratly Islands.311 In 
the following year, the United States and the Philippines revised the MBA.312 At the same 
time, upon the Philippine request, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance exchanged a letter to 
Philippine Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo, explaining the U.S. interpretation of the 
MDT in greater detail. The letter dated January 6, 1979 reaffirmed the U.S. defense 
commitment to the Philippines under the MDT, clarifying the following four points.313 
First, the Letter defined the “metropolitan territory” of the Philippines as all of the land 
areas and adjacent waters which were ceded to the United States by Spain in the Treaty of 
Paris in 1898 and the Treaty of Washington in 1900. Secondly, the Letter stated that an 
attack on Philippine armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific would “not” 
have to occur within the metropolitan territory of the Philippines or island territories 
under its jurisdiction in the Pacific in order to come within the definition of the Pacific 
area in Article V. Thirdly, the Letter confirmed that an armed attack on the armed forces, 
public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific of either of the countries, including islands under 
their jurisdiction, would serve as a “casus foederis” for the implementation of the treaty. 
Lastly, the Letter noted that the 1973 War Powers Resolution did not alter treaties which 
were in existence at the time the resolution was adopted.314 
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               The Vance Letter was intended to express a continuous U.S. presence in 
Southeast Asia after the withdrawal from Vietnam, but it raised concern among U.S. 
Congressional members who thought that the Secretary was expanding the U.S. defense 
commitment with the Philippines which could cause the U.S. to be dragged into territorial 
disputes. In response Assistant State Secretary Douglas J. Bennet, Jr. stated the Vance 
Letter “in no way represents an expansion of the commitment in the Treaty which has 
been in effect since 1951.”315  
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Figure 5.5. Contested boundaries and islands in the South China Sea316  
 
 
1995 Mischief Reef Incident 
               This chapter has previously examined that the Philippine external threat 
perception was very relaxed from the 1980s to early 1990s. When China built a military 
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reclamation-south-china-sea, accessed on February 28, 2016.  
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platform at Mischief Reef, a part of the Spratly Islands, in February 1995, the Philippines 
found themselves totally unprepared to face challenges from the Chinese.  
               The Mischief Reef incident was the first test of a U.S. response under the MDT. 
The United States expressed its concern for freedom of navigation which was a primary 
national interest, and asked of the Chinese leaders if they were seeking sovereignty over 
the shipping lanes. In response China expressed no intent to control the shipping lanes, 
and from a U.S. perspective, the likelihood of a major military confrontation between 
China and the Philippines was extremely low. The 1979 Vance Letter might have 
increased the Philippine expectations of U.S. aids in the territorial dispute contingencies 
after 1979, but the relieved United States then urged the Philippines and China to 
negotiate peacefully.317 In August 1995 the two countries agreed on a code of conduct, 
which aimed at preventing similar incidents from occurring in the future, and increasing 
bilateral cooperation in the South China Sea,318 however Mischief Reef continues to 
remain under Chinese control. 
 
1999 Second Thomas Shoal Incident 
               The new Sino-Philippine code of conduct was not able to curtail their activities 
in the South China Sea as the two countries demonstrated their sovereignty once again. In 
1998, China repaired and fortified its structure at Mischief Reef, and the Philippines 
demanded China to destroy it. The Philippines also signed and ratified the Visiting Forces 
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Agreement (VFA) with the United States which increased the U.S.-Philippine joint 
military exercises in the Philippines.319 In May 1999, the Philippines ran aground a 
World War II-era ship called the Sierra Madre, on the Second Thomas Shoal in the 
Spratly Islands, just about 21 nautical miles from Mischief Reef.320 During the same 
month, the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Thomas C. Hubbard wrote a letter to 
Philippine Foreign Secretary Domingo L. Siazon, reconfirming that “the US Government 
stands by its statements in the Vance-Romulo letter of January 6, 1979.” In the same 
letter, Hubbard cited Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s statement that “the US 
considers the South China Sea to be part of the Pacific Area.”321 Since 1999 the 
Philippines have maintained the ship as a kind of military outpost stationed with fewer 
than a dozen Filipino troops there as of today.322 The 1999 Hubbard- Siazon Letter 
further clarified the inclusion of the South China Sea under the scope of the MDT, but it 
still did not clarify what the United States is obligated to do “exactly” under the MDT.  
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2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident 
               In the period between 2000 and 2008, there was positive momentum between 
the Philippines and China, including the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea that enunciated a commitment to international law, self-restraint and 
consultation. But the sovereignty of the Scarborough Shoal was officially claimed by the 
Philippines in 2009.323 Following a series of provocative actions and reactions between 
the two countries in 2011,324 the Philippines and China collided in April 2012 over the 
Scarborough Shoal, a small reef in the South China Sea, lying 128 nautical miles west of 
Luzon and 600 nautical miles east of China’s Hainan Island.325 The standoff involved the 
Philippine navy and Chinese maritime forces and represented the highest level of tension 
between the two countries since the 1995 Mischief Reef incident.  
               The United States maintained its traditional stance once again stating that it will 
not take a position on territorial disputes between the Philippines and China, and 
supported a peaceful resolution based upon international law and multilateral 
processes.326 It remains unclear whether the MDT applies the Scarborough Shoal, but 
since 2001, the United States itself has been involved in multiple incidents with the 
Chinese ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace. In March 2001, September 
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2002, March 2009, and May 2009, Chinese ships and aircraft confronted and harassed the 
U.S. naval ships Bowditch, Impeccable, and Victorious as they were conducting survey 
and ocean surveillance operations in both, South and East China Seas.327 At this time the 
United States saw the growing Chinese activities in the South China Sea as posing a 
security risk to freedom of navigation and took additional measures to meet the 
challenges.  
               First, the United States and the Philippines signed the Manila Declaration in 
November 2011, which reaffirmed the alliance. At the signing ceremony in Manila, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that “The United States will always be in the 
corner of the Philippines and we will stand and fight with you.”328 During his April 2014 
visit to the Philippines, President Barrack Obama signed the Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) which stipulates that U.S. military forces are to be 
deployed on a rotational basis, and added that “our commitment to defend the Philippines 
is ironclad.”329  
               Second, the United States and the Philippines further enhanced the joint military 
exercises, focusing on potential external security threats in the South China Sea. The 
annual joint exercises include the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), 
the Amphibious Landing Exercise (PHIBLEX), and “Balikatan” (Shoulder-to-Shoulder). 
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The CARAT exercises are conducted bilaterally and multilaterally between the U.S. 
Navy and several Southeast Asian countries. In June 2011, U.S.-Philippine naval 
exercises were held in the Sulu Sea. In October 2011, the annual PHIBLEX included a 
mock hostile beach assault. U.S. and Philippine officials stated that the CARAT exercises 
and PHIBLEX drills were “not” related to the recent Spratly Islands incidents. Balikatan 
is the most comprehensive annual U.S.-Philippines joint military exercises, started in 
1991, and suspended in 1995-1999 during the VFA negotiations. In 2012, Balikatan 
included the first joint combat drills off the coast of Palawan Island, which is the 
Philippine land mass closest to the disputed Spratly Islands and also near the country’s 
largest offshore oil field. As a result, the United States trained the Philippine forces in 
defending and retaking oil and gas rigs.330   
               Thirdly and lastly, the Philippines have planned to increase their defense budget 
to buy ships, helicopters, and weapons in order to bolster their capabilities. Since 2011 
the United States has been selling a particularly modern naval weapon system and 
equipment to the Philippines. The Philippines also have purchased two decommissioned 
U.S. Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters, which are now the largest vessels in their navy. 
The Philippines reportedly are seeking six more frigates and are in negotiations to acquire 
a squadron of surplus F-16 fighter jets.331            
               In its response to the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012, the United States 
took stronger measures than those of the two previous incidents. This change in U.S. 
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policy came about because Chinese activities seemed to pose a more serious challenge to 
the U.S. national interest, freedom of navigation. While remaining neutral in the disputes 
and ambiguous towards the MDT application in the disputed islands, the U.S. intensions 
were to provide greater reassurance to the Philippines verbally and materially, build the 
Philippines’ own capabilities through the training exercises and arms sales, and deter 
China from taking further provocative actions through the enhanced Philippine 
capabilities and U.S. military activities in the South China Sea. The United States hoped 
for China to change their current course of actions in the end.  
 
Conclusion 
               The Philippines have continued to lose their claimed sovereign islands since 
1995, while the United States acted strictly impartial and urged the Philippines and China 
to negotiate peacefully. The U.S. aid under the MDT had been mainly psychological and 
material between the 1995 Mischief Reef and 2012 Scarborough Shoal incidents. The 
latter incident actually took place in the background of growing direct competition 
between the United States and China in the South China Sea since the early 2000s. From 
a U.S. viewpoint, the Chinese assertive behaviors in the Scarborough Shoal have not only 
threatened the Philippine interest but also the U.S. interest of freedom of navigation to a 
great degree. Since 2012, the United States has taken tougher measures than ever before, 
while hoping for China to change their current course of actions in the South China Sea. 
               Contrary to the U.S. desire, the South China Sea disputes have remained at a 
high level of tension among the parties involved. The most recent development was 
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China’s land reclamation and facility-construction activities in December 2013. China, as 
of June 2015, has reclaimed more than 2,900 acres of land in comparison with Vietnam, 
80 acres; Malaysia, 70 acres; the Philippines, 14 acres; and Taiwan, 8 acres. At the 
reclamation sites, China has built new berthing areas to allow access for larger ships to 
the outposts. China also landed a test flight on a newly completed airfield at Fiery Cross 
Reef in the Spratly Islands. These facilities will enable China to establish a more robust 
power projection presence in the region.332 The United States has conducted the Freedom 
of Navigation (FON) operations in the South China Sea in order to challenge maritime 
claims that the United States believes is inconsistent with international law, but so far the 
FON program has not succeeded in stopping or altering positively the Chinese 
expansionistic activities.  
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6. Case Studies: U.S.-South Korea Alliance 
               In October 1953, the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South 
Korea) signed the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), which took effect in November 1954, 
and it was the beginning of a formal alliance relationship between the two countries. 
During the Korean War, 54,246 American service members lost their lives in defense of 
South Korea, while South Korea dispatched approximately 50,000 troops at maximum in 
a year during the Vietnam War, and 4,407 South Korean troops were killed in support of 
its ally, the United States.333 South Korea also dispatched medical and transport units to 
support the U.S. in Kuwait in 1991, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003.334 The year 
2013 marked the sixty-year anniversary of the MDT, and the two countries pledged the 
continuity of the alliance.335 
               The U.S.-ROK alliance is defined as a deviant and negative case with a 
“surprising value” based on my proposed theory of alliance restructuring.336 The values 
of the two key independent variables (i.e., stronger South Korean capabilities in 
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comparison to neighbors and external major powers; and domestic regime change since 
the alliance formation) have been positively present since 1960s, but there has been no 
formal alliance restructuring, which is inconsistent with my theory. There should be some 
possible theoretical explanation for the absence of predicted outcomes. The analytical 
aims of this chapter are to find a possible omitted factor in a proposed theory, and an 
error in the measurement of variables; and to assess a possible new causal mechanism 
that might have been previously overlooked.337    
               This chapter is organized in six sections. The first section examines why the 
United States and South Korea initially decided to sign a mutual defense treaty in 
October 1953. Secondly, this chapter presents quantitative evidence supporting that South 
Korea had actually become more powerful in comparison to non-allied neighbors and 
external powers and had experienced domestic regime changes since the alliance 
formation. The third section focuses on the South Korean foreign and security policy 
under the Kim Dae-jung administration (1998-2003) in the late 1990s,338 and investigates 
why the South Korean alliance objectives and preferences on balance between its own 
arms and U.S. support did not shift. Fourthly, the chapter examines why South Korea had 
not restructured the alliance even though the two external and internal factors have 
existed before the Kim Dae-jung administration. The fifth section examines two counter-
arguments to explain the non-existence of restructuring: (1) institutional explanation; and 
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(2) ideational explanation. Lastly, the chapter briefly discusses about the Roh Moo-hyun 
administration (2003-2008) and its alliance policy as a postscript.  
               This chapter argues that there were three omitted independent variables: (1) 
geography; (2) weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and (3) provocative North Korean 
behaviors which prevented South Korea from shifting its alliance objectives and security 
preferences, and concludes that my proposed theory of alliance restructuring in 
combination with the omitted factors provides a more convincing explanation for the 
persistence of the U.S.-South Korea alliance in the late 1990s. 
 
6.1. Alliance Objectives and Security Preferences at the Time of Alliance Formation 
               This section examines the alliance objectives and security preferences of the 
U.S. and South Korea at the time of alliance formation. A tracing of the bilateral 
interactions from 1948 to 1954 reveals that South Korea continuously sought with 
determination to gain a U.S. defense commitment and establish sufficient military 
capabilities through U.S. military assistance. The U.S. was attempting to avoid the 
security commitment, but finally decided to negotiate a MDT with South Korea during 
the armistice talks. This section divides the bilateral interactions into the three periods: 
(1) the pre-Korean War (1948-1950); (2) the Korean War (1950-1953); and (3) the post-
Korean War (1953-1954). 
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6.1.1. The Pre-Korean War (1948-1950)   
               In December 1945, foreign ministers from the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the 
U.K. agreed to establish a unified independent government in Korea after a five-year 
period of trusteeship by four powers including China.339 The U.S. however faced strong 
opposition to the trusteeship from conservative Koreans who were eager to obtain 
immediate independence. Without the participation of the conservatives in the South, a 
provisional government would be dominated by leftists who were under the Soviet 
influences.340 The U.S. was in need of finding an alternative policy option, and decided to 
adopt a new policy of establishing conditions in support of a new government in South 
Korea as a means of facilitating the liquidation of the U.S. commitment of men and 
money in Korea with minimal negative effects.341  
               There are several strategic and economic reasons supporting this new U.S. 
policy.342 From U.S. strategic viewpoints, the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) concluded that 
“the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases 
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in Korea.”343 The southern part of Korea was considered difficult to defend, therefore the 
JCS viewed that in the case of war, the current level of U.S. forces in Korea 
(approximately 45,000 troops) might be either destroyed or obligated to abandon Korea, 
with serious damage to U.S. prestige in either case.344 Furthermore, continued direct 
political, economic, and military responsibility in Korea could potentially increase the 
risk of U.S. with involvement in a major war in an area advantageous to the Soviet 
Union.345 A withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea at the time would not damage the U.S. 
military position in Asia unless the Soviets established military strength in South Korea 
capable of directly threatening Japan.346 Also a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
Korea would not adversely affect the U.S. position in Japan either.347 Lastly, due to a 
rapid defense budget reduction, the U.S. military manpower in Korea should be 
redeployed to a higher priority location.348                  
               From an economic viewpoint, the southern part of Korea was agricultural and 
dependent on North Korean natural resources and industrial capacity including electric 
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power generation and coal.349 The U.S. estimated that an economic collapse in South 
Korea would ensue within a matter of weeks after the termination of U.S. aid,350 and also 
noted that “there is no assurance that South Korea can be made economically self-
sufficient so long as the peninsula remains truncated.”351            
               On the ROK side, the withdrawal of U.S. troops was a matter of national 
survival. The most urgent policy consideration inside the ROK government was to build 
its ability to defend itself in the case of a North Korean attack.352 But the ROK’s efforts 
were not successful. President Syngman Rhee tried to link his request for additional 
military aids with his disapproval of the U.S. military withdrawal. His continuous and 
coercive requests, privately and even publicly, annoyed U.S. officials, and Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson stated to the Ambassador to South Korea John Muccio that 
additional military assistance was “absolutely out of [the] question.” Acheson also 
informed Muccio that only $11 million was available as U.S. military aids to South Korea 
in comparison to the ROK requests of more than $200 million.353 From the U.S. 
assessment, ROK forces would be well-trained and equipped based on the ongoing U.S. 
military aids plan.354 
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               Furthermore Rhee sought to formalize the U.S. defense commitment.355 The 
U.S. repeatedly attempted to verbally assure to Rhee that the U.S. had no intention of 
abandoning Korea,356 but did not specifically mention a U.S. defense commitment. Rhee 
dispatched a special envoy to meet with Acheson in July 1949, and sought “a specific 
assurance that the United States would come to the defense of the Republic of Korea in 
the event of an armed attack against it.” Acheson positively refused and stated that “such 
a specific military commitment by the United States was out of the question.”357          
               There was a further drawback to Rhee’s hope for the alliance with the United 
States. In January 1950, Secretary Acheson gave an acclaimed speech on U.S. policy 
toward Asia, and described a defensive perimeter running through the Aleutians, Japan 
and the Ryukyu Islands to the Philippines.358 South Korea itself was excluded from the 
defensive parameter. The following day, Acheson told the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that  
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“South Korea could now take care of any trouble that was started 
solely by North Korea, but it could not take care of any invasion which 
was either started by the Chinese Communists or powerfully supported 
by them or by the Soviet Union. I think this is clear….It is also clear 
that in that case we would take every possible action in the U.N. I do 
not believe that we would undertake to resist it by military force….if 
under the [U.N.] charter action were taken, we would take our part in 
that, but probably it [the U.N. action] would not be taken because they 
[the Russians] would veto it.”359  
 
               Before the start of the Korean War, South Korea had given up on expectations 
for a U.S. defense commitment except through a U.N. charter action, which was unlikely 
due to the Soviet’s veto power in the Security Council. U.S. military aid was designed to 
increase South Korean capabilities enough for internal security and external aggressions 
from North Korea without support from China and the Soviet Union. The only option left 
for South Korea was to increase its capabilities through its own efforts along with the 
limited U.S. military aids. In spring 1950, North Korea established military superiority 
over the South, and the following table is a summary of the military balance between 
them which was formed from previous studies.360 
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Table 6.1. Military Balance between South Korea and North Korea in Spring 1950 
 South Korea North Korea 
Total 
manpower 
-100,000 troops  -135,000 troops 
Equipped and 
trained 
manpower 
-64,697 troops were equipped 
and trained by the United 
States. 
-50,000 troops were equipped 
and trained by the Soviet Union 
-28,000 to 29,000 troops were 
veterans of the Chinese civil 
wars. 
Heavy 
hardware 
-No tanks 
-140 anti-tank guns 
-27 armored cars 
-10 training planes 
-No air fighters and bombers 
-60 cannons   
-240 to 258 tanks 
-550 anti-tank guns 
-12 anti-aircraft guns 
-176 self-propelled guns 
-110 to 170 air fighters and 
bombers  
Military 
advisors 
-500 from the United States -3,000 to 3,500 from the Soviet 
Union 
-15 Soviet officers in each North 
Korean army division 
 
6.1.2. The Korean War (1950-1953)   
               On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army crossed over the 38th parallel, and the 
U.S. intervened in the Korean War through U.N. charter action. As the war intensified, 
there was a peace effort already developing in the international community. In June and 
early July 1951, truce negotiations became a reality, but South Korea feared a possible 
settlement which included the conditions of a divided Korea and retention of Chinese 
troops in North Korea. South Korea began to think that if an armistice was inevitable, a 
U.S. military assurance would be necessary for future national security.361 In March 1952, 
President Rhee wrote a letter to President Truman and expressed his desire for a bilateral 
security pact in exchange for his support to an armistice as follows: 
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“A mutual security pact between our two nations….is an essential 
thing. Since your desire has been….to defend Korea against red 
aggression, there can be no reason for objecting to such a pact which 
alone w[ou]ld give the Korean people the supporting assurance they 
would badly need during a hazardous armistice. With a mutual 
security pact backing me….I can succeed in persuading my people to 
accept an armistice. The absence of any pact of reassuring nature…. 
the Koreans w[ou]ld rather fight to death….There is a persistent story 
that certain high US authorities are of the opinion that Koreans cannot 
defend their country without aid from their neighbors and that the 
neighbor that would help them is Japan….From bitter past experiences, 
many non-Communist Koreans w[ou]ld be forced to hug Communism 
as preferable to Japanese domination.”362 
 
               The U.S. reaction remained negative. In the middle of armistice talks, the 
increasingly anti-armistice remarks and behaviors from South Korea were a mounting 
concern to the United States.363 It was disturbing for U.S. officials to hear Rhee’s 
threatening comments on the withdrawal of the South Korean forces from operational 
command under the U.N. Command (UNC), and a possible unilateral military action 
beyond the armistice agreements.364 While Secretary Acheson believed that the retention 
of only adequate military forces in South Korea would be enough for their security, it was 
considered to be not in U.S. interest to form an alliance with such an unpredictable state 
as South Korea.365  
                                                          
362 United States Department of State. “The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Truman, 
Pusan, March 21, 1952.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Korea (in Two Parts), XV, 
Part 1. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984): 114-16. 
363 United States Department of State. “President Truman to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee), 
[Washington,] March 4, 1952.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Korea (in Two Parts), 
XV, Part 1. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984): 74-76. 
364 United States Department of State. “The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Tokyo, February 25, 1952-6:40 P.m.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1952-1954. Korea (in Two Parts), XV, Part 1. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1984): 59-61. 
365 United States Department of State. “Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 
[Washington,] April 30, 1952.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Korea (in Two Parts), 
XV, Part 1. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984): 185-86. 
 177 
 
               President Dwight Eisenhower took office in January 1953, and the issue of a 
bilateral security pact began to further link Korean reactions to the armistice negotiations. 
In April 1953, ROK Ambassador Yang visited Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and 
raised the issue of a mutual security pact.366 President Rhee also threatened to withdraw 
the ROK forces from the UNC and take military action against the Communists 
unilaterally. If so, the armistice negotiation between the U.S. and the Communists would 
surely be in jeopardy.367 
               The U.S. realized President Rhee’s strong desire for a mutual security pact, 
along with the expansion of U.S. military assistance. Rhee told the UNC Commander in 
Chief, Mark Clark, that it was difficult to understand why the U.S. could enter into a 
security pact with Japan and the other countries and yet remain unable to create a similar 
pact with the ROK which had been fighting in battle as a U.S. principle ally. Also Rhee 
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further sought U.S. military support in order to increase the ROK army, a total of 20 
divisions and establish a South Korean navy for future security.368 
               Eisenhower finally decided to offer Rhee negotiations for a MDT along the 
same lines as the Philippine and AUZUS (Australia and New Zealand) MDTs. The U.S. 
agreed to start negotiations, subject to receiving the following three assurances from 
Rhee: (1) ROK must refrain from opposition and agitation to a UNC armistice proposal; 
(2) ROK must cooperate with the implementation of an armistice agreement; and (3) 
ROK forces must remain under operational control of the UNC until the U.S. and ROK 
mutually agree such arrangements are no longer necessary.369 In late June, President Rhee 
finally suggested that he could support an armistice agreement but it would be impossible 
to sign it because that would be tantamount to accepting the current division of Korea.370 
The two countries agreed to high-level direct talks in order to narrow down the 
differences in various armistice-related issues including the negotiation of a MDT.371  
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               In the talks, President Rhee was trying to maximize his gains as much as 
possible because he believed the U.S. would never withdraw from Korea.372 The U.S. 
was aware that it could not win this war without expanding it beyond Korea, and wanted 
to succeed in an armistice agreement with the communists. In order to reach an armistice, 
the U.S. needed Rhee’s assurance of full cooperation, thus reducing U.S. concerns of 
Rhee’s possible unilateral military actions. President Eisenhower even advised that the 
United States do something to suggest that the U.S. might very well be prepared to leave 
Korea, by shifting military units or supplies.373 The U.S. actually used this tactic to 
influence Rhee’s decision of concession.374       
               President Rhee revealed his final position with the following points: (1) ROK 
cannot sign an armistice, but will not obstruct it, as long as it will not be detrimental to 
South Korean national survival; (2) If the US/UN forces cannot join with the ROK forces 
to achieve reunification, following a possible failure of political conference, ROK must 
have a specific assurance of moral and material support to its forces for reunification; and 
(3) ROK gives up its demand that a MDT be ratified prior to the conclusion of an 
armistice, and instead accept assurance from President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles 
that a MDT will be ratified. This was the first time that Rhee formally and in writing 
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agreed not to obstruct an armistice,375 and went on to attach the first Korean version draft 
of a MDT.376 
               Rhee’s letter was not totally satisfactory to the U.S. because it failed to mention 
the matter of continuous operational control of the UNC over ROK forces, and Rhee’s 
MDT draft was based on NATO, not the U.S.-Philippines MDT.377 But Dulles considered 
that Rhee’s first formal remarks on his willingness to cooperate in an armistice was 
sufficient in order to conclude an armistice with the communists. Rather than spending 
more time clarifying many unsatisfactory points in his letter at the time, the U.S. 
preferred to leave them for future negotiation with South Korea, and went on to issue a 
U.S.-ROK joint statement based on Rhee’s letter as soon as possible.378 Following the 
announcement of the bilateral joint statement,379 an armistice agreement was finally 
signed on July 27, 1953 by the U.S./UN and North Korean/Chinese delegation.       
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1953-7:46 P.m.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Korea (in Two Parts), XV, Part 2. 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984): 1362-63. 
379 United States Department of State Office of Media Services, United States Department of State Office 
of Public Communication. “Mr. Robertson Concludes Talks With Syngman Rhee, Press Release 369 Dated 
July 11[, 1953].” In The Department of State Bulletin, XXIX. No. 734. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1953): 72-73. 
 181 
 
 
6.1.3. The Post-Korean War (1953-1954) 
               Since the announcement of the U.S.-ROK joint statement dated July 11, 1953, 
the two countries had continued to correspond regarding the drafting of MDT.380 Their 
basic stances were that the U.S. wanted to minimize the possibility of entanglement with 
war in Korea, while the ROK wanted to maximize the possibility of involvement with the 
U.S. with war in Korea. From August 5th to 10th, 1953, Secretary Dulles visited Korea 
and discussed with President Rhee directly the following main points: (1) if a U.S.-ROK 
MDT will apply in the event of future Japanese aggression towards Korea; (2) if a MDT 
would commit the U.S. to participate in ROK efforts to reunify Korea through military 
force after the failure of a post-armistice political conference; and (3) for the U.S. to 
make a stronger commitment to South Korea than to the Philippines.  
               For the first point, Rhee explained that the Korean people were worried more 
about Japan than the Soviet Union, and went on to say that some Americans were indeed 
friendly to Japan but it was not wise to build up Japan militarily and economically. Rhee 
said he was not asking for U.S. protection in times of aggression initiated by the ROK, 
however he wanted to ensure that U.S. protection would cover any external attack 
including those from Japan. Dulles assured that a MDT would provide protection from 
                                                          
380 United States Department of State. “The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State, 
Seoul, July 21, 1953-2 P.m.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Korea (in Two Parts), 
XV, Part 2. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984): 1404-6.; United States 
Department of State. “The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the President 
of the Republic of Korea (Rhee), Washington, July 21, 1953.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1952-1954. Korea (in Two Parts), XV, Part 2. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1984): 1411-12.; United States Department of State. “The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the 
Secretary of State, Seoul, July 26, 1953.” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Korea (in 
Two Parts), XV, Part 2. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984): 1439-41. 
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Japan and the Soviet Union, and added that the current Japanese military program was 
designed to build up 10 army divisions, while the current ROK program planned 20 army 
divisions. The U.S., which will have military bases in Japan, will be allied to both Japan 
and ROK, therefore Dulles said that ROK should be able to cooperate with Japan with 
little fear.381 
               For the second point, Rhee stated that as long as the Chinese Communists 
remained in the north, ROK could not survive as a free and independent nation. Dulles 
firmly replied that he could not commit military forces from the U.S. to enter war again 
along with ROK in order to achieve the reunification of Korea. He pointed out that U.S. 
Senators were becoming quite worried about extending a U.S. commitment to the 
mainland of Asia, suggesting that if a MDT included a U.S. commitment to the 
reunification of Korea by force following the failure of political conference, it would 
never be ratified in the Senate. Rhee finally agreed and acknowledged the fact that the 
U.S. could not commit to such actions.382 
               For the third points, Rhee pushed for a MDT that would be stronger than the 
U.S.-Philippines MDT. ROK wanted the treaty to continue indefinitely without a clear 
termination clause. Dulles replied that the new treaty must have the same termination 
clause as the U.S.-Philippines MDT, which allowed either party to terminate the treaty 
                                                          
381 United States Department of State. “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of 
Northeast Asian Affairs (Young), [Seoul,] August 5, 1953-10:30 A.m.” In Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1952-1954. Korea (in Two Parts), XV, Part 2. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1984): 1466-73. 
382 United States Department of State. “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of 
Northeast Asian Affairs (Young), [Seoul,] August 7, 1953-10 A.m.” In Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1952-1954. Korea (in Two Parts), XV, Part 2. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1984): 1481-88. 
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with one year advance notice. If the U.S.-ROK MDT used different words, it would cause 
new trouble for the ratification process as well as U.S. relations with the other allies.383 In 
the end, Rhee again accepted the U.S. position. 
               At the final meeting, Rhee and Dulles initialed the MDT draft,384 and issued a 
joint statement, announcing that ROK will continue to cooperate with the UNC and leave 
the ROK forces under the UNC operational control until the U.S.-ROK MDT takes effect 
approximately in January 1954.385 In October 1953, the two countries officially signed 
the treaty,386 but the negotiations to arrange a political conference between the U.S./UN 
and the communists ended in a stalemate, which greatly frustrated Rhee. The ROK 
suggested that they might take unilateral action including the resumption of hostilities 
against North Korea if a political conference was neither held nor seemed to be held.  
               The U.S. Senate supported ratification of MDT with ROK in January 1954, but 
the U.S. placed the following two conditions in order for the ratification to take effect: (1) 
ROK must agree that their forces remain under the UNC operational control until both 
countries mutually agree that this arrangement is no longer necessary; and (2) the U.S. 
                                                          
383 United States Department of State. “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of 
Northeast Asian Affairs (Young), [Seoul,] August 7, 1953-10 A.m.” In Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1952-1954. Korea (in Two Parts), XV, Part 2. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1984): 1481-88. 
384 United States Department of State Office of Media Services, United States Department of State Office 
of Public Communication. “Text of Draft U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, Press Release 426 Dated 
August 7[, 1953].” In The Department of State Bulletin, XXIX. No. 738. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1953): 204. 
385 United States Department of State Office of Media Services, United States Department of State Office 
of Public Communication. “Joint Statement by the Secretary [Dulles] and President Rhee, Press Release 
424 Dated August 7[, 1953].” In The Department of State Bulletin, XXIX. No. 738. (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953): 203-4. 
386 United States Department of State Office of Media Services, United States Department of State Office 
of Public Communication. “Mutual Defense Treaty With Korea Signed, Press Release 531 Dated October 
1[, 1953].” In The Department of State Bulletin, XXIX. No. 746. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1953): 484-85. 
 184 
 
employs its military power against the aggressor of ROK in accordance with the U.S. 
constitutional processes (i.e., Congressional legislation that declares war), only in the 
event of an unprovoked attack on ROK. In November 1954, ROK accepted these 
conditions and the MDT finally took effect.387   
               In summary, South Korea as a newly independent nation and years-long 
belligerent against the communist neighbors attempted to maximize its national security 
by formalizing a U.S. defense commitment and increase its own capabilities through the 
U.S. assistance. ROK assessed that it would be tremendously difficult, if not impossible, 
to fight if North Korea received Chinese and Russian assistance. To deal with this 
possibility, ROK desired to formalize a U.S. defense commitment, and expected the 
MDT to be applied in the case of a resurgent Japanese attack against South Korea.  
               The U.S. was very reluctant to a U.S.-ROK MDT. A security pact with a 
country of strategically low value such as ROK did not make a sense. The unpredictable 
nature of the South Korean leadership created grave concern that the U.S. might be 
dragged into unwinnable wars in Korea once again. But in order to end the current 
unwinnable war in Korea, it was necessary to secure a ROK cooperation for the 
armistice.388 The MDT was the price to end such a war, and the U.S. made sure that the 
                                                          
387 United States Department of State Office of Media Services, United States Department of State Office 
of Public Communication. “U.S. and Korea Announce Initialing of Agreed Minute: Joint Statement, Press 
Release 652 Dated November 17[, 1954]; and Text of Agreed Minute, Press Release 660 Dated November 
19[,1954].” In The Department of State Bulletin, XXXI. No. 805. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1954): 809-11. 
388 United States Department of State. “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
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MDT would not be applied in times of the external aggression provoked by ROK. The 
ROK consent to maintain its forces under the UNC control even after the implementation 
of the armistice also helped to reduce U.S. fears of entanglement in future unnecessary 
wars in Korea. 
 
6.2. Changes in Capabilities and Domestic Regime 
               This section provides quantitative evidence of the changes in the South Korean 
capabilities and domestic regime and briefly describes the country’s developments in 
both capabilities and domestic politics.  
 
6.2.1. Capabilities Change 
               Figure 6.1 shows how South Korean capabilities have shifted in comparison 
with a set of non-allied neighbors and external major powers.389 The South Korean power 
position to a set of neighbors and external major powers had begun to improve since the 
1970s, continued until 1993, and has remained stable since then.  
                                                          
389 As explained in Methodology chapter, I annually identified which state possibly posed a security threat 
to South Korea in terms of power, contiguity, and allied relations by using Quackenbush’s politically active 
dyads (PAD) data. Based on the PAD data, I aggregated the possible threatening states’ capabilities data 
from the COW Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) and annually compared it to the South 
Korean capabilities. Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Identifying Opportunity for Conflict: Politically Active 
Dyads,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 23, 1 (2006): 37-51. 
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               There are two main reasons why the South Korean power position has improved 
over time. First, the South Korean capabilities steadily increased overall.390 Table 6.2 
represents military expenditures and presents historical data of South Korea and major 
neighbors and external powers. As the Table shows, the South Korean military 
expenditures were $83 million in 1953 and $10.5 billion in 1998. In the 1970-80s, South 
Korea continued to modernize its forces along with partial reductions of U.S. forces, and 
also increased its financial contributions to the U.S. forces in Korea. The second reason is 
much more significant, which is the decline of the Soviet Union/Russia’s capabilities.391 
To a lesser extent, the decreasing North Korean military expenditures after 1997 should 
be noted. Table 6.3 shows the real gross domestic product (GDP) data in billions of 2005 
                                                          
390 According to the CINC data, the South Korean capabilities share in the total international system was 
0.76% in 1953 and had increased to 2.67% in 1997. 
391 The Soviet Union/Russia’s capabilities share in the total international system was 17.3% in 1953 and 
drastically decreased to 5.4% in 1997. 
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US dollars, which is not a part of the CINC index, and the trend of real GDP is almost 
identical.   
Table 6.2. Historical military expenditures data of South Korea and major neighbors and 
external powers, 1953-2007 (in millions of US dollars) 
 South Korea USA Japan China Russia North Korea 
1953      83   49,621      437   2,538   25,528 NA 
1963    100   52,295      681 10,690   47,000 NA 
1973    429   78,385   3,119 24,500   96,410    608 
1976    876   91,013   4,972 31,700 138,000 1,004 
1977 1,471 100,925   5,514 32,700 149,000 1,034 
1983 4,407 217,198 11,654 34,500 250,000 1,916 
1986 5,110 265,480 20,930   5,830 287,600 3,870 
1987 6,970 273,966 25,420   5,640 303,000 4,220 
1988 8,510 281,935 28,406   5,860 317,900 4,620 
1989 9,886 294,880 30,090   6,670 119,440 4,200 
1990     10,620 289,755 28,730   6,060 128,790 5,230 
1991     10,800 262,389 32,680 18,790 133,700 5,450 
1992     11,400 286,892 38,600 24,300   47,220 5,500 
1993     11,930 297,600 41,730 27,400   29,120 5,300 
1994     12,764 293,214 46,639 28,945   96,693 5,660 
1995     14,179 277,834 50,219 32,929   82,000 5,232 
1996     16,172 277,254 45,502 36,176   73,990 5,559 
1997     15,334 276,324 40,891 36,551   64,000 2,273 
1998     10,461 279,702 38,482 38,191   57,107 2,086 
1999     12,088 292,147 40,383 39,889   56,800 2,100 
2000     12,749 303,136 45,316 42,000   52,000 2,091 
2001     11,165 322,365 39,513 46,049   63,684 2,049 
2002     13,081 348,555 39,200 68,963   50,800 5,000 
2003     14,632 404,920 42,835 75,500   65,200 5,500 
2004     17,463 455,908 45,152 87,150   59,600 NA 
2005     21,504 495,326 43,910 29,873   18,768 NA 
2006     24,645 521,840 41,144 35,223   24,577 NA 
2007     26,588 552,568 41,039 46,174   32,215 NA 
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Table 6.3. Historical real GDP data of South Korea and major neighbors and external 
powers, 1953-2000 (in billions of 2005 US dollars)392 
 South Korea USA Japan China Russia North Korea 
1953   20   2,271    241    445 NA NA 
1963   32   3,157    549    515 NA NA 
1973 100   4,934 1,372 1,018 NA   8 
1976 147   5,141 1,520 1,106 NA 11 
1977 158   5,387 1,622 1,143 NA 11 
1983 216   6,106 1,917 1,760 NA 14 
1986 298   7,010 2,194 2,571 NA 15 
1987 344   7,231 2,351 2,666 NA 15 
1988 389   7,523 2,591 2,648 NA 16 
1989 426   7,790 2,794 2,484 NA 16 
1990 475   7,912 3,021 2,556 2,748 15 
1991 525   7,875 3,214 2,718 2,947 15 
1992 561   8,161 3,341 2,983 2,293 13 
1993 607   8,420 3,451 3,401 1,966 13 
1994 670   8,798 3,583 3,609 1,675 13 
1995 738   9,034 3,753 4,008 1,571 12 
1996 781   9,402 3,812 4,164 1,210 12 
1997 810   9,850 3,833 4,344 1,168 11 
1998 745 10,296 3,734 4,305 1,054 11 
1999 834 10,792 3,727 4,566 1,019 11 
2000 910 11,253 3,834 4,863 1,150 12 
2001 931 11,344 3,795 5,198 1,194 12 
2002      1,003 11,495 3,811 5,746 1,217 12 
2003      1,043 11,776 3,870 6,231 1,328 12 
2004      1,093 12,191 3,954 6,855 1,522 13 
2005      1,163 12,564 4,003 7,522 1,717 13 
2006      1,201 12,908 4,024 8,296 2,018 13 
2007      1,229 13,161 4,061 9,192 2,368 13 
2008      1,256 13,082 4,029 9,476 2,589 13 
2009      1,242 12,594 3,768     10,269 2,376 13 
2010      1,333 12,916 3,960     11,101 2,492 13 
2011      1,377 13,195 3,947     11,812 2,613 13 
 
                                                          
392 Robert C. Feenstra, Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. Timmer. “The Next Generation of the Penn World 
Table.” American Economic Review 105, 10 (2015): 3150–82; United Nations Statistics Division, National 
Accounts Main Aggregates Database, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/introduction.asp 
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6.3.2. Domestic Regime Change 
               Figure 6.2 shows how the South Korean domestic political regime type level has 
shifted since the alliance formation.393  
 
 
               The MDT was negotiated, signed and ratified during the Syngman Rhee 
administration, and as the first president, Rhee was elected by the National Assembly in 
1948. Rhee himself was not a member of any political party but gained majority support 
in the National Assembly from conservative Rhee loyalists and the Korean Democratic 
                                                          
393 As explained Methodology chapter, this study annually measured whether and to what extent the 
domestic regime type level shifted since the alliance formation, by using the democracy-autocracy 
composite regime level data set of the POLITY IV Project. The democracy-autocracy composite regime 
type level data ranges from plus 10 (full democracy) to minus 10 (full autocracy). Based on the POLITY IV 
data, I annually calculated the absolute value of difference in the regime type level of South Korea. Monty 
G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2009 (version 2012). http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm: Center for 
Systemic Peace. 
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Party (KDP), which was founded by large landowners and business persons.394 The 
coalition however did not last long because the KDP was determined to establish a 
parliamentary system and weaken the presidential power of Rhee.395 Following Rhee’s 
refusal to appoint a KDP leader as prime minister, the KDP grew as a major opposition 
party and was later reorganized as the Democratic National Party (DNP) in 1949. In order 
to secure the congressional majority, Rhee established the Liberal Party (LP) in 1951.396 
               President Rhee consolidated his power during the Korean War and later turned 
more authoritarian.397 Both the LP and the DNP (later reorganized as the Democratic 
Party: DP in 1955) were conservative, but their cleavage was whether to support or 
oppose Rhee.398 Rhee’s fourth victory in the 1960 presidential election led to massive 
student protests against the result and Rhee finally resigned and fled to Hawaii. As Figure 
6.2 shows, the South Korean regime type level began to shift sharply in 1960 and 
continued to shift over time.399 These shifts were a reflection of political events including 
                                                          
394 Jinwook Choi. “Political Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: A Comparative Study of Brazil, Taiwan, and 
South Korea.” PhD Dissertation, (Cincinnati. OH: University of Cincinnati, 1992): 63. 
395 John Kie-chiang Oh. Korea: Democracy on Trial. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968): 14-21. 
396 Bruce Cumings. The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950. Vol. 2. 2 vols. 
Studies of the East Asian Institute. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990): 484-485; Richard C. 
Allen. Korea’s Syngman Rhee. (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Turtle Co, 1960): 125. 
397 Sung-Joo Han. The Failure of Democracy in South Korea. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1974): 16. 
398 Jinwook Choi. “Political Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: A Comparative Study of Brazil, Taiwan, and 
South Korea.” PhD Dissertation, (Cincinnati. OH: University of Cincinnati, 1992): 75. 
399 After the independence in 1948 with the American support, South Korean domestic political 
developments are generally categorized as follows: (1) the First Republic (1948-1960) under President 
Syngman Rhee; (2) the Second Republic (1960-1961) under the parliamentary democratic system; (3) the 
Third Republic (1961-1972) under President Park Chung Hee who took office following the military coup; 
(4) the Fourth Republic (1972-1979) under President Park who became more authoritarian; (5) the Fifth 
Republic (1979-1987) under President Chun Doo Hwan who took office following the military coup; and 
(6) the Sixth Republic (1987-Present) starting with a peaceful government transition. See Sung-Joo Han. 
“South Korea: Politics in Transition.” In Democracy in Developing Countries, edited by Larry Diamond, 
Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, 3. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989): 267-99: 267; 
Jinwook Choi. “Political Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: A Comparative Study of Brazil, Taiwan, and 
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military coups, democratization along with civilian uprisings, and drastic constitutional 
revisions. The DP adopted the parliamentary system, but led to a severe intra-party 
factional struggle.400 This political instability was the basis for the deep mistrust among 
military leaders towards the party politics, which was destroyed by a military coup led by 
Major General Park Chung Hee in 1961.401   
               During the period of 1961 to 1987, South Korea remained under the military 
authoritarian rule of General Park and General Chun Doo Hwan, successors of Park.402 
This quarter century authoritarian regime had been supported by the military junta, 
bureaucrats, and pro-military conservative figures. Generals Park and Chun established 
their own political parties and dominated a presidential position under their rule.403 On 
                                                                                                                                                                             
South Korea.” PhD Dissertation, (Cincinnati. OH: University of Cincinnati, 1992): 58; Bum Suk Kim. 
“Divergent Paths of Democratization: Comparative Study of Taiwan and South Korea.” PhD Dissertation, 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 2001): 78. 
400 Koon Woo Nam. South Korean Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and Stability. (Lanham, 
MD: University Press of America, 1989): 12; Sung-Joo Han. The Failure of Democracy in South Korea. 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974): 37-42, 122; Gregory Henderson. Korea: The Politics 
of the Vortex. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968): 300. 
401 Y. C. Han. “Political Parties and Political Development in South Korea.” Pacific Affairs 42, 4 (1969): 
446–464: 448. 
402 Sung-Joo Han. “South Korea: Politics in Transition.” In Democracy in Developing Countries, edited by 
Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, 3. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1989): 267-299: 275; Koon Woo Nam. South Korean Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and 
Stability. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989): 57; Sung-Joo Han. “South Korea in 1974: 
The ‘Korean Democracy’ on Trial.” Asian Survey 15, 1 (1975): 35–42: 36. 
403 In 1963 General Park established the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), and in the 1963 presidential 
election, Park defeated a candidate from the main opposition Civil Rule Party (CRP) which was organized 
by the former members of DP. See Chong-won Kim. Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-
1972. Harvard East Asian Monographs 59. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976): 250; 
Jinwook Choi. “Political Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: A Comparative Study of Brazil, Taiwan, and 
South Korea.” PhD Dissertation, (Cincinnati. OH: University of Cincinnati, 1992): 83-84; C. I. Eugene 
Kim. 1964. “Significance of the 1963 Korean Elections.” Asian Survey 4, 3 (1964): 765–773.; General 
Chun became President in 1980 and established his Democratic Justice Party (DJP) as his ruling party. See 
Jinwook Choi. “Political Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: A Comparative Study of Brazil, Taiwan, and 
South Korea.” PhD Dissertation, (Cincinnati. OH: University of Cincinnati, 1992): 187-188; Donald N. 
Clark, eds. The Kwangju Uprising: Shadows over the Regime in South Korea. (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1988); Koon Woo Nam. South Korean Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and Stability. 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989): 243. 
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the opposition side, former DP members and anti-Park conservative figures established 
the New Democratic Party (NDP) in 1967. Kim Dae-jung was nominated as their 
presidential candidate in 1971, and succeeded in gaining substantial support from urban 
workers, students, intellectuals, and the residents in Southwestern Korea. Kim became a 
prominent opposition leader throughout the period of authoritarian regime.404  
               In 1984, the growing demand for democratization finally forced the Chun 
regime to accept a direct presidential election in 1987. However due to a lack of 
cooperation among three opposition parties, retired General Roh Tae Woo, a successor of 
Chun, was elected as the first president through direct popular voting since 1969. His 
victory also marked the first peaceful government transition since the independence.405 
               In 1988 at the National Assembly election, Roh’s ruling party the Democratic 
Justice Party (DJP) failed to secure the majority. In order to overcome the minority ruling 
party position, Roh made a drastic move and merged the DJP with the two opposition 
parties (Kim Young Sam’s Democratic Reunification Party and Kim Jong-pil’s New 
Democratic Republican Party) and formed the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). Since 
then, South Korean politics has been a place of political competition between the 
decedent parties from the conservative and center right DLP and those from the 
                                                          
404 In the 1971 presidential election, Park received 53.2 percent of the total vote while Kim received 45.3 
percent. See Jinwook Choi. “Political Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: A Comparative Study of Brazil, 
Taiwan, and South Korea.” PhD Dissertation, (Cincinnati. OH: University of Cincinnati, 1992): 85-87. 
405 The 1987 presidential election was made up of four candidates: (1) Roh Tae Woo from the DJP 
(conservative); (2) Kim Young Sam from the Unification Democratic Party-UDP (center right); (3) Kim 
Dae-jung from the Party for Peace and Democracy-PPD (progressive); and (4) Kim Jong-pil from the New 
Democratic Republican Party-NDRP (conservative). See Bum Suk Kim. “Divergent Paths of 
Democratization: Comparative Study of Taiwan and South Korea.” PhD Dissertation, (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University, 2001): 160-161; Sung-Joo Han. “The Korean Experiment.” Journal of Democracy 2, 2 
(1991): 92–104: 96.  
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progressive Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) led by Kim Dae-jung.406 In the 1997 
presidential election, progressive Kim Dae-jung finally defeated a conservative 
candidate,407 and his victory marked the first peaceful government transition to an 
opposition bloc in the history of South Korea.     
 
6.3. Kim Dae-jung Administration as a Deviant and Negative Case          
               South Korea grew over time to be more powerful relative to its neighbors and 
external powers and also experienced domestic regime change since the alliance 
formation, therefore my theory of alliance restructuring predicts that the South Korean 
alliance objectives and security preferences on the balance between its own arms and 
allied support would change, and South Korea would renegotiate with the U.S. to 
accommodate a new security preference for the alliance and restructure the ongoing 
alliance relationship.  
               The Kim Dae-jung administration however did not restructure the formal 
alliance treaty framework, and for this reason, the case of the Kim Dae-jung 
administration is a deviant and negative case in my theory of alliance restructuring. There 
are two occurrences which demonstrate that alliance restructuring did not happen based 
                                                          
406 In the 1992 presidential election, Kim Young Sam from the DLP defeated Kim Dae-jung from the 
progressive Democratic Party. See Hong Yung Lee. “South Korea in 1992: A Turning Point in 
Democratization.” Asian Survey 33, 1 (1993): 32–42; Jin Park. “Political Change in South Korea: The 
Challenge of the Conservative Alliance.” Asian Survey 30, 12 (1990): 1154–1168. 
407 National Congress for New Politics candidate Kim Dae-jung gained 40.3% of the total popular vote over 
Grand National Party candidate Lee Hoi Chang’s 38.7%. See Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim, eds. 
Consolidating Democracy in South Korea. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Larry Diamond and Doh 
Chull Shin, eds. Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea. (Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1999); Tong Whan Park. “South Korea in 1997: Clearing the Last Hurdle to Political-
Economic Maturation.” Asian Survey 38, 1 (1998): 1–10.  
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on my theory. In the first case, external and internal changes did not cause a shift in the 
South Korean objectives and preferences for the alliance, and in the second case, South 
Korean objectives and preference actually did shift but ROK still did not restructure the 
formal alliance framework. This section explores these two possible situations in detail. 
               The ROK foreign and security policy under the Kim Dae-jung administration 
was directed by two main actors including President Kim Dae-jung himself and his chief 
aide Lim Dong-Won.408 In his inauguration speech, President Kim outlined his foreign 
and security policy, which was founded on three principles as follows: (1) non-tolerance 
of a North Korean military threat or armed provocation; (2) official abandonment of the 
idea of unification by absorption and the negation of any other measures to undermine or 
threaten North Korea; and (3) promotion of exchanges and cooperation through the 
resumption of the 1991 North-South Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, 
Exchanges, and Cooperation.409    
               This new ROK foreign policy was labeled by the government as the “Sunshine” 
or “Engagement” policy, and it often received public attention as the soft side of this new 
policy.410 But as reflected in the first principle of the “Sunshine” policy, Kim was fully 
aware of the military threat coming from North Korea, and believed that the “Sunshine” 
                                                          
408 Lim Dong-Won served as a senior secretary for National Security and Foreign Affairs at the Blue House 
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CIA), and Minister of Unification. Norman D. Levin, and Yong-sop Han. Sunshine in Korea: The South 
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Kim Dae-Jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges, edited by Chung-in Moon and 
David I. Steinberg, (Seoul, Republic of Korea: Yonsei University Press, 1999): 35-56: 36 note 1. 
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policy would work effectively to reduce that threat only if ROK were to maintain credible 
and effective deterrent capabilities well-supported by its own military strength, the U.S.-
ROK alliance, and the U.S. military presence in South Korea.411 Especially the Kim Dae-
jung administration perceived that combined forces with the U.S. would be necessary and 
sufficient to deter any North Korean military aggression.412                       
               At the time of alliance formation, the Chinese troops in North Korea presented a 
grave security concern to ROK, but China had already completed a withdrawal of all its 
troops in 1958.413 Regarding the North Korean threat, South Korea had projected for 20 
army infantry divisions as its own capacity sufficiently to defend their country from 
North Korea without U.S. help in the mid-1950s. As Table 6.4 shows, South Korea 
established 19 army infantry divisions plus two marine divisions, 19 submarines, 39 
surface combatant ships, 130 fighters, and 355 ground attack planes as of the year 
1999.414 These figures suggest that the ROK military strength already reached the 
estimated level that South Korea could defend their country from North Korea without 
U.S. help at the time of alliance formation. 
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Doctrine: The Sunshine Policy and the Korean Peninsula.” In Kim Dae-Jung Government and Sunshine 
Policy: Promises and Challenges, edited by Chung-in Moon and David I. Steinberg, (Seoul, Republic of 
Korea: Yonsei University Press, 1999): 40. 
412 Dong-won Lim, “North Korean Policy under the Kim Dae-jung Government,” a speech delivered at a 
breakfast meeting with the National Reconciliation Council, March 11, 1999, cited in Chung-in Moon. 
“Understanding the DJ Doctrine: The Sunshine Policy and the Korean Peninsula.” In Kim Dae-Jung 
Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges, edited by Chung-in Moon and David I. 
Steinberg, (Seoul, Republic of Korea: Yonsei University Press, 1999): 40 note 7. 
413 Hajime Izumi and Shunji Hiraiwa. “Withdrawal of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army and the 
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Table 6.4. Military Balance between North Korea and South Korea, 1999-2000415 
Items South Korea North Korea 
Total active armed forces 683,000 1,082,000 
Active ground forces 585,000 including 25,000 
marines 
950,000 
Tanks 2,330 main battle tanks 3,500 heavy tanks 
  560 light tanks 
Armored personnel 
carriers 
1,700 2,500 
Artillery 3,500 towed artillery 3,500 towed artillery 
 1053 self-propelled 
artillery 
4,400 self-propelled 
artillery 
Multiple rocket launchers 285 2,500 
Surface-to-surface 
missiles 
12 NHK-I/-II 24 Frog-3/-5/-7; 30 Scud-
C, No-dong 
Surface-to-air missiles 1,020 10,000 plus 
Attack helicopters 117 (NA) 
Naval vessels 19 submarines 26 submarines 
 6 destroyers, 9 frigates, 24 
corvettes 
3 frigates 
 84 patrol and coastal ships 310 patrol and coastal 
ships 
 14 amphibious 10 amphibious 
Ground attack aircrafts 355 (195 F-5; 160 F-16) 319 (107 J-5; 159 J-6; 18 
Su-7; 35 Su-25) 
Air fighter aircrafts 130 F-4 222 (130 MiG-21; 46 
MiG-23; 46 MiG-29) 
Foreign forces 36,630 U.S. forces (Army 
27,500; Navy 300; Air 
Force 8,700 with ground 
attack aircrafts of 72 F-16, 
and 18 A/OA-10; Marines 
130) 
(NA) 
 
               Analysts have even assessed that ROK had military advantages over the North 
pointing out that North Korea had “quantitative” military superiority but South Korean 
“qualitative” military superiority has allowed for greater defensive military advantages 
                                                          
415 International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2000, 100, 1 (2001): 202-205. 
 197 
 
over the North.416 The new Kim Dae-jung administration however fully recognized a 
North Korean threat and did not change its security preference on the balance between its 
own arms and allied support to the extent that ROK would restructure the existing formal 
alliance framework. There are possibly three threatening factors which my variables of 
power changes failed to recognize as follows: (1) geographical environments; (2) 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and (3) continuous and ongoing provocative North 
Korean behaviors.  
 
Geographical Environments 
               Per geographic reality, the ROK is uniquely vulnerable to North Korean attacks. 
There is little doubt that North Korean military capabilities are far less advanced 
compared to the ROK, but the very quantitative size of the North Korean capabilities has 
posted a grave threat to ROK security. North Korea also has increased the number of its 
forces deployed near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), a buffer zone between the North 
and South, since the mid-1980s. It has been estimated that approximately 65 percent of 
all North Korean forces were deployed within 100km of the DMZ in 1998, compared 
with approximately 40 percent in 1981, as Figure 6.4 shows. With these forward 
deployments along with long range artillery systems directly capable of targeting Seoul 
                                                          
416 Michael O’Hanlon, “Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea Is Easier than the 
Pentagon Thinks.” International Security 22, 4 (1998): 135–70.; Jae-Jung Suh. “Blitzkrieg or Sitzkrieg? 
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(45km from the DMZ), North Korea could attack the South with a shorter warning time 
and without longer lines of logistical support.417        
Figure 6.3. North Korean Military Depositions in 2006418 
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Figure 6.4. North Korean Historical Force Deployment toward the DMZ419 
 
 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
               The second of the three threatening factors is the North Korean possession of 
the WMD. According to the ROK Defense White Paper in 1999, North Korea increased 
                                                          
419 Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford. North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional 
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Army War College, 2007): 66. 
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their stockpiles of toxic agents from 1,000 tons to approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons.420 
There is no convincing estimates available on the North Korean biological weapons 
stockpiles.421 North Korea’s long range artillery systems, especially multiple rocket 
launchers (North Korea possessed 2,500 of them in 2000, as shown in Table 6.2), are 
capable of delivering both chemical and biological weapons into the metropolitan 
Seoul.422 This North Korean WMD threat was emphasized in the South Korea Defense 
White Paper in 1998, 1999, and 2000, even under the Kim Dae-jung administration.423 
The power change variables in my study failed to recognize the impact of the North 
Korean WMD on South Korean threat perceptions. 
 
Provocative North Korean Behaviors 
               Lastly, even after President Kim Dae-jung took office in February 1998 and 
began his engagement policy, North Korean actions remained constantly provocative. In 
June 1998, ROK seized a North Korean spy submarine after it became entangled with 
fishing nets in South Korean waters. Nine North Koreans were found dead inside, with 
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four suicides after killing five.424 In the following month, the dead body of a North 
Korean commando carrying a Czech-made submachine gun and a hand grenade, was 
found on the beach not far from the location of previous submarine intrusions.425 In 
August, North Korea launched a long range rocket called a Taepodong 1 missile over the 
Japanese mainland.426 In December a North Korean spy boat intruded deep into South 
Korean territorial waters and sunk after a firefight with South Korean forces.427 While the 
South Korean engagement policy was being implemented, tensions between the two 
Koreas continued in 1999. In June, six North Korean patrol boats intruded into the 
Northern Limit Line of the West Sea, a UN-declared border that ROK acknowledged but 
North Korea did not.428 In the end, a ROK naval ship sunk one North Korean torpedo 
boat after a fierce gun battle.429 This incident was the first serious naval clash in the West 
Sea since the armistice of the Korean War.430 Thus provocative North Korean actions 
continued to feed South Korean perceptions of an existential threat from the North. 
               In sum, my theory of alliance restructuring has failed to predict correctly the 
case of the Kim Dae-jung administration’s inaction of restructuring the existing alliance 
because my power shift variables were not sophisticated enough to identify the threat 
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environments associated with geography, WMD, and provocative behaviors by potential 
aggressors in a cross-national manner. My statistical analysis could present statistically 
significant effects of power shift variables (and also regime change variables) on a state’s 
alliance restructuring, but an obvious lesson here is that it is necessary to take into 
consideration other threat-related factors.  
 
6.4. Discussions of Non-Existence of Alliance Restructuring in the 1960-1990s 
               The previous section explained why the Kim Dae-jung administration in the late 
1990s did not restructure the alliance even though external and internal conditions in 
favor of alliance restructuring were present. As Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show, the relative 
increase in South Korean capabilities and the domestic political regime change already 
began to exist after 1960. A remaining question to this fact is: why did South Korea not 
restructure the alliance in the 1960s and early 1990s?  
               The previously identified factors of geography, WMD, and provocative actions 
can also further explain the lack of South Korean alliance restructuring. In addition to the 
invariable geographical environments, North Korea succeeded in making weapons-grade 
chemical agents for itself for the first time during the period between 1961 and 1967, and 
it is believed that the North has been building a self-reliant chemical and biological 
weapon capability since the early 1970s.431 The North Korean provocations, as Table 6.5 
shows, were countless, and South Korea maintained high levels of threat perceptions 
during the 1960s and early 1990s. 
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Table 6.5. Major North Korean Provocations in the 1960-1990s432  
1966-1969 Korean DMZ Conflict 299 South Korean and 43 American 
troops were killed.  
1968 Blue House (South Korean 
Presidential Office) Raid 
68 South Koreans were killed. 
1968 Pueblo incident One American sailor was killed. 
1969 EC-121 shoot-down incident 31 American sailors and marine were 
killed. 
1970 Attempted assassination of ROK 
president 
Bomb exploded in the national 
cemetery. 
1973-1976 West Sea Incident North Korean naval and air forces 
crossed the Northern Limit Line (NLL), 
a de facto maritime boundary.  
1974 Attempted assassination of ROK 
president 
South Korean first lady was killed. 
1976 Axe Murder Incident Two American army officers were 
killed. 
1981 SR-71 incident North attacked a U.S. SR-71 
reconnaissance aircraft. 
1983 Rangoon bombing Four cabinet ministers including Deputy 
Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs 
Minister were killed. 
1986 Gimpo International Airport 
boming 
Five South Koreans were killed. 
1987 Bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 115 passengers and crew members were 
killed. 
1993-1994 First Nuclear Crisis North threatened to withdraw from the 
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
1993 Nodong-1 missile test First medium-range ballistic missile test 
1994 U.S. army helicopter shoot-down 
incident 
One American soldier was killed. 
1994-1996 Armed demonstrations in the Joint 
Security Area (JSA) 
North dispatched several hundred armed 
forces.  
1997 Armed skirmishes in the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) 
North Korean forces crossed Military 
Demarcation Line (MDL) 
1998 Taepodong-1 missile test First intermediate-range ballistic missile 
test 
1999 First Battle of Yeonpyeong Naval battle between North and South. 
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6.5. Discussions of Possible Different Causal Mechanisms  
               My theory of alliance restructuring is built on two key factors: (1) capabilities 
change; and (2) domestic regime change, and explains the continuity or discontinuity of 
an ongoing formal alliance relationship. In alliance studies, there are two different 
theoretical approaches to explain why the alliances would not restructure: (1) the 
institutional explanation; and (2) the ideational explanation. This section discusses 
whether institutional and/or ideational approaches would present a better explanation to 
the Kim Dae-jung administration’s inaction of restructuring the formal alliance 
relationship.  
 
6.5.1. Institutional Explanation of Alliance Endurance 
               Shortly before the end of the Cold War, Realist scholars predicted a near future 
disappearance of NATO because of the collapse of its external threat, the Soviet 
Union.433 Realist theories generally assume that international anarchy causes sovereign 
states to rely on self-help strategies and focus on relative gains.434 From a Realist view, 
states will cooperate in order to deal with common threats, for example, by way of the 
formation of alliances, but such security cooperation is likely to be contingent. When 
common threats disappear, so do alliances.  
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               Contrary to Realist predictions, NATO actually expanded its membership into 
the former Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, and its roles and missions beyond the European 
Continent. Institutionalist theory attempts to provide a more convincing explanation to 
the endurance of alliances. Like Realist theories, institutionalist theories begin by 
explaining that states form alliances when they face common threats or fight wars jointly. 
Alliances are designed to aggregate capabilities and coordinate security strategies to deal 
with common threats, and alliance security coordination could include integrated military 
commands, joint military planning and training, and joint troop placements. When 
common threats disappear later on, allies can continue to deal with the various security 
problems and risks, and view the existing alliance as a useful institution in order to 
manage those security risks and other intra-allied relations. Allies would have motives to 
utilize such portable alliances continuously.435 
               The U.S.-South Korea alliance has been highly institutionalized since its 
inception. Since 1950, ROK forces had been under operational control by the United 
Nations Command (UNC OPCON). In 1978, the bilateral U.S.-ROK Combined Forces 
Command (CFC) was newly created and their forces were designated under the 
operational control of the CFC (CFC OPCON), which has been responsible for defending 
South Korea since then. While a four-star U.S. general serves as Commander-in-Chief 
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(CINC), a four-star ROK Army general serves as Deputy CINC.436 The two countries 
have also launched a regular policy coordination organization, (1) the Security 
Consultative Meetings (SCM) since 1968; and (2) the Military Committee Meetings 
(MCM) since 1978. The former purposes to enhance security cooperation through regular 
bilateral meetings among high-level foreign and security policy officials, while the latter 
are held prior to the SCM and cohosted by the Chairmen of the U.S. and ROK Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.437  
               The U.S. has continued to maintain its armed forces in South Korea, stationing 
from 85,500 in 1954 to 36,500 troops in 2000.438 Since the 1970s, the CFC has been in 
charge of regular joint military exercises including (1) Ulchi Focus Lens, which has 
simulated a full-scale war (since 1973); (2) Team Spirit, which has exercised a large-
scale joint field maneuver (since 1976); and (3) Foal Eagle, which has been a combined 
Special Forces exercise (since 1975).439            
               The two allies have established various institutional structures and practices 
since the alliance formation. The level of institutionalization in the U.S.-ROK alliance 
has been surely high, but then does institutionalist theory provide additional insight to the 
endurance of the alliance? If the U.S.-ROK alliance continues to survive after North 
Korean threats disappear, institutionalist theory is well able to provide a strong 
explanation for alliance duration. But when President Kim dae-jung took office from 
1998 to 2003, his administration fully recognized North Korean threats. 
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6.5.2. Ideational Explanation of Alliance Persistence 
               Ideational approaches link domestic polities with the foreign policy of states. In 
the ideational view, threat perceptions do not simply emerge from an objective 
international material power structure, but from states’ views on other states’ external 
behaviors and the collective identities shaped by their values and norms governing the 
domestic political processes. In an ideational interpretation of NATO’s origins, the Cold 
War began because worldviews regarding the domestic and international order clashed 
between the Western and the Eastern blocs. The Western democracies perceived Soviet 
communism as a threat to the Western ways of living. The Western bloc institutionalized 
NATO based on common values and a collective identity of liberal democracies over 
time. The end of the Cold War did not represent the end of the Western democratic 
values and norms, rather NATO extended its membership into new democratic states in 
Eastern Europe. NATO has grown into a highly institutionalized pluralistic security 
community of liberal democracies.440  
               Based on the POLITY IV data, Figure 6.5 shows the two countries’ domestic 
polity scores, scaling plus 10 as most democratic and minus 10 as most authoritarian. 
According to this figure, the U.S. and South Korea began as a democratic-authoritarian 
alliance in 1953, and along with the South Korean democratization since the late 1980s, 
the alliance finally grew into a democratic alliance. The emergence of the Kim Dae-jung 
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administration in 1998 especially narrowed the domestic polity gap between the U.S. 
(plus 10) and South Korea (plus 8). In addition to a highly institutionalized alliance 
structure, the shared values and norms of liberal democracies explains the endurance of 
the U.S.-South Korea alliance.  
 
                However, there is also another important factor in the ideational view which is 
anti-Americanism in South Korea. Scholars began to pay more attention to this factor in 
the late 1980s,441 and related works have proliferated under the progressive Roh Moo-
hyun administration (2003-2008) which succeeded the Kim Dae-jung government.442 
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According to previous works, the sources of South Korean anti-Americanism seem 
diverse. While ideological anti-Americanism is shared by progressives and leftists, who 
tend to be pro-North Korea, other types of anti-Americanism are more of an emotional 
reaction to specific events including the crimes and accidents caused by the U.S. troops 
stationed in South Korea.443 Another type is more pragmatic and policy-oriented, and this 
type erupts when the U.S. and South Korea deal with tense policy matters including the 
free trade agreement.444 Even though anti-Americanism or its sentiment already existed in 
South Korea, its influence on attitudes toward the alliance were unclear during the Kim 
Dae-jung administration (1998-2003).   
                    
6.6. Conclusion 
               This chapter has examined the history and factors which have resulted in the 
non-existence of a South Korean alliance restructuring in 1998-2000 as a deviant and 
negative case. Since the alliance formation, South Korean capabilities have grown more 
powerful relative to non-allied neighbors and external powers. South Korea also 
experienced domestic political change, first starting with the authoritarian Rhee 
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administration, then to a military regime from the 1970s to the middle 1980s, and finally 
a democratization after 1988. 
               When South Korea formed the alliance with the U.S., potential future external 
aggression, mainly from North Korea with or without Chinese and Russian assistance and 
a resurgent Japan, was the primary national security concern of the South Korean leaders. 
They expected a mutual defense treaty with the U.S. combined with the presence of U.S. 
forces to effectively deter all external threats and defend their country. As a newly 
independent nation, South Korea viewed national security as a matter of survival. 
Recognizing that the U.S. defense commitment was limited, South Korea valued the 
increases of its own military capabilities and sought U.S. assistance toward this end.  
               In the late 1990s, the initial South Korean alliance objectives and preference on 
the combination of its own arms and allied support did not change. While South Korean 
power grew stronger, North Korean threats did not decrease at all. ROK is still fully 
aware that the North Korean forward military presence close to its capital, Seoul remains 
formidable. North Korean chemical and biological weapons have been deployed close to 
the DMZ and are capable of reaching Seoul. Even though South Korea adopted an 
engagement policy in order to increase exchanges and contacts with the North, North 
Korea has never stopped its provocative behaviors including armed intrusions. From the 
South Korean viewpoint, the U.S.-South Korea alliance well serves their national 
interests, as long as North Korean threats continue to exist and the South remains 
incapable of living and coping with them with its own arms. The first peaceful 
government transition to an opposition party in 1998 did not change the original South 
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Korean preference between its own arms and allied support and also did not even 
encourage the new South Korea leadership to restructure the alliance with the United 
States in the end.  
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7. Case Studies: U.S.-Japan Alliance 
               This chapter tests my theory of alliance restructuring to the U.S.-Japan alliance, 
and focuses on the emergence of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led coalition 
government in 2009 and its alliance policy. My theory has been built, based on data 
regarding alliances formed between 1946 and 2000, however it has not yet tested the 
cases outside the population of cases. The year of 2009 was the first time that the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) lost its status as the largest political party in the House of 
Representatives (i.e., Lower House) since its establishment in 1955. 
               My study argues that Japan placed greater value on a U.S. defense commitment 
than its own capabilities at the time of alliance formation. The maintenance of U.S. 
military bases served as a vital tool for Japanese security from external aggression, even 
though existence of those foreign bases could have harmed the sense of dignity as an 
independent nation. Since alliance formation, Japan has grown more powerful relative to 
neighboring states and external powers. Japan however did not experience domestic 
regime changes during that same time period, but the 2009 government change led to a 
shift in the alliance objectives and security preferences in the balance between its own 
arms and allied support. The new DPJ government attempted to renegotiate with the U.S. 
a relocation of U.S. bases in Okinawa, then failed and finally returned only to accept 
again, the existing relocation plan already agreed upon by the previous LDP 
administrations.445 
                                                          
445 For excellent sources of Japanese foreign and security policy, see Thomas U. Berger. “From Sword to 
Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism.” International Security 17, 4 (1993): 119–50; 
Thomas U. Berger. “The Pragmatic Liberalism of an Adaptive State.” In Japan in International Politics: 
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               This chapter is organized in three main sections. The first section examines both 
Japanese and American alliance objectives and security preferences on the combination 
of arms and allies at the time of alliance formation. The second section provides 
quantitative evidence for both changes in Japanese capabilities and domestic regime since 
the alliance formation in 1951. The third section examines whether the initial Japanese 
objectives security preferences have changed or not, and shows whether a restructuring 
attempt between the two allies occurred and how this process played out.  
 
7.1. Alliance Objectives and Security Preferences at the Time of Alliance Formation 
7.1.1. U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 
               Following the Japanese surprise attack in Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, 
the United States officially entered WWII, and the U.S. battle casualties in the Pacific 
area theaters reached a total of 169,635, including the loss of 57,137 soldiers.446 The 
initial U.S. objectives for postwar Japan were: (1) to insure that Japan will never again 
become a menace to the U.S.; and (2) to establish a peaceful and responsible government 
in Japan which will respect the rights of other states and support the U.S. objectives. The 
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University Press, 1994); Richard J. Samuels. Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of 
East Asia. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007); Christopher W. Hughes. Japan’s Remilitarisation. 
(Oxon, U.K.; New York: Routledge, 2009); Andrew Oros. Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the 
Evolution of Security Practice. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).  
446 United States Office of the Adjutant General. Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World 
War II. Final Report, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 
1953): 8. 
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U.S. expected to disarm and demilitarize Japan completely,447 in cooperation with the 
U.K., the Soviet Union, and China.448  
               The initial U.S. policy toward Japan began to show signs of change after the 
beginning of the Cold War. According to the leading U.S. strategist, George F. Kennan, 
U.S. national security was dependent upon the maintenance of the balance of power, and 
there were only five meaningful power centers in the world, which were composed of the 
U.S., U.K., the Rhine valley, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Kennan made a point that the 
goal of the U.S. containment policy should be to prevent no more than one of these 
industrial centers from falling under hostile control.449 The central U.S. objective should 
be to establish Japan as a stable country, friendly to the U.S., and if necessary, a ready 
and dependable ally. The total demilitarization of Japan was no longer a serious matter, 
and that long term international supervision including the Soviet Union would be 
counterproductive to the democratic advances in Japan.450  
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               The strategic value of Japan was greatly appreciated in the newly defined U.S. 
strategy. In March 1948 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, U.S. 
General Douglas MacArthur stated that with the retention of powerful and effective air 
power in Okinawa, Japan, the U.S. could destroy enemy forces along the Asiatic coast 
from Vladivostok and Singapore, as Figure 7.1. shows.451 The NSC 49 further elaborated 
on the vastness of the Japanese military strategic values as follows: 
“Japan’s strategic importance is increased by her manpower and her 
industrial potentials. These several potentials could….have great 
influence either for or against the interests of the United States in the 
event of global war. 
The ability of the Japanese to wage both aggressive and defensive war 
was proven in the last world conflict….If United States influence 
predominates, Japan can be expected, with planned initial United 
States assistance, at least to protect herself and, provided logistic 
necessities can be made available to her, to contribute importantly to 
military operations against the Soviets in Asia, thus forcing the USSR 
to fight on the Asiatic front as well as elsewhere…. 
The ability of the United States to derive full strategic advantage from 
the potentialities of Japan and to deny Japan’s ultimate exploitation by 
the USSR will depend largely on the course we follow from now on 
with respect to Japan. This course should, accordingly, take into 
account the essential objectives, from the military viewpoint, of 
denying Japan to the Soviets and of maintaining her orientation toward 
the Western Powers.”452 
 
                                                          
451 United States Department of State. “Conversation between General of the Army MacArthur, Under 
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Government Printing Office, 1974): 706-12. 
452 United States Department of State. “Note by the Executive Secretary (Souers) to the National Security 
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Figure 7.1. Okinawa’s Strategic Location453 
 
              Both Departments of State and Defense agreed strongly on the extraordinary 
strategic value of Japan, but had different views on the timing of a peace treaty. While the 
Defense Department argued that the U.S. should continue to occupy Japan until the 
                                                          
453 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart. The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma 
Base Controversy. Vol. R42645. CRS Report for Congress. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, January 20, 2016): 5. 
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Japanese western orientation was established, the State Department disagreed and urged 
the U.S. to move “soon” toward a peace treaty with Japan because a long term U.S. 
occupation would diminish the Japanese respect and favor to the U.S., causing a negative 
effect to the essential U.S. objectives in the end.454  
               In the meantime, Japan adopted a new constitution in November 1946 under 
U.S. pressure based on the initial disarmament policy.455 Article 9 of the Constitution 
stipulated that: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, 
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international 
disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea 
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. 
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.456  
 
Until the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
envisaged permanent neutrality with security guaranteed through the UN collective 
security system and/or a UN sponsored regional collective security system.457       
               The outbreak of the Korean War perfectly proved the U.S. assessment of 
Japan’s strategic value in the case of war as “accurate.” Immediately following the 
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dispatch of all U.S. combat forces in Japan to the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. faced 
growing concern over Japanese security from Soviet aggression and internal communist 
threats. In July 1950, the U.S. occupation authority ordered the Japanese government to 
double the number of its police forces to 75,000 and to establish a new coast guard of 
8,000 forces.458 The U.S. also started to seriously count on the Japanese rearmament as a 
part of the Western conventional forces expansion.459  
               It was unclear to what extent Japan might receive security support from the UN 
during times of contingencies.460 Prime Minister Yoshida regarded the internal U.S. 
departmental disagreements (i.e., the timing of peace treaty and the maintenance of U.S. 
base rights in Japan) as constraining on the beginning of a peace settlement process. 
Yoshida needed to find a way to secure national security while achieving an early 
recovery of independence.461 In May 1950, Yoshida delivered his message to the U.S., 
which would hopefully put an end to the internal U.S. disagreements at the start of a 
peace treaty negotiation,462 as follows: 
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“….the [Japanese] Government desires the earliest possible treaty. As 
such a treaty probably would require the maintenance of U.S. forces to 
secure the treaty terms and for other purposes, if the U.S. Government 
hesitates to make these conditions, the Japanese Government will try 
to find a way to offer them.”463 
  
               Yoshida’s message was helpful at the start of a peace settlement process. In 
September 1950, the Departments of State and Defense finally agreed to the conditions 
for a peace treaty with Japan, and President Harry Truman approved the start of the 
preliminary negotiations. The key conditions were as follows: 
“      It must provide that initially Japan will be garrisoned by forces 
acceptable to the United States under a United States military 
command…. 
        The security arrangements, while protecting the United States 
from being forced out of Japan without its consent, should also make it 
possible for the United States to withdraw its forces whenever 
satisfactory alternative security arrangements are concluded…. 
        It must not contain any prohibition, direct or implicit, now or in 
the future, of Japan’s inalienable right to self-defense in case of 
external attack, and to possess the means to exercise that right…. 
        The Treaty must give the United States the right to maintain 
armed forces in Japan, whenever, for so long, and to such extent as it 
deems necessary….”464                  
  
These conditions can be summarized through two U.S. goals which later became the 
foundation in forming the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951: (1) securing U.S. base 
rights in Japan; and (2) rearming Japan as a part of Western conventional forces.  
               In January 1951, the official bilateral talks began. Yoshida presented John 
Foster Dulles, special advisor to the State Department, with the initial Japanese position 
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paper, explaining the viewpoints for national security. The paper proposed that the 
Ryukyu and Bonin Islands (including Okinawa) be placed under UN trusteeship with the 
U.S. as the administrative authority.465 While serving Japanese external security from 
potential Soviet aggression, this part of his proposal was designed to meet the U.S. 
objectives of retaining base rights in Japan. For internal security Japan would be 
responsible for dealing with domestic communist subversions,466 through the 
strengthening of its police forces.                         
               The Japanese rearmament remained as the larger issue discussed in the talks. 
Japan argued that its own rearmament would be impossible for the immediate time due to 
the lack of basic resources for modern armament, and the burden of rearmament would 
crush the national economy, breeding domestic social unrest, which would be exactly 
what the communists wanted. Rearmament, which was supposed to serve national 
security, would actually endanger it from within. Japan’s national security depends far 
more on domestic stability rather than on armament.467 Yoshida also assessed that a total 
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war between the Eastern and Western blocs was highly unlikely, and the Cold War 
situation would probably continue for a long time, even though situations would 
sometimes become tense or loose.468           
               The U.S. was greatly disappointed with the Japanese negative position on the 
rearmament, and strongly emphasized its interest in the step toward the Japanese 
establishment of a ground force. Yoshida felt the bilateral talks were rapidly 
deteriorating,469 and finally agreed to the establishment of security forces, land and sea, 
totaling 50,000 troops, separate from the existing police forces.470 Yoshida’s most 
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important objective was to ensure the earliest recovery of independence, however without 
the agreement of rearmament, he realized his objective could never be achieved. As a 
second best effort, he tried to minimize the financial burden associated with the 
rearmament for economic recovery. The U.S. assessed that Japan would need at least 
300,000 to 325,000 ground forces plus naval and air forces for the homeland defense, and 
just 50,000 forces were simply better than nothing, and in the end accepted this plan as 
the initial step.471                  
               In the end, the U.S. secured its base rights in Japan while Japan earned the 
earliest recovery of independence. They achieved their most important goals, but both 
sides remained dissatisfied with a few points. From Japanese viewpoints, the security 
treaty did not clearly obligate the U.S. to defend Japan in times of contingencies in 
exchange for U.S. base rights in Japan.472 For the U.S. side, the weak Japanese 
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commitment to the rearmament left the U.S. with great uncertainty about the future 
Japanese direction, pro-U.S./West or neutrality (or leaning on the East). Dulles remarked 
that the U.S. cannot press Japan to assume greater military obligations for Western 
defense until the Japanese themselves have dealt with their Constitutional problem. But 
only when Japan revises its Constitution, and becomes able to make precise military 
commitments like those being obtained from NATO members, to contribute a certain 
number of divisions by a certain date, would the U.S. be able to make more concrete 
commitments to the defense of Japan. Dulles concluded that until then, the U.S. must 
maintain a flexible position including the withdrawal of U.S. troops at any time.473 To 
what extent Japan would seriously commit its own rearmament in favor of the Western 
defense was a litmus test to judge the future Japanese direction: is Japan with us or not? 
 
7.1.2. U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Revision in 1960 
               The U.S. aimed to maintain a pro-Western tendency in Japan against the 
communist and neutral political forces, while ensuring the U.S. base rights in Japan. On 
the other side, Japan aimed to achieve its earliest recovery of independence, and enhance 
social and economic stability in fighting against the domestic communist subversion, 
while increasing its own defense capabilities slowly, relying on the U.S. protection for its 
external defense. But this basic alliance bargaining in 1951 began to face various 
challenges from both the international and domestic events.  
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               On the international environments, the Korean War ended in July 1953.474 The 
U.S. avoided a direct military intervention in the Indochina War between France and Viet 
Minh, and the Geneva Accords restored peace in Indochina in July 1954.475 In the Third 
World, India began to promote a non-alignment movement, becoming an alternative 
international position to Asian countries.476 These events created an atmosphere of 
reduced tensions in Asia, and a neutral/non-aligned stance grew more attractive. Hayato 
Ikeda, a future Prime Minister, stated that the U.S. failed in its roll-back policy against 
communists in Indochina, and that the truce in Indochina proved an increasing initiative 
of Communist China. Ikeda even remarked that, “This is not time for Japan to choose 
outright between west and east.”477 The normalization of diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union in 1956 also raised the U.S. concerns on Japan’s future directions.478 
               There were also two incidents that happened, which had great impact on the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. First, the Fukuryu Maru incident in March 1954 caused great tension 
between the two countries. The U.S. conducted a hydrogen bomb test in the Marshall 
Islands, and twenty three Japanese fishermen were exposed to the nuclear fallout. As the 
first nuclear attacked country, the public reaction was extraordinarily emotional. Japanese 
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leftists asked the conservative government to alienate the country from the U.S.479 
Second, in the case of the Girard incident of January 1957, an American soldier shot and 
killed a Japanese female farmer in a U.S. Army shooting range. The jurisdiction over the 
case was disputed between the two states, leading to even stronger anti-base sentiments 
among the Japanese public.480  
               As Table 7.1 shows, the Japanese socialists, who were against close relations 
with the U.S. and for neutrality or accommodation with the Communist bloc, had been 
gaining greater popularity in the lower house elections since 1952. The appearance of 
growing neutralist tendencies in Japan caused the U.S. to review its policy toward Japan. 
Table 7.1. Results of Japanese House of Representatives Elections, 1952-1960481  
 Items 1952 1953 1955 1958 1960 
Conservatives 
(Liberal 
Democratic 
Party and its 
predecessors)  
Popular 
vote 
23,367,671 22,717,348 23,377,432 22,976,830 22,740,265 
Percentage 
of popular 
vote 
67.2 65.7 63.2 57.8 57.6 
Lower 
house 
seats 
325 310 297 287 296 
Socialists 
(Socialist 
Party, 
Democratic 
Socialist 
Party, and 
their 
predecessors) 
Popular 
vote 
7,768,061 9,553,321 11,193,154 13,093,948 14,351,284 
Percentage 
of popular 
vote 
21.9 27.5 30.2 32.9 34.6 
Lower 
house 
seats 
115 143 160 166 162 
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               Following the review, the U.S. still envisioned Japan as a vital strategic asset. 
Japan was capable of serving as a strong outpost by which Communism can be stopped 
and defeated in Asia. A loss of Japan would probably be followed by the loss of Korea, 
Okinawa and Taiwan as well.482 Japan was vital to the proper deployment and logistical 
support of the U.S. deterrent forces in Asia. If the U.S. did not have the two large fleet 
facilities at Yokosuka and Sasebo and the other naval facility in the Philippines, it would 
take two-and-a-half times as many ships and men to maintain the 7th Fleet in Far Eastern 
waters. This would involve a terrific additional defense appropriation. An alliance with 
Japan would have a true impact on the balance of power.483  
               A major challenge for the U.S. remained in the question of how to firmly align 
and knit Japan thoroughly into the networks of the free world nations. There were no 
common ties of religion, culture, philosophy or civilization between the U.S. and Japan. 
Japan’s two closest free world neighbors were Korea and Taiwan. However collective 
security arrangements with Korea were out of the question because of Korean suspicions. 
Also Japan itself did not wish to enter into a collective security arrangement with Taiwan 
for fear of being dragged into a potential war between Taipei and Beijing.484 
               Therefore the maintenance of U.S. base rights in Japan and the prevention of 
Japanese neutralization depended on the overall soundness of the U.S.-Japan bilateral 
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relations. According to one U.S. assessment, Japan considered the 1951 Security Treaty 
as genuinely unequal in several points.485 In order to prevent the possibility of Japanese 
neutralization and maintain U.S. base rights, it was tremendously important for the U.S. 
to initiate a revision of the 1951 Security Treaty, which would help to reduce 
unsatisfactory feelings among the Japanese and support the conservatives who still 
believed that the U.S.-Japan alliance was essential to their security.486 This was the main 
U.S. focus for the security treaty revision in 1960. 
               The U.S. considered that it would be great timing to pursue this goal on better 
terms through negotiations with Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who was believed to 
share strategic perspectives with the United States. Kishi believed that keeping Korea, 
Taiwan and Southeast Asia out of Communist hands were matters of vital importance for 
Japan. He acknowledged Japan's dependence on the U.S. nuclear deterrent to prevent 
general war, and the U.S. forward presence of mobile striking forces. Kishi publicly 
recognized that Japan should “cope with aggression with recourse to the joint security 
system with the United States of America.” The U.S. thought they could do business with 
him to make the necessary readjustments in the bilateral relations.487 
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               Kishi met with Secretary of State Dulles in June 1957, and he made it very clear 
that he had no thoughts what so ever of seeking to abolish or weaken the Security Treaty 
or remove the U.S. from Japan. He clearly stated that his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 
which was recently established through the merger of two main conservative parties, felt 
that Japan’s future lies solely on a close cooperation with the U.S. Kishi did express 
however that the Japanese people believed that there was room for improvement to adjust 
the Treaty. For example, Japan thought that it should have the right of consultation 
concerning the disposition of U.S. forces in Japan.488       
               Kishi’s remark on Japan’s future direction was highly important to the United 
States. Dulles commented that, “The essential….is that the Japanese should accept the 
basic premise that their future lies in close cooperation with the United States to create a 
balance of power as against the Soviet Union and Communist China.”489 Also Dulles 
assessed that in comparison with Germany, Japan had been slower in regaining its 
national pride and spirit, and assessed that when the national pride and spirit did 
reemerge, the Japanese would psychologically align with the free world and recognize 
the indispensability of a security relationship with the United States against the 
Communist neighbors.490    
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               Kishi succeeded in showing his pro-U.S. stance and spirit of national pride on 
many occasions. In October 1957, the Soviets successfully launched a satellite Sputnik, 
and the same rocket that launched Sputnik was capable of delivering nuclear warheads 
anywhere in the world. It was broadly perceived that the Soviets now had superior 
nuclear missile technology, placing the United States in a militarily weaker position. The 
U.S. expected the Sputnik shock to promote a neutralization among certain Western 
countries.491 But Kishi expressed his strong support for the U.S.492 Furthermore, the U.S. 
withdrew a large part of its forces in Japan, while Japan had been building up its own 
defense forces to make up for this power vacuum, as Table 7.2 shows.              
Table 7.2. Number of the U.S. Forces in Japan and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, 
1952-1960493 
 U.S. Forces in Japan Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces 
December 1952 260,000 117,590 
December 1953 250,000 120,323 
December 1954 210,000 152,115 
December 1955 150,000 149,769 
December 1956 117,000 197,182 
August 1957   87,000 204,105 
December 1958   65,000 222,102 
December 1959   58,000 230,935 
June 1960   48,000 230,934 
 
               In October 1958 official bilateral negotiations began in Tokyo, based on a U.S. 
draft of a mutual security treaty,494 and the two allies signed the new mutual security 
                                                          
491 John W. Finney, “U.S. Missile Experts Shaken By Sputnik.” New York Times, October 13, 1957: 185.; 
Thomas J. Hamilton, “World Seen Reaching a Balance of Terror.” New York Times, October 13, 1957: 183. 
492 New York Times. “Japan Answers Moscow,” February 27, 1958: 26. 
493 Shingo Nakajima. Sengo Nihon no Boei Seisaku: “Yoshida Rosen” wo Meguru Seiji Gaiko Gunji 
[Postwar Japanese Defense Policy: "Politics, Diplomacy, and Military Affairs Surrounding the Yoshida 
Line]. (Tokyo, Japan: Keio Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006): 156. 
 230 
 
treaty in January 1960.495 The U.S. aimed to reduce the possibility of Japanese 
neutralization and its accommodation with the East, and at the same time maintain its 
base rights in Japan in a manner as free as possible. Japan at the same time desired to 
revise the 1951 Security Treaty because the conservative government considered some 
treaty provisions as unequal. These provisions were also vulnerable to criticism by the 
Japanese lefts, who aimed to promote Japanese neutralization. 
               One Japanese desire was to strengthen the U.S. defense commitment to Japan, 
and it was successful. The U.S. commitment was not an obligation under the 1951 
Security Treaty,496 but the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty clarified the U.S. defense 
commitment.497 Another Japanese goal was to ensure that Japan maintains a “say” in the 
U.S. use of its bases and show the Japanese public its exercise in sovereignty in the 
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essential security policy decision process.498 In the end, the U.S. accepted the 
establishment of the prior consultation formula, which Japan desired, and the U.S. also 
substantially succeeded in maintaining its base rights in a manner as free as possible. The 
two states agreed that the term of consultation did not mean “consent,” and did not give 
Japan veto power. They also agreed to various exemptions to the subjects of prior 
consultation.499  
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               In summary, at the time of alliance formation, Japan aimed to establish its own 
capabilities for internal security while relying on the U.S. military support for external 
security. This balance of alliance security preferences between arms and allied support 
was determined by the following three conditions: (1) Japan recognizes that its future lies 
solely on a close cooperation with the U.S., and avoids neutrality or accommodation with 
the East.; (2) The U.S. recognizes Japan as a strategically valuable ally, and its bases in 
Japan remain indispensable to the U.S. strategy.; and (3) Japan agrees to the U.S. 
uses/deployments of its troops and equipment in a flexible manner as much as possible, 
which will continue to be beneficial to U.S. strategy and the Japanese security. 
 
7.2. Changes in Capabilities and Domestic Regime 
               Figure 7.2 only shows the shifting trends of Japanese capabilities from 1952 to 
2000 due to the lack of available data after 2000,500 but it is clear that Japan in the year of 
2009 grew more powerful in comparison with a set of its neighbors and external major 
powers since the alliance formation.      
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               Japan has had no regime change since the alliance formation.501 This evidence 
suggests that Japan had no incentive to restructure the alliance with the U.S., but another 
domestic political change factor, government change (i.e., replacement of ruling parties 
and their descendants at the time of alliance formation) suggests that Japan would have 
had a new security preference of balance between its own arms and allied support. At the 
time of alliance formation, the Liberal Party (LP) government signed a security pact with 
the U.S. in 1951. Since the merger between the LP and the Japan Democratic Party in 
1955, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) remained the ruling party (except for the 
period between August 1993 and June 1994) until the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-
led coalition government took office in 2009. My theory of alliance restructuring predicts 
that the newly formed DPJ would have had a different preference on the combination of 
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democracy) in the period between 1952 and 2013. 
 234 
 
its own arms and allied support, increasing their incentive to restructure the existing 
alliance.  
 
7.3. Emergence of the DPJ-led Coalition Government in 2009 
               Since the signing of the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty in 1960, the LDP had 
been the largest political party in the Japanese Diet until the DPJ-led coalition 
government took office in September 2009. This section examines the DPJ’s alliance 
security preference, and its alliance policy during the Yukio Hatoyama DPJ-led coalition 
government, which held office from September 2009 to May 2010. This section 
especially focusses on the two alliance security-related policies during the Hatoyama 
administration: (1) East Asian Community (EAC) initiative; and (2) U.S. Marine 
Futenma Air Base relocation facility construction review. The DPJ’s stance on these two 
matters was considered a litmus test to its views on the future direction of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance and as having a negative impact on the U.S. use of bases in a flexible manner.    
 
7.3.1. DPJ’s Views on the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
               Since its establishment in 1998, the DPJ publicized various party documents 
regarding its foreign and security policies.502 The DPJ’s policies had never been tested in 
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the “real world” until 2009, but these party policy documents revealed the DPJ’s 
dissatisfaction with the U.S.-Japan alliance. It is important to note that the DPJ was not 
anti-American or anti-U.S.-Japan alliance oriented. For examples, the very first DPJ 
policy document in 1998 declared that “We will continue to place the Japan-US Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security at the center of our national security policy.”503  
               The DPJ and the LDP have shared a view that the U.S.-Japan alliance is pivotal 
to Japanese foreign and security policies, but a striking feature in the DPJ’s policy 
documents is its emphasis on such phrases as “independence and dynamism in Japanese 
diplomacy,”504 “Japan’s More Autonomous Decision-Making,”505 “independent 
diplomacy,”506 “Japan-US relationship, based on trust and an equal partnership,”507 and 
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“a close and equal Japan-U.S. alliance.”508 The DPJ perceived that Japanese voices had 
not been sufficiently heard by the U.S., and that the LDP did not show strong willingness 
to insist on national interests over the U.S. while following whatever the U.S. told Japan 
to do. The 1999 DPJ Basic Policies on Security pointed out that: 
Because the current Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements have left the 
United States to make the major decisions and Japan has been satisfied 
with simply being a junior partner, the Japan-U.S. relationship cannot 
be called an alliance in the true sense of the word….Obviously, the 
national interests of Japan and the United States will not always 
coincide perfectly….Japan's more autonomous decision-making is 
critical in this regard….509 
 
               When the Iraq War began in 2003, the DPJ’s perception of a subordinate 
alliance relationship with the U.S. was strengthened. The LDP-led coalition government 
supported the U.S.’s war decision and dispatched Japanese armed forces into Iraq for 
non-combat/reconstruction operations. The DPJ as an opposition party at that time 
questioned the legitimacy of the U.S. action, and accused the LDP of sending Japanese 
armed forces into Iraq. The 2004 DPJ manifesto promised that “we will do away with the 
dependent relationship in which Japan ultimately has no alternative but to act in 
accordance with US wishes, replacing it with a mature alliance, based on independence 
and equality.”510  
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               In order to build a close, equal, sound and mature U.S.-Japan alliance, the DPJ 
consistently made two key campaign promises: (1) a reduction of U.S. bases in Japan, 
especially the U.S. Marines base in Futenma, Okinawa; and (2) the strengthening of 
Japanese relations with Asian neighbors, through regional security institution building 
called an East Asian Community.  
               For the first promise, the DPJ pledged to work actively toward the consolidation 
and scaling-down of U.S. bases in Okinawa, including the transfer of facilities within 
Japan and abroad.511 After the electoral victory in 2009, DPJ leaders were willing to 
renegotiate the Futenma relocation facility (FRF) issue with the U.S. as early as possible 
following the formation of their new government.512   
               For the second promise, since its establishment in 1998 the DPJ pledged to seek 
a deeper cooperation with Asian neighbors.513 This policy of closer regional cooperation 
works as a tool to achieve autonomy in Japanese security policy.514 The DPJ first 
                                                          
511 Democratic Party of Japan. 1999. “Democratic Party of Japan’s Basic Policies on Security (Provisional 
Version).” Democratic Party of Japan. http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/basic.html. (accessed on 
February 24, 2015) 
512 Nihon Keizai Shimbun. “Hatoyama Minshu Daihyo, Futenma Isetsusaki ‘Saiteidemo Kengai’ [DPJ 
President Yukio Hatoyama makes an effort to relocate the Futenma base out of the Okinawa prefecture at 
the very least],” July 19, 2009, Online edition. 
http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/seiji/20090719STXKA025319072009.html. (accessed on July 19, 2009); Jiji 
Press. “Futenma Minaoshi Yusendo Takai, Minshuto no Okada shi [DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada 
says the Futenma review is a high priority],” July 20, 2009, Online edition. 
http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2009072000179. (accessed on July 20, 2009). 
513 Democratic Party of Japan. 1998. “Basic Policies.” Democratic Party of Japan. 
http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/basic.html. (accessed on February 24, 2015); Democratic Party of 
Japan. 1999. “Democratic Party of Japan’s Basic Policies on Security (Provisional Version).” Democratic 
Party of Japan. http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/basic.html. (accessed on February 24, 2015). 
514 The 2004 manifesto stated that: “Japan-US relations will remain very important to Japan's national 
security, but it is essential above all else to create a relationship of independence and equality between our 
two nations. The foundation of diplomacy lies in mutual interaction, confidence-building, and the building 
of cooperative relationships with neighbouring countries. Japan will not be able to achieve independent 
diplomacy and genuine national security unless it reestablishes itself as a nation that is truly part of Asia, 
and keeps in step with the times by developing more advanced relationships with South Korea, China, and 
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proposed its own regional institution building concept called an East Asian Community 
(EAC) in the 2005 party manifesto.515 During the 2009 election campaign, the DPJ’s 
stance on the membership and roles of the EAC began to raise great concerns inside and 
outside Japan. In September 2009, DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama described his views 
on the current and future regional environments and his policy positions. He criticized the 
U.S. unilateralism and globalism, and the LDP administration as a blind American 
follower. In this context, Hatoyama emphasized the formation of an EAC as a national 
goal under the forthcoming DPJ administration.  
“Another national goal….is the creation of an East Asian community. 
Of course, Japan-US Security Pact will continue to be the cornerstone 
of Japanese diplomatic policy….However, at the same time, we must 
not forget our identity as a nation located in Asia…. 
….the era of the US-led globalism is coming to an end and that we are 
moving away from a unipolar world led by the US towards an era of 
multipolarity…. 
Although the influence of the US is declining, the US will remain the 
world's leading military and economic power for the next two to three 
decades. Current developments show clearly that China….will become 
one of the world's leading economic nations, while also continuing to 
expand its military power….How should Japan maintain its political 
and economic independence and protect its national interest when 
caught between the United States, which is fighting to retain its 
position as the world's dominant power, and China which is seeking 
ways to become one?....This is a question of concern not only to Japan 
but also to the small and medium-sized nations in Asia. They want the 
military power of the US to function effectively for the stability of the 
region but want to restrain US political and economic excesses. They 
also want to reduce the militarily threat posed by our neighbor China 
while ensuring that China's expanding economy develops in an orderly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the ASEAN countries. See Democratic Party of Japan. 2004. “Manifesto 2004: Directly and Single-
Mindedly, Together with the People, Creating a New Kind of Politics and a New Japan, Katsuya Okada’s 
View of Japan.” Democratic Party of Japan. 
http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto4/pdf/manifesto_2004_a4.pdf. (accessed on February 24, 2015): 4-5. 
515 Democratic Party of Japan. 2005. “DPJ Manifesto for the 2005 House of Representatives Election: 
Nippon Sasshin: Toward a Change of Government.” Democratic Party of Japan. 
http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto5/pdf/manifesto_05.pdf. (accessed on February 24, 2015): 9 and 23. 
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fashion….This is also a major factor accelerating regional 
integration.”516                                                      
 
               To the DPJ, the U.S.-Japan alliance was not the sole cornerstone of Japanese 
security policy, but one of two cornerstones including Asia-oriented diplomacy, 
characterized by the creation of EAC. It was easily interpreted by the U.S. that Japan 
under the DPJ administration would become neutral or a balancing power between the 
U.S. in decline and China on rise, or would accommodate with rising China. Such 
Japanese moves were not consistent with the long term U.S. national interests decided at 
the time of alliance formation.  
               The DPJ’s policies on the FRF review and an EAC challenged the long term 
basic consensus between the two countries. Since alliance formation, the U.S. had 
provided Japan with an external security umbrella, while maintaining its base rights in 
Japan (especially in Okinawa) in a most flexible manner in return. The U.S. also secured 
a Japanese commitment to its long term pro-U.S. orientation. Contrary to the U.S. desire 
to maintain this basic alliance framework, the DPJ proposed to restructure the 
relationship. The next section explores the DPJ’s handling of two matters with the U.S.: 
the FRF review and EAC building initiative. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
516 Yukio Hatoyama. “Watashi no Seiji Tetsugaku [My Political Philosophy].” Voice, vol. September 
(2009): 132–41. 
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7.3.2. DPJ’s Efforts to Restructure the U.S.-Japan Alliance and its Failures 
7.3.2.1. U.S. Marine Futenma Base Relocation Review 
               The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) serves as an expeditionary force in readiness. 
Their main roles are to seize or defend advanced posts and conduct other land operations 
to support army and naval campaigns. The USMC has three standing units of Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF), which is a principle Marine warfighting organization 
employed during large crises and contingencies. MEFs, each with a Marine division, air 
wing, and logistics group, are capable of amphibious operations and sustained operations 
ashore in any geographic environment. An MEF command is located in Okinawa, Japan 
(III MEF: 19,000 troops at maximum) under the U.S. Pacific Command which takes a 
geographic area of responsibility stretching from the west coast of U.S. homeland to the 
western border of India. The tiltrotor aircraft group is currently stationed in Futenma.517   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
517 United States Marine Corps. 2010. “U.S. Marine Corps: Concepts and Programs 2010.” 
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/pandr/ConceptsandPrograms/ConceptsandPrograms2010.aspx. (accessed on 
March 1, 2015); “U.S. Marine Corps.” Official Website. Accessed March 1. http://www.marines.mil/. 
(accessed on March 1, 2015); “U.S. Pacific Command.” Official Website. Accessed March 1. 
http://www.pacom.mil/. (accessed on March 1, 2015); “Zainichi Beikaiheikai [III Marine Expeditionary 
Force, U.S. Marine Corps Installations Pacific].” Official Website. http://www.okinawa.usmc.mil/. 
(accessed on March 1, 2015) 
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Figure 7.3. Selected U.S. Military Installations in Okinawa518 
 
               As a result of a rape case in 1995 by marines in Okinawa,519 the U.S. and Japan 
established a special action committee to deal with problems surrounding the U.S. bases, 
and integrate and reduce the U.S. military functions in Okinawa. In 1996, the two 
                                                          
518 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart. The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma 
Base Controversy. Vol. R42645. CRS Report for Congress. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, January 20, 2016): 2. 
519 Andrew Pollack. “Rape Case in Japan Turns Harsh Light on U.S. Military: An Apology from the U.S. to 
Ease Tensions over Its Troops’ Behavior in Japan.” New York Times, September 20, 1995: A3. 
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countries agreed to the U.S. return of the Marine Air Station in Futenma after the 
construction of an alternative base in Okinawa.520 In 1998, the Nago mayor accepted the 
construction of an alternative base inside the city,521 and the U.S. and Japan finally 
reached an agreement on the FRF construction in 2006.522 It took a decade to reach this 
consensus among the parties involved, and it existed on a fragile foundation of 
intertwined bargains among the parties, including military rationality, reduction of 
military base burden on Okinawa, burden sharing among local authorities, economic 
incentives, environmental protection, and construction feasibility.523                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
520 Nicholas D. Kristof. “U.S. Will Return Base in Okinawa: Pentagon to Yield Other Land to Ease 
Islanders’ Rancor U.S. Agrees to Return Okinawa Base to Japan.” New York Times, April 13, 1996: 1 and 
4.; Andrew Pollack. “Okinawa Copter Base May Move Out to Sea.” New York Times, December 2, 1996: 
A6. 
521 New York Times. “Backer of U.S. Heliport Wins Vote in Japan,” February 9, 1998: A9. 
522 New York Times. “U.S. and Japan Reach Deal on Marine Move,” April 24, 2006: A3. 
523 For useful sources on the military base issues, see Akikazu Hashimoto, Mike Mochizuki, and Kurayoshi 
Takara, eds. The Okinawa Question and the U.S.-Japan Alliance. (Washington, DC: The George 
Washington University, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The Sigur Center for Asian Studies, 
2005); Sheila A. Smith. Shifting Terrain: The Domestic Politics of the U.S. Military Presence in Asia. East-
West Center Special Reports, No. 8. (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 2006); Kent E. Calder. Embattled 
Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2007); Alexander Cooley. Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas. (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2008); Andrew Yeo. Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests. (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
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Figure 7.4. U.S. Marines Air Station Futenma524 
 
               The DPJ’s campaign promise to relocate the Futenma base to outside Okinawa 
or Japan was welcomed by a majority of the Okinawan people, as the DPJ-led opposition 
coalition candidates dominated seats in all four single-member districts in Okinawa. The 
DPJ leaders were initially very optimistic concerning U.S. reactions. Based on various 
contacts with the U.S. side, the DPJ perceived that the FRF issue was not a primary 
concern for the Obama administration, and if Japan increased its support for U.S. efforts 
                                                          
524 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart. The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma 
Base Controversy. Vol. R42645. CRS Report for Congress. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, January 20, 2016): 17. 
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to stabilize Afghanistan, then they would also accept a revision of the 2006 plan.525 The 
reasons why the DPJ became optimistic are unknown,526 and this DPJ’s perception was 
proved totally wrong later on. 
               The U.S. understood the DPJ’s petition to review the negotiation process of the 
2006 relocation plan under the LDP administrations,527 even though the U.S. officially 
                                                          
525 For examples, the DPJ dispatched Kiyoshi Sugawa, senior researcher of the DPJ’s Policy Research 
Committee, and Satoshi Honjo, secretary of Rep. Katsuya Okada, DPJ Secretary General, to Washington, 
DC in August 2009. They met with U.S. officials including Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Kevin Maher, Director of the Office of Japan Affairs at the Department of 
State; Michael Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs, East 
Asia; Wallace “Chip” Gregson, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. 
Mainichi Shimbun. “Nihon ga Kawaru: Taibei Kankei, Kimistu Kyoyu, Sekkin suru Minshu, Gaimusho 
[Japan Changes: Relations with the U.S., Sharing Sensitive Information, DPJ and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Get Closer],” September 13, 2009, Online edition. 
http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20090913ddm001010063000c.html. (accessed on September 13, 2009); 
Mainichi Shimbun. “Shido Hatoyama Gaiko: Kigen Semaru Futenma [Hatoyama Diplomacy Launched: 
Futenma Issue Becomes Imminent],” September 20, 2009, Online edition. 
http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20090920ddm003010140000c.html. (accessed on September 20, 2009); 
Mainichi Shimbun Seijibu [Mainichi Shimbun Policial Affairs Devision]. 2010. Ryukyu no Seijoki: 
“Futenma” wa Owaranai [Stars and Stripes in the Ryukyus: Futenma Is Not Over Yet]. (Tokyo, Japan: 
Kodansha, 2010): 70-75.; Asahi Shimbun Seiken Shuzai Senta [Asahi Shimbun DPJ Administration Report 
Center], ed. Minshuto Seiken 100-nichi no Shinso [Truth in the First 100 Days of the Democratic Party of 
Japan Administration]. (Tokyo, Japan: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan, 2010): 166-167. 
526 For examples, the former U.S. officials and the DPJ high ranking members met in Tokyo in December 
2008. From the U.S., Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 
(Clinton Administration), Michael Green, former Senior Director for Asian affairs at the National Security 
Council (George W. Bush Administration), John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clinton 
Administration), John Kerry, U.S. Democratic Senator from Massachusetts; and from the DPJ, Naoto Kan, 
Acting President, Yukio Hatoyama, Secretary General, Katsuya Okada, Vice President, Seiji Maehara, 
Vice President were included. In this meeting, Nye cautioned against the DPJ by saying that the United 
States would consider the DPJ are not interested in maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance if the DPJ opposes 
the 2006 Futenma relocation plan. See Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, ed. Seiken: The Ruling Power. (Tokyo, 
Japan: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Shuppansha, 2010): 223.; Sankei Shimbun. “Minshuto Kanbu to 
Beiminsyuto Kokubo Kankeisha Seiken Kotai Misue Kaidan [Democratic Party of Japan High Officials 
Meet With the U.S. Democratic Party National Security Figures in Anticipation of the Japanese 
Government Change],” December 20, 2008, Online edition. 
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/081220/stt0812200831003-n1.htm. (accessed on December 20, 
2008); Sankei Shimbun. “Kakukoku Gaikodan, Minshuto ni Sesshoku Kosei, Seiken Kotai Shiya ni 
Nebumi [Diplomats in Tokyo Rush the Contact with the Democratic Party of Japan in Anticipation of the 
Japanese Government Change],” December 22, 2008, Online edition. 
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/081222/stt0812222130007-n1.htm. (accessed on December 22, 
2008) 
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and repeatedly stated that the 2006 plan was the best and only option, broadly acceptable 
to all parties involved.528 The U.S. was willing to accept a minor revision in the plan (e.g., 
shortening of the length of runways),529 but also hoped that after the review, the DPJ-led 
coalition government would accept the 2006 plan.                                         
               As soon as the DPJ took office on September 16, 2009, Foreign Minister 
Katsuya Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa began to review the FRF 
negotiation process. Their focus was to reexamine any and all options considered 
previously and to review the U.S.-Japan agreement to relocate the Futenma marine base 
to Henoko district in the Nago city. Kitazawa immediately figured out that the 2006 
Henoko plan was the only feasible option for all parties involved. Ten days after the 
inception of the DPJ administration, Kitazawa quickly remarked that it was extremely 
difficult to explore a new plan and it would take a very long time to find an alternative to 
relocate the Futenma base out of Okinawa or Japan.530 Okada also understood that it was 
impossible to move the Futenma base out of Okinawa, and initially considered that it 
                                                                                                                                                                             
527 U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Remarks With Bangladesh 
Foreign Minister Dipu Moni After Their Meeting, Washington, DC.” Official Website. September 16, 2009. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/09/129279.htm. (accessed on March 4, 2015) 
528 For examples, U.S. Department of Defense. “DoD News Briefing with Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff 
Morrell at the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, Va.” Official Website. September 9, 2009. 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4475. (accessed on March 4, 2015); 
Mure Dickie. “US Calms Fears over DPJ Plan to Recast Relations.” Financial Times, September 19, 2009: 
4. 
529 Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. A Combatant Commander’s 
Perspective on Security in the Asia-Pacific. (Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009), 
http://csis.org/files/attachments/090915_transcript.pdf., p. 5. (accessed on March 5, 2015) 
530 Japan Ministry of Defense. “Press Conference by the Defense Minister (6:15-6:40 P.M. September 26, 
2009).” Official Website. September 26, 2009. http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2009/09/26a.html. 
(accessed on March 5, 2015); Interview with Toshimi Kitazawa in Katsuyuki Yakushiji. Shogen Minshuto 
Seiken [Testimony: Inner Politics of the Democratic Party]. (Tokyo, Japan: Kodansha, 2012): 85-87. 
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might be better to merge with the U.S. Air Force base in Kadena, Okinawa.531 As a result 
of further review, Okada finally reached the same conclusion as Kitazawa in November 
or early December 2009.532  
               When U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Tokyo on October 20-21, 
2009, Prime Minister Hatoyama suggested that Japan keep looking for an alternative plan 
in the next year of 2010.533 In meeting with Okada and Kitazawa, Gates made it very 
clear that the 2006 plan was the “only viable option,” and requested that a conclusion be 
reached as soon as possible.534 Okada and Kitazawa began to work together to settle the 
FRF issue by the end of 2009,535 but Hatoyama stated that “If we are obsequious to the 
United States as the previous LDP administrations, there would be no need to reconsider 
a new alternative to the current Henoko option. But we, the DPJ-led administration, 
would like to clearly show a Japanese independent spirit to the United States on this 
                                                          
531 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Press Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada 
(Briefing Room, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Friday, October 23, 2009, 5:00 p.m.).” Official Website. 
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issue….it is not easy to say when we make a final conclusion on this issue, and we hope 
it to be understood.”536     
               On November 13, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Hatoyama met 
at a summit in Tokyo. Hatoyama committed five billion dollars over five years to support 
civilian efforts in Afghanistan, but their main topic of discussion was the FRF. Contrary 
to the DPJ’s optimistic assessment, the Japanese financial commitment to Afghanistan 
did not ease the U.S. position on the FRF issue at all. The two leaders agreed to the 
establishment of a working group including Okada, Kitazawa, and John Roos, U.S. 
Ambassador in order to deal with the FRF issue. In a joint press conference, Hatoyama 
stated that “There is no question that this is a very difficult issue….we understand the 
need to resolve the issue as soon as possible within the Working Group.” Obama added 
that “The United States and Japan have set up a high-level Working Group that will focus 
on [the] implementation of the agreement that our two governments reached with respect 
to the restructuring of the US forces in Okinawa, and we hope to complete this work 
expeditiously.”537  
               This joint press conference revealed that the two leaders had a different 
viewpoint on the U.S.-Japan alliance. The DPJ perceived that Japan was too dependent 
on the U.S., and the DPJ’s goal was to seek a close and equal alliance. In a joint press 
                                                          
536 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. “Kyoko na Nichibei Kankei wo Mezashite [Toward a Strong 
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conference, Obama disagreed and responded that “Let me, first of all, insist that the 
United States and Japan are equal partners. We have been and we will continue to be.”538 
Another point was that Hatoyama talked about a deepening of the alliance. He pointed 
out that the U.S.-Japan alliance should not be limited to the security dimension, and the 
two countries could deepen the alliance through bilateral cooperation in various areas as 
disaster prevention, health, education and the environment. But Obama emphasized the 
security dimension of the alliance, and replied that “Our goal remains the same, and that's 
to provide for the defence of Japan.”539 
               One U.S. media described that the U.S.-Japan relations were “at their most 
contentious since the trade wars of the 1990s.”540 The bilateral summit failed to ease 
tensions, and even worse Hatoyama’s remarks in Singapore the next day further damaged 
the bilateral relations. In a joint press conference, Hatoyama mentioned “the need to 
resolve the issue as soon as possible within the Working Group,” and Obama added that 
the Working Group “will focus on [the] implementation of the agreement” that the two 
countries reached in 2006, and complete this work expeditiously.541 These words were 
widely interpreted as that the two countries would reconfirm the 2006 FRF plan by the 
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end of 2009. But the very next day Hatoyama in Singapore totally denied Obama’s 
position, by arguing that the Working Group should explore an alternative relocation plan, 
and otherwise would be meaningless if it only implements the 2006 plan. He further 
commented that his decision might be deferred into the next year.542 Hatoyama’s remarks 
greatly surprised the DPJ politicians involved with the foreign and security policy making 
because his words could be understood to break President Obama’s face.543  
               Okada and Kitazawa continued to convince Hatoyama that it was critical to 
accept the 2006 plan by the end of 2009.544 Hatoyama did not give up exploring an 
alternative relocation plan and made it clear that he was the final decision maker on this 
matter.545 In the end, on December 15, Hatoyama officially decided to keep exploring an 
alternative plan and to make a final decision in the year of 2010.546 There were two 
rationales behind his decision. First, Hatoyama strongly sought to achieve his version of 
the “equal” alliance by reducing the U.S. military presence in Japan. In the first week of 
December, his personal foreign policy advisor Jitsuro Terashima, Chairman of the Japan 
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Research Institute, visited Washington, D.C., and told Japanese experts that “Japan, as an 
independent state, should reduce the size of U.S. forces by one third.”547 His remarks 
clearly echoed with Hatoyama’s long standing policy of seeking the alliance without the 
standing U.S. military presence inside Japan.548   
               For the second rationale, Hatoyama needed to maintain his coalition 
government with the Social Democratic Party (SDP),549 which had been opposed to the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. In the 2009 election, the SDP promised the reduction/removal of the 
U.S. forces from Japan,550 but the DPJ needed the SDP to secure a majority in the upper 
house. If Hatoyama had accepted the 2006 plan, a departure of the SDP from the 
coalition would lead to the collapse of the DPJ administration, which actually happened 
in May 2010 in the end. The loss of the majority in the upper house meant that there was 
little chance to pass a government-backed bill in the Diet, even though the DPJ had 
enjoyed the majority in the lower house. Hatoyama needed to choose between the SDP 
and the U.S. and chose the former for his own political survival. His decision greatly 
disappointed the U.S.551                 
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               After January 2010 and until Hatoyama finally accepted the 2006 plan in May 
2010, it had been a devastating process where Hatoyama had explored all conceivable 
options, screening them out one by one, only to approve the existing plan as the only 
available one. Okada and Kitazawa stepped aside entirely from the review process in 
2010. Instead, the Prime Minister’s Office directly took the lead in exploring all other 
options.552 Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano had especially played a key role in 
the process, and shared the same view as Hatoyama of an equal U.S.-Japan alliance.553 
Hirano’s demanding jobs were to find an alternative to meet the U.S. military 
specifications, and when found, he needed to secure the approval from local authorities. 
Then Hirano needed further approval from the coalition partners (especially the SDP).  
               The DPJ had only five months to complete these tasks simultaneously, while in 
comparison it took a decade under the previous LDP administrations. Hatoyama and 
Hirano ultimately failed to do all that was required in the end, and finally accepted the 
2006 plan with a nominal revision on May 28, 2010. On that same date Hatoyama fired 
Minister of Consumer Affairs Mizuho Fukushima, President of the SDP from his cabinet 
due to her continuous resistance against the 2006 plan. Two days later the SDP departed 
from the ruling coalition,554 and the DPJ lost control over the upper house. On June 2, 
Hatoyama announced his resignation due to the FRF turmoil, his own political fund 
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scandals, and his low public approval ratings,555 which resulted in his failure of 
restructuring the U.S.-Japan alliance through the FRF review process.       
 
7.3.2.2. East Asian Community Building 
               The U.S.-Japan relations during the Hatoyama administration had been nearly, 
entirely dominated by the FRF issue. In the middle of the Futenma turmoil, Foreign 
Minister Okada even remarked in a press conference, “I cannot say with absolute 
confidence how much of our bilateral relationship of trust will be maintained in the event 
that the Japan-US agreement is not implemented as the United States has planned. I have 
a strong sense of crisis regarding the current state of the Japan-US alliance.”556  
               However, from the U.S. viewpoint, the DPJ’s attempt to review the FRF 
agreement was considered the second shock. The very first shock was the DPJ’s 
promotion of an East Asian Community (EAC) initiative, which had been interpreted as 
the DPJ’s intension to balance against the U.S. influence toward Asia,557 exclude the U.S. 
from East Asian regional institution building and establish much closer relations with 
rising China. Even DPJ cabinet members had great concern that the EAC would become 
the main source of U.S. mistrust to the DPJ, greater than the FRF review.558                                             
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               On September 21, 2009, Hatoyama visited the U.S. in his first overseas trip as 
prime minister, in order to attend a U.N. General Assembly just five days after his 
inauguration. His first summit counterpart was Chinese President Hu Jintao. Japanese 
prime ministers under the LDP administrations typically would have had their own 
summit initially with the U.S. President. During the summit, Hatoyama proposed his 
initiative of the EAC to Hu,559 and explained that the EAC would exclude the U.S.560 
Hatoyama’s proposal of the EAC to China was made without any prior consultation with 
the U.S., and Hatoyama did not even talk about the EAC with Obama at their first 
summit on September 23, following the Hatoyama-Hu summit.561 Regarding the EAC 
membership issue, Hatoyama did not publically mention the exclusion of the United 
States, but Foreign Minister Okada told foreign media reporters that he envisioned an 
EAC without the U.S.562             
               At the trilateral summit in Beijing on October 10, 2009, Hatoyama called on his 
counterparts, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and South Korean President Lee Myung Bak, 
to begin work to advance his EAC initiative, and furthermore had been more candid 
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saying that “It could be said that we have so far depended on the United States too 
much….While the Japanese-US alliance is important, I want to devise policies that focus 
more on Asia, as a member of Asia….I want to start with the strengthening of economic 
cooperation, and then work to strengthen exchanges at the cultural and social levels.”563 
Again Hatoyama’s remarks were made without consultation to the U.S.564 At the same 
time, as if supporting Hatoyama’s remarks, his private foreign policy advisor Terashima 
published an article urging that Japan as an independent state should create a greater 
distance from the U.S., and that Japan should strike a balance between the U.S. in decline 
and China on the rise in the trilateral triangle relations.565 
               Hatoyama worked hard to sell his EAC initiative, but failed to materialize in the 
end for the following two reasons. First, several regional countries in close relations with 
the U.S. that included Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
New Zealand, had growing concerns about the DPJ’s exclusive approach toward the 
U.S.566 Singaporean Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew’s analysis is a good example of this 
position. From Lee’s viewpoint, while China has been rapidly gaining economic and 
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geopolitical clout, Beijing is neither willing nor ready to take on equal responsibility for 
managing the international system. The very size of China would make it impossible for 
the rest of Asia, including Japan and India, to match it in weight and capacity in the next 
two to three decades. Lee concluded that Asia needs the U.S. to strike a balance against 
China, and the U.S. should not be shut out of any new Asian architecture.567      
               Second, the DPJ’s proposal of the EAC renewed a regional leadership 
competition between Japan and China regarding issues of membership and areas of 
cooperation.568 Before Hatoyama’s EAC proposal to Chinese President Hu on September 
21, China had already promoted its own regional framework called the ASEAN Plus 
Three (APT) that included ASEAN states, China, Japan, and South Korea. At the same 
time, Japan supported the ASEAN Plus Six that additionally included three Asian 
democracies: Australia, New Zealand, and India. Japan had been concerned that the APT 
would be dominated by Chinese influences, and had intended to include three more 
regional democracies in order to counterbalance excessive Chinese influences in the 
region at the present and in the future. Hatoyama’s EAC envisioned the same 
membership as the previous LDP administrations had done for the ASEAN Plus Six. The 
difference was that Hatoyama’s EAC was combined with Japan’s attempt to create a 
greater distance from the U.S., while the LDP’s ASEAN Plus Six had been based on a 
strong U.S.-Japan alliance. From a long term Chinese viewpoint, the reduction (or 
exclusion) of U.S. influences from Asia would enhance the Chinese position in Asia, but 
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if Hatoyama’s regional approach leads to the weakening of the U.S-Japan alliance, and 
Japan becomes an independent military power, that too would be against the Chinese 
national interests. A more realistic assessment is that China could not expect Hatoyama to 
succeed in creating a greater distance from the U.S., and for this reason, it would be 
against the Chinese national interests to support the EAC under Japanese leadership and 
the continuous U.S. influences.569  
               Therefore, at the first bilateral summit, Hu took a cautious approach to 
Hatoyama’s EAC, and did not respond to the proposal.570 Then China became apparently 
more alert over the EAC under the Japanese leadership, and the Foreign Minister Yang 
Jiechi of China told Foreign Minister Okada that China (not Japan) was among the first 
batch of countries to advocate the building of an East Asian community.571 In order to 
subsume a growing concern among Asian countries and to gain their greater support to 
his EAC, Hatoyama began to emphasize the importance of the U.S. involvement with the 
EAC on October 24, 2009. Hatoyama also desired to improve relations with the U.S. 
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because the two countries had been in turmoil from another problem: FRF review.572 In 
response to Hatoyama’s move, Chinese Premier Wen mentioned the Chinese objection to 
a rapid building of the EAC, pointing out the developmental and cultural diversity of 
Asian countries.573 
               The DPJ-led administration began to intensify a feud with the U.S. over the FRF 
review issue in the middle of October, 2009, and Hatoyama’s approach to the EAC had 
become more and more moderate by emphasizing the importance of the U.S. involvement, 
the institutional features of openness and transparency, and a functional approach to 
enhance regional cooperation in more specific areas such as trade, investment, finance, 
education, and environment. In the end, Hatoyama’s EAC became almost equivalent to 
the LDP’s version of regional cooperation,574 and the original version of Hatoyama’s 
EAC could not survive after his resignation as prime minister on May 28, 2010.     
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7.4. Conclusion 
               This chapter tested the applicability of my theory of alliance restructuring to the 
U.S.-Japan alliance and my theory explains the Japanese case that the alliance has 
remained the same even though Japan attempted and failed to restructure the alliance 
relationship with the U.S. in 2009-2010. When the alliance formed in 1951-1960, Japan 
aimed to establish its own capabilities for internal security while relying on U.S. military 
support for external security. This balance of alliance security preferences between the 
Japanese own arms and the U.S. military support reflects that Japan recognizes that its 
future lies solely on a close cooperation with the U.S., and will not become neutral 
between the East and West (or does not accommodate with the East).; and that Japan 
agrees to the U.S. uses of bases in Japan in a flexible manner as much as possible, which 
continues to be beneficial to U.S. national strategy and Japanese external security.  
               Since the alliance formation, Japanese capabilities have grown more powerful 
relative to its neighbors and external powers. Japan also experienced a domestic political 
shift in the DPJ’s electoral victory in 2009, when it was the first time that the LDP had 
lost the position of the political party with the largest seats in the Diet since 1955. As a 
result, the initial Japanese alliance objectives and security preference on the combination 
of its own arms and allied support had actually changed, as my theory expected. From the 
DPJ’s viewpoint, the U.S. power has been in decline while Chinese power has been on 
the rise. The DPJ had a sense that Japan would need a new diplomatic approach to deal 
with this new international environment.  
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               Their answers were to enhance diplomatic autonomy by relying less on U.S. 
security support through the reduction/greater restraints of the U.S. military presence in 
Japan and by building an East Asian Community (EAC) which would increase 
cooperative dimensions in the relations with China. The DPJ triggered these two options 
at the same time but failed to materialize both due to the following two reasons. First, the 
DPJ and the U.S. were unable to find a new mutually agreeable balance of alliance 
security preference. The DPJ’s goal to reduce or remove the U.S. Marines from Okinawa 
meant to the U.S. that its base rights in Japan would be significantly altered and less 
flexible, which was against long term U.S. national interests.  
               Second, the DPJ’s attempt to promote the EAC meant to the U.S. that Japan 
might lean towards neutrality between the U.S. and China, or would even accommodate 
with China. From the U.S. viewpoint, Japan may no longer recognize that its future lies 
solely on a close cooperation with the U.S. The DPJ’s EAC approach of excluding the 
U.S. also made the U.S. allies and friends in East Asia very uncomfortable. In response, 
the DPJ needed to change their original stance and emphasize the importance of the U.S. 
involvement with the EAC. Furthermore, the DPJ’s promotion of the EAC triggered (or 
renewed) a regional leadership competition with China, rather than enhance Sino-
Japanese regional cooperation. 
               The DPJ attempted to restructure the alliance in order to meet their new alliance 
preference in 2009, but failed to materialize their concept of restructuring. In the end, the 
following two DPJ-led coalition governments after Hatoyama returned to the same 
alliance security preference that the previous LDP administrations had built. In the 
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December 2012 lower house election, the DPJ severely lost and the LDP formed the 
ruling government once again.                 
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8. Conclusion 
8.1. Findings 
               Military alliances are formed when members value the alliance as the best tool 
to achieve their own objectives with the most preferred balance between their own arms 
and allied support. However, environments inside and outside the alliance will not remain 
the same since the time of alliance formation, and due to the shifting internal and external 
conditions, an individual ally must continuously seek the most preferred arms-and-allies 
balance to achieve its national security objectives. When the ally’s preference of arms-
and-allies balance shifts, the ally bargains with the members and restructures the existing 
alliance relationship by choosing dealignment, expiration, renewal or status quo. 
               As statistically identified in Chapter 4, there are three factors showing a 
significant and substantial effect on state behaviors for restructuring the existing alliance. 
One is related to international factors (i.e., capabilities increase) and two are related to 
domestic factors (i.e., regime change and government change). First, a state is more likely 
to restructure the current alliance when the state grows “more” powerful relative to the 
neighbors and external powers after the alliance formation. Secondly, the probability of 
the state’s alliance restructuring increases when experiencing democratization or 
authoritarianization. Thirdly, when a ruling government at the time of alliance formation 
is replaced, the state is more likely to restructure the current alliance relationship. 
               As discussed in Chapter 5, the Philippines’ alliance restructuring with the 
United States in 1992 demonstrates whether and how a state restructures their existing 
alliance when experiencing a capabilities increase and regime/government change. When 
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the U.S.-Philippines alliance was formed in 1947, the Philippine leaders were primarily 
distressed and concerned about a resurgent Japan and Communist China as a potential 
external threat. They valued sovereignty as a newly independent nation but also 
understood their country’s limited resources for building sufficient military capabilities. 
They placed greater value on U.S. support over their own arms, and expected the 
retention of U.S. bases to fully defend their country. Since alliance formation, the 
Philippines grew stronger relative to their neighbors and external powers, and in the late 
1980s the country experienced democratization at the same time. The capabilities 
increase and regime changes inclined the Philippine leaders to reassess their alliance 
objectives and the original arms-and-allies balance. After a little over one year of 
bargaining efforts, the Philippines chose to restructure the alliance and remove U.S. bases 
from their country (i.e., to renew the alliance with different terms), totally in line with my 
theory. 
               Chapter 6 examines the South Korean case from 1998-2000 as a deviant and 
negative case. At the time of alliance formation in 1954, the South Korean leaders feared 
future external aggression, from North Korea, with or without Chinese and Russian 
assistance and a resurgent Japan. South Korea was aware that without a U.S. defense 
commitment, they could not defend their country from these potential threats. The leaders 
also expected U.S. military aid to be used to help build up South Korean capabilities. 
Since the formation, South Korea grew more powerful relative to neighbors and external 
powers and experienced regime changes, both authoritarianization and democratization. 
Also, the emergence of a progressive Kim Dae-jung administration represented drastic 
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political change replacing a long term conservative ruling political force. However, the 
new South Korean leadership chose not to restructure the alliance because of the 
enduring geographical vulnerability to North Korean force deployment, the North Korean 
WMD threats and their constant provocative behaviors which caused the South Korean 
leaders to maintain the same level of threat perception since the alliance formation. These 
factors are hard to measure cross-nationally and are missing in the currently available 
cross-national data.                     
               My proposed theory of alliance restructuring is created by the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of 142 military alliances formed from 1946 to 2000. There should be 
no surprise to be able to explain most cases from 1946 to 2000. Chapter 7 demonstrates 
the theory’s explanatory power to cases outside the population: the Japanese attempt to 
restructure the alliance with the United States in 2009-2010. When the alliance was 
formed in 1951, Japan’s greatest security concern was primarily internal from communist 
subversions, and secondarily external from the Eastern bloc. Japan planned to establish 
its own capabilities for internal security and rely on U.S. military support for external 
security. Since the alliance formation, Japan grew stronger relative to its neighbors and 
external powers. The regime change never occurred, but Japan did experience a 
government change in 2009, when the LDP, the largest party in the Diet since 1955, was 
finally replaced. The new ruling leadership, the DPJ placed a lesser value on U.S. 
military support and emphasized greater autonomy in times of diplomatic decision 
making, than the LDP. While attempting to reduce U.S. bases from Okinawa, the DPJ 
also began to lean towards neutrality with China on the rise and the U.S. in decline. 
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These goals were totally against the essential U.S. interests held since the alliance 
formation. The DPJ, following their electoral victory, realized that they could not find a 
common ground with the United States and failed in the end to achieve their goals.           
 
8.2. Implications 
               The findings of this study have four major implications for: (1) management of 
alliances; (2) roles of domestic politics; (3) the tradeoff between arms versus allies; and 
(4) the balance of power. 
               There are multiple implications for the management of alliances. First, the 
previous works have discussed that any changes in the capabilities of state and its ally 
make an alliance more likely to break.575 This study finds that not just “any” capabilities 
changes would lead to the alliance restructuring. A state is more likely to restructure the 
current alliance when the state grows “more powerful” relative to the neighbors and 
external powers after the alliance formation. Second, most conflicts occur between the 
neighboring states and/or major powers possessing a power projection capability. The 
previous works have measured capabilities changes as a shifting percentage share in the 
entire international system, and the measurement does not reflect the realistic source of 
threat that most states usually fear. This study refines the previously used measurement 
and supports that a state’s alliance restructuring is highly associated with a capabilities 
increase relative to the neighbors and external powers. Thirdly, the previous works have 
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provided evidence that when the current domestic regime changes, the alliance associated 
with the state will be terminated,576 however they did not clarify which state will 
restructure the alliance, the state experiencing the regime change or the ally. Chapters 5 
and 7 show that the state experiencing the regime or government change is the state 
which is more likely to try to restructure the existing alliance. 
               Secondly, there are implications for the roles of domestic politics. A state 
leader’s most important interest is to stay in office and care about the views of those who 
can keep them in office.577 When their winning coalition greatly cares about foreign 
policy conducted by state leaders who they support and keep in office, state leaders must 
consider their foreign policy choice and the consequence of their future personal interest 
as top leaders. Chapter 7 discusses the case of the DPJ’s alliance policy in 2009-2010 and 
illustrates the roles of the ruling coalition party, the SDP, in foreign policy makings and 
the fate of the DPJ-led coalition government after the departure of the SDP. Secondly, 
there is a debate about the reliability and sustainability of democratic alliances. While 
some works argue that a greater chance of leadership change will lead to more frequent 
policy change and make alliances less reliable,578 other works discuss that democracies 
often ratify an alliance treaty with two government branches and that the ratification will 
make the hurdle of alliance treaty termination more difficult, causing the alliances to be 
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more durable.579 This study supports the former.  The quantitative results show that a 
more democratic state is likely to restructure the current alliance relationship although the 
degree of statistical significance is not stable. But the qualitative evidence, shown in 
Chapters 5 and 7, the democratization in the Philippines and the government change in 
Japan all demonstrate the process of leadership change bringing a new and different 
perspective on the alliance policy into the foreign policy makings. 
               Thirdly, the traditional understandings of the arms-and-allies tradeoff may need 
to be refined. Both objectives of building up their own military capabilities and forming 
an alliance with other states are to achieve national security. Both are also costly because 
scarce resources need to be invested in and alliances also carry the risk of committing 
military intervention to support the allies. Conventionally, when a state achieves national 
security, the tradeoff between arms and allies is considered a zero-sum, either by 
increasing their own capabilities or by seeking allies.580 The Japanese case in Chapter 7 is 
a good example of the zero-sum tradeoff between arms and allies. For Japan, its own 
arms were initially designed to address internal communist subversions while the alliance 
with the United States has played a role in dealing with potential external threats at the 
risk of its involvement with American military interventions. However, both Chapters 5 
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and 6 demonstrate that the Philippines and South Korea in the 1950s had no sufficient 
recourse to build up their own military capabilities, and also needed to rely on the U.S. 
financial and material assistance to the end. For the two countries, there was no tradeoff 
between their own arms and allied support. The only available choice was to seek the U.S. 
support.  
               Lastly, there are also implications for the balance of power theory. The 
traditional balance of power theory explains the incentives for less powerful states to ally 
with others against a most powerful state that seeks to dominate them.581 Assuming that 
the traditional balance of power is valid, this study provides a possible explanation for 
shifting incentives of lesser powers to either maintain or restructure their alliances with 
the other lesser powers. When a lesser power grows more powerful relative to the 
neighbors and external powers including the most powerful state, the once lesser power 
may want to eliminate potential cost of commitment and risk of entanglement, and then 
choose to dealign from the current alliance or allow the alliance to expire as scheduled. 
Or the once lesser power may become more interested in renewing the existing alliance 
with different and more advantageous terms than the original.             
 
8.3. Future Research 
               This study is a combined quantitative and qualitative method analysis for the 
alliance restructuring, and there are a variety of possible ways of building on this study 
for future research.  
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               First, this study focuses on alliances with defensive obligations. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, there are various types of other security commitments from offense, non-
aggression, and consultation. Differences in commitments from a high risk to low may 
create different dynamics than those of defensive alliances. How is an individual 
defensive alliance member’s behavior towards restructuring different from those of other 
types? Also do capabilities increase and regime, government change have an impact as 
well on the alliance restructuring behaviors of those different types?  
               Secondly, this study excludes informal alliances (e.g., U.S.-Israel alliance) from 
the cross-national data collection, as explained in Chapter 2. These alliances are 
sometimes called “alignment”, not “alliances.” How is an individual alignment member’s 
behavior different in terms of alignment restructuring? What factors are significantly and 
substantially associated with the state’s alignment restructuring? How does alignment 
restructuring play out? 
               Thirdly, this study focuses on the post-WWII alliances. The reason for this 
choice is methodological in order to deal with possible unknown confounders, and it also 
makes sense because the previous work’s findings have suggested that the pre-WWII 
alliance dynamics are different from the post-WWII dynamics. However, when Chapter 
4’s quantitative data expands to include the pre-WWII alliances, can the quantitative 
findings remain significant and substantial? 
               Fourthly, Chapters 5 to 7 examined the three U.S. alliances in East Asia in detail. 
These chapters revealed that the United States entered into formal alliances with the 
Philippines and South Korea in the 1950s even after initially refusing to do so, while the 
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U.S. identified, a formal alliance with Japan, strategically valuable from the beginning. 
These findings lead to one cross-national puzzle and one empirical puzzle. First, why do 
some states choose to formalize some relations, but some do not? The United States in 
the 1950s took the formalization of defense commitments to East Asian allies and its 
possible positive and negative consequences very seriously, however previous works 
generally do not distinguish alignments (i.e., informal alliances) from formal alliances.582 
This question goes beyond the relations between allies. Possibly when alliances become 
formalized, a signal will be sent to the third party state and have greater impact on the 
degree of deterrent effects of alliance target states. Second, why is there no NATO in 
Asia? Scholars have provided various explanations of the origins of the U.S. bilateral 
alliances in East Asia.583 Despite the fact that the U.S. alliances in East Asia have been 
considered a key factor in the current regional stability, their answers have been largely 
inconclusive. To date, none have produced a clear and consistent answer to the basic 
question. The findings of this study suggest that there is no NATO in Asia because of 
Japan, the single most strategically critical state to the United States. The U.S. formed 
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alliances with other East Asian states only when such alliances served the U.S. policy 
efforts toward Japan or the situational U.S. diplomatic goals. I tentatively name my 
argument as “Japan-cornerstone thesis.” However, the argument still remains incomplete 
because it lacks the research associated with the origins of the U.S. alliances with the 
other Asian states: Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan and Thailand. 
               Fifthly, the outcomes of alliance restructuring may have an impact to the 
ongoing alliance burden sharing, leading a shift to the division of labor in alliance 
members’ military roles. This study investigates the relationships between shifting 
security preferences of arms and allied support and alliance restructuring decisions. 
Alliance burden sharing is closely related to the tradeoff between arms and allied 
support.584 The primary goal of an alliance is to deter and defend against a threatening 
power, and a successful alliance plays the role of public goods for all alliance members. 
But success mainly depends on contributions of the larger allies, and the conventional 
wisdom is that the alliance military burden is shared unequally among the allies. The 
previous works have most commonly investigated the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and concluded that the United States disproportionally bears the larger military 
burden of NATO and smaller states enjoy free-riding,585 however other works have found 
no significant evidence supporting the burden sharing problem.586 So far there is no 
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comprehensive study on the topic of burden sharing in U.S. alliances in East Asia. Has a 
burden sharing problem existed in the U.S.-led alliance system in East Asia?       
               Lastly, this study finds that when an individual ally grows more powerful 
relative to the neighbors and external powers, the state is more likely to restructure the 
existing alliance, along with the shifting preferred balance between arms and allied 
support. One possible case finds that the state with more capabilities will carry the greater 
alliance burden in military roles. This possibility raises important research questions 
regarding relationships between the shifting burden sharing and allies’ involvement with 
the militarized interstate disputes. Most U.S. allies in East Asia are involved with 
territorial disputes with neighboring countries, and more capabilities will consequently 
put more military options in their hands. In the end, these U.S. allies in Asia may have a 
greater incentive to invoke militarized inter-state disputes against the disputants, and the 
United States could become entrapped in undesirable conflicts between its allies and the 
disputants. Does shifting alliance burden sharing lead to allied misbehaviors in territorial 
disputes? If so, what conditions make the allies “less” provocative in disputes? 
 
8.4. Concluding Remarks 
               This study found that 88% of the state’s restructuring behaviors from 1946 to 
2000 were associated with capabilities increase and domestic regime change. During the 
same time period, states restructured their existing alliances more than twice every year. 
In addition, as mentioned in the Introduction, several alliance restructuring cases can be 
identified in Latin America, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, almost all over the globe in 
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the last few years. As long as the alliance remains as an important security tool available 
to countries, the state’s alliance restructuring will continue to have an impact on the 
strategic interest calculations of not only alliance members but also third party states and 
alliance target states. An alliance restructuring can affect an individual state’s security 
positively or negatively, therefore state leaders must continue to pay close attention to the 
management of alliances.      
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. List of state’s alliance restructuring, 1946-2000 
 Year ATOP 
code 
State that 
restructured an 
alliance  
Mode of 
alliance 
restructuring 
Memo from ATOP code sheets 
1 1948 3040 United 
Kingdom 
Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3125. 
2 1948 3040 Jordan Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3125. 
3 1949 3035 Poland Dealignment Breakup with Tito's Yugoslavia after 
Tito's break with the Soviet Union 
4 1949 3045 Czechoslovakia Dealignment Breakup with Tito's Yugoslavia after 
Tito's break with the Soviet Union 
5 1949 3050 Albania Dealignment Breakup with Tito's Yugoslavia after 
Tito's break with the Soviet Union 
6 1949 3085 Bulgaria Dealignment Breakup with Tito's Yugoslavia after 
Tito's break with the Soviet Union 
7 1949 3090 Hungary Dealignment Breakup with Tito's Yugoslavia after 
Tito's break with the Soviet Union 
8 1949 3095 Romania Dealignment Breakup with Tito's Yugoslavia after 
Tito's break with the Soviet Union 
9 1954 3055 France Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3130, 
Phase II (Western European Union: 
WEU). 
10 1954 3055 United 
Kingdom 
Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3130, 
Phase II (Western European Union: 
WEU). 
11 1954 3130 Luxembourg Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3130, 
Phase II (Western European Union: 
WEU). 
12 1954 3130 United 
Kingdom 
Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3130, 
Phase II (Western European Union: 
WEU). 
13 1954 3130 Netherlands Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3130, 
Phase II (Western European Union: 
WEU). 
14 1954 3130 France Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3130, 
Phase II (Western European Union: 
WEU). 
15 1954 3130 Belgium Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3130, 
Phase II (Western European Union: 
WEU). 
16 1954 3245 Laos Expiration As the results of 1954 Geneva 
Conference (US, USSR, PRC, UK, 
France, Laos, Cambodia, North 
Vietnam, South Vietnam) 
17 1954 3245 France Expiration As the results of 1954 Geneva 
 274 
 
Conference (US, USSR, PRC, UK, 
France, Laos, Cambodia, North 
Vietnam, South Vietnam) 
18 1957 3125 Jordan Dealignment Breakup with United Kingdom 
19 1959 3280 Iraq Dealignment Breakup with United Kingdom after 
the coup in Iraq 
20 1960 3220 United States Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3375. 
21 1960 3220 Japan Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3375. 
22 1961 3300 Egypt Dealignment Breakup with Syria over the Syrian 
coup 
23 1961 3300 Jordan Dealignment Breakup with Syria over the Syrian 
coup 
24 1961 3345 Egypt Expiration Policy disputes 
25 1961 3345 Yemen Arab 
Republic 
Expiration Policy disputes 
26 1962 3075 Cuba Dealignment Withdrawal from the Rio Treaty after 
the Cuban revolution 
27 1962 3080 Sri Lanka Expiration UK ceased all operations in Sri Lanka 
28 1962 3080 United 
Kingdom 
Expiration UK ceased all operations in Sri Lanka 
29 1962 3150 Cuba Dealignment Withdrawal from the Organization of 
American States (OAS) after the 
Cuban revolution 
30 1962 3305 Saudi Arabia Dealignment Breakup with Egypt over the Yemeni 
Civil War 
31 1962 3310 Saudi Arabia Dealignment Breakup with Egypt over the Yemeni 
Civil War 
32 1962 3310 Yemen Arab 
Republic 
Dealignment Breakup with Egypt over the Yemeni 
Civil War 
33 1962 3423 Nigeria Dealignment Breakup with United Kingdom 
34 1963 3430 Mali Expiration Adoption of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) Charter 
35 1963 3430 Ghana Expiration Adoption of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) Charter 
36 1963 3430 Guinea Expiration Adoption of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) Charter 
37 1964 3455 Chad Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
38 1964 3455 Central African 
Republic 
Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
39 1964 3455 Rwanda Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
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40 1964 3455 Burkina Faso Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
41 1964 3455 Ivory Coast Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
42 1964 3455 Senegal Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
43 1964 3455 Madagascar Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
44 1964 3455 Cameroon Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
45 1964 3455 Togo Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
46 1964 3455 Benin Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
47 1964 3455 Gabon Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
48 1964 3455 Congo Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
49 1964 3455 Mauritania Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
50 1964 3455 Niger Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
organization (African and Malagasy 
Union for Economic Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
51 1966 2370 Mongolia Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3535 
52 1966 2370 Russia Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3535 
53 1967 3060 Czechoslovakia Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3540 
54 1967 3060 Poland Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3540 
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55 1967 3100 Albania Dealignment Breakup with the Soviet bloc 
including Bulgaria 
56 1967 3120 Russia Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3580 
57 1967 3120 Hungary Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3580 
58 1967 3135 Bulgaria Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3560 
59 1967 3135 Russia Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3560 
60 1967 3155 Poland Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3555 
61 1967 3155 Bulgaria Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3555 
62 1967 3260 France Dealignment Withdrawal from the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
63 1967 3467 Egypt Dealignment Breakup with Yemen over the Yemen 
Civil War 
64 1967 3538 Syria Expiration Loss of war with Israel 
65 1967 3538 Egypt Expiration Loss of war with Israel 
66 1968 3145 Bulgaria Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3595 
67 1968 3145 Czechoslovakia Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3595 
68 1968 3160 Hungary Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3600 
69 1968 3160 Poland Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3600 
70 1968 3170 Czechoslovakia Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3610 
71 1968 3170 Romania Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3610 
72 1968 3185 Czechoslovakia Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3605 
73 1968 3185 Hungary Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3605 
74 1968 3285 Albania Dealignment Withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization (WTO) after breaking 
with the Soviet bloc 
75 1969 3165 Hungary Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3620 
76 1969 3165 Bulgaria Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3620 
77 1969 3490 El Salvador Dealignment Football war with Honduras, an ally 
78 1970 3105 Bulgaria Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3650 
79 1970 3105 Romania Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3650 
80 1970 3115 Romania Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3630 
81 1970 3115 Russia Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3630 
82 1970 3175 Poland Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3645 
83 1970 3175 Romania Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3645 
84 1970 3235 Libya Expiration Colonel Gaddafi overthrew King 
Idris 
85 1970 3235 United 
Kingdom 
Expiration Colonel Gaddafi overthrew King 
Idris 
86 1970 3480 United States Expiration Replaced by a consultation pact 
(ATOP code 3635) 
87 1970 3480 Spain Expiration Replaced by a consultation pact 
(ATOP code 3635) 
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88 1971 3330 United 
Kingdom 
Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement (Five Power Defence 
Agreements: UK, Australia, NZ, 
Malaysia, and Singapore) 
89 1971 3330 Malaysia Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement (Five Power Defence 
Agreements: UK, Australia, NZ, 
Malaysia, and Singapore) 
90 1971 3525 Singapore Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement (Five Power Defence 
Agreements: UK, Australia, NZ, 
Malaysia, and Singapore) 
91 1971 3525 Malaysia Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement (Five Power Defence 
Agreements: UK, Australia, NZ, 
Malaysia, and Singapore) 
92 1972 3110 Romania Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3680 
93 1972 3110 Hungary Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3680 
94 1972 3260 Pakistan Dealignment Withdrawal from the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
95 1972 3505 United 
Kingdom 
Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement  
96 1972 3505 Malta Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement  
97 1973 3390 Madagascar Dealignment Breakup with France 
98 1974 3325 Tunisia Dealignment Breakup with Libya after refusing the 
Libyan proposal to merge the two 
states 
99 1974 3395 Congo Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement with France 
100 1974 3405 Cyprus Dealignment Coup in Cyprus and its attempt to 
unify with Greece 
101 1974 3405 Greece Dealignment Breakup with Turkey over the Cyprus 
issue 
102 1974 3405 Turkey Dealignment Turkish invasion of Cyprus 
103 1975 3290 United 
Kingdom 
Dealignment Breakup with South Africa 
104 1976 3395 Chad Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement with France 
105 1977 3260 Thailand Expiration Mutually agreed disbandment of the 
SEATO 
106 1977 3260 United States Expiration Mutually agreed disbandment of the 
SEATO 
107 1977 3260 New Zealand Expiration Mutually agreed disbandment of the 
SEATO 
108 1977 3260 Philippines Expiration Mutually agreed disbandment of the 
SEATO 
109 1977 3260 Australia Expiration Mutually agreed disbandment of the 
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SEATO 
110 1977 3260 United 
Kingdom 
Expiration Mutually agreed disbandment of the 
SEATO 
111 1977 3350 Egypt Expiration Sadat's visit to Israel 
112 1977 3350 Iraq Expiration Sadat's visit to Israel 
113 1977 3545 Poland Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3780 
114 1977 3545 German 
Democratic 
Republic 
Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3780 
115 1977 3550 Czechoslovakia Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3805 
116 1977 3550 German 
Democratic 
Republic 
Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3805 
117 1977 3565 Hungary Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3770 
118 1977 3565 German 
Democratic 
Republic 
Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3770 
119 1977 3575 Bulgaria Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3800 
120 1977 3575 German 
Democratic 
Republic 
Renewal New defense pact is coded as 3800 
121 1979 3270 United States Dealignment Breakup with Taiwan (Republic of 
China) and passes a domestic law 
regarding a security relation with 
Taiwan (Taiwan Relations Act: TRA) 
122 1979 3365 Iran Dealignment Breakup with the US after the Iranian 
Revolution 
123 1979 3570 Jordan Dealignment Breakup with Egypt over Egypt-
Israel peace 
124 1979 3570 Iraq Dealignment Breakup with Egypt over Egypt-
Israel peace 
125 1979 3700 Uganda Dealignment Breakup with Sudan over Amin's 
supporters' escape to Sudan 
126 1980 3200 Russia Expiration China refused renewal 
127 1980 3200 China Expiration China refused renewal 
128 1981 3725 Niger Dealignment Breakup with Libya over the issue of 
Chad 
129 1981 3750 United States Renewal Spain joined the NATO 
130 1981 3750 Spain Renewal Spain joined the NATO 
131 1982 3860 Chad Dealignment Breakup with Libya over Libyan 
support to the oppositions in Chad 
132 1984 3748 Algeria Dealignment Breakup with Libya over the Libyan-
Moroccan proposed merger 
133 1984 3865 Malta Dealignment Breakup with Italy, and then leaning 
on the Libya and Soviet bloc. 
134 1985 3758 Sudan Dealignment Breakup with Egypt, and then leaning 
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on Libya 
135 1985 3807 Algeria Dealignment Algerian restoration of diplomatic 
relations with Egypt 
136 1986 3215 New Zealand Dealignment Breakup with the US over the nuclear 
ships 
137 1986 3660 Sierra Leone Expiration Replaced by a non-aggression pact 
(Mano River Union Nonaggression 
and Security Pact) 
138 1986 3660 Guinea Expiration Replaced by a non-aggression pact 
(Mano River Union Nonaggression 
and Security Pact) 
139 1986 3843 Guinea Expiration Replaced by a non-aggression pact 
(Mano River Union Nonaggression 
and Security Pact) 
140 1986 3843 Liberia Expiration Replaced by a non-aggression pact 
(Mano River Union Nonaggression 
and Security Pact) 
141 1986 3903 Yemen People's 
Republic 
Dealignment Breakup with Libya and Ethiopia 
over their support to the oppositions 
in YPR 
142 1986 3960 Morocco Dealignment Breakup with Libya over the Libyan 
criticism of Israeli PM's visit to 
Morocco 
143 1989 3930 Gambia Expiration Policy differences 
144 1989 3930 Senegal Expiration Policy differences 
145 1990 3285 German 
Democratic 
Republic 
Dealignment Withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization 
146 1990 3465 Saudi Arabia Dealignment Breakup with Jordan over the 
Jordanian support to Iraq in Gulf War 
147 1990 3500 Russia Expiration German reunification 
148 1990 3500 German 
Democratic 
Republic 
Expiration German reunification 
149 1990 3695 Romania Expiration German reunification 
150 1990 3695 German 
Democratic 
Republic 
Expiration German reunification 
151 1990 3745 Russia Expiration German reunification 
152 1990 3745 German 
Democratic 
Republic 
Expiration German reunification 
153 1990 3770 Hungary Expiration German reunification 
154 1990 3770 German 
Democratic 
Republic 
Expiration German reunification 
155 1990 3780 Poland Expiration German reunification 
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156 1990 3780 German 
Democratic 
Republic 
Expiration German reunification 
157 1990 3800 Bulgaria Expiration German reunification 
158 1990 3800 German 
Democratic 
Republic 
Expiration German reunification 
159 1990 3805 Czechoslovakia Expiration German reunification 
160 1990 3805 German 
Democratic 
Republic 
Expiration German reunification 
161 1991 3285 Bulgaria Expiration Mutually agreed disbandment of the 
WTO 
162 1991 3285 Czechoslovakia Expiration Mutually agreed disbandment of the 
WTO 
163 1991 3285 Romania Expiration Mutually agreed disbandment of the 
WTO 
164 1991 3285 Poland Expiration Mutually agreed disbandment of the 
WTO 
165 1991 3285 Hungary Expiration Mutually agreed disbandment of the 
WTO 
166 1991 3285 Russia Expiration Mutually agreed disbandment of the 
WTO 
167 1991 3520 Poland Dealignment Breakup with Russia 
168 1991 3540 Czechoslovakia Expiration Replaced by a consultation pact 
(ATOP code 4075) 
169 1991 3540 Poland Expiration Replaced by a consultation pact 
(ATOP code 4075) 
170 1991 3580 Hungary Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression pact 
(ATOP code 4115) 
171 1991 3580 Russia Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression pact 
(ATOP code 4115) 
172 1991 3600 Hungary Expiration Replaced by a consultation pact 
(ATOP code 4080) 
173 1991 3600 Poland Expiration Replaced by a consultation pact 
(ATOP code 4080) 
174 1991 3605 Czechoslovakia Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement 
175 1991 3605 Hungary Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement 
176 1991 3620 Bulgaria Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement 
177 1991 3620 Hungary Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement 
178 1991 3630 Romania Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement 
179 1991 3630 Russia Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement 
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180 1992 3140 Russia Expiration Replaced by a neutrality, 
nonaggression, consultation pact 
(ATOP code 4145) 
181 1992 3140 Finland Expiration Replaced by a neutrality, 
nonaggression, consultation pact 
(ATOP code 4145) 
182 1992 3210 Philippines Renewal US base agreement ended while 
mutual defense treaty remains in 
effect 
183 1992 3560 Bulgaria Expiration Replaced by a neutrality, 
nonaggression, consultation pact 
(ATOP code 4305) 
184 1992 3560 Russia Expiration Replaced by a neutrality, 
nonaggression, consultation pact 
(ATOP code 4305) 
185 1992 3595 Bulgaria Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression, 
consultation pact (ATOP code 4195) 
186 1992 3595 Czechoslovakia Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression, 
consultation pact (ATOP code 4195) 
187 1992 3650 Romania Expiration Replaced by a neutrality, 
nonaggression, consultation pact 
(ATOP code 4150) 
188 1992 3650 Bulgaria Expiration Replaced by a neutrality, 
nonaggression, consultation pact 
(ATOP code 4150) 
189 1993 3535 Mongolia Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression pact 
(ATOP code 4395) 
190 1993 3535 Russia Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression pact 
(ATOP code 4395) 
191 1993 3555 Bulgaria Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression, 
consultation pact (ATOP code 4435) 
192 1993 3555 Poland Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression, 
consultation pact (ATOP code 4435) 
193 1993 3610 Romania Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression, 
consultation pact respectively with 
Slovakia (ATOP code 4510) and with 
Czech Republic (ATOP code 4610) 
194 1993 3610 Czechoslovakia Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression, 
consultation pact respectively with 
Slovakia (ATOP code 4510) and with 
Czech Republic (ATOP code 4610) 
195 1993 3625 Russia Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression, 
consultation pact respectively with 
Slovakia (ATOP code 4505) and with 
Czech Republic (ATOP code 4500) 
196 1993 3625 Czechoslovakia Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression, 
consultation pact respectively with 
Slovakia (ATOP code 4505) and with 
Czech Republic (ATOP code 4500) 
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197 1993 3645 Poland Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression, 
consultation pact (ATOP code 4405) 
198 1993 3645 Romania Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression, 
consultation pact (ATOP code 4405) 
199 1996 3440 Russia Dealignment Breakup with North Korea, notifying 
no intention to extend  
200 1996 3680 Hungary Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression pact 
(ATOP code 4845) 
201 1996 3680 Romania Expiration Replaced by a nonaggression pact 
(ATOP code 4845) 
202 1999 3795 Panama Expiration Panama Canal returned to Panama 
203 1999 3795 United States Expiration Panama Canal returned to Panama 
204 1999 4220 Uzbekistan Dealignment Did not sign the renewal protocol 
205 1999 4220 Azerbaijan Dealignment Did not sign the renewal protocol 
206 1999 4220 Georgia Dealignment Did not sign the renewal protocol 
207 2000 3785 Ivory Coast Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement (ECOWAS: Economic 
Community of West African States) 
208 2000 3785 Mauritania Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement (ECOWAS: Economic 
Community of West African States) 
209 2000 3785 Niger Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement (ECOWAS: Economic 
Community of West African States) 
210 2000 3785 Senegal Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement (ECOWAS: Economic 
Community of West African States) 
211 2000 3785 Burkina Faso Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement (ECOWAS: Economic 
Community of West African States) 
212 2000 3785 Togo Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement (ECOWAS: Economic 
Community of West African States) 
213 2000 3785 Mali Expiration Replaced by a non-alliance 
agreement (ECOWAS: Economic 
Community of West African States) 
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Appendix 2. List of a state’s alliance restructuring as a typical case, 1946-2000 
 Year ATOP 
code 
State that 
restructured 
the existing 
alliances 
Allies Mode of 
restructuring 
COW 
regional 
criteria 
Memo from 
ATOP code 
sheets 
1 1949 3045 Czechoslov
akia 
Yugoslavia Dealignment Europe Breakup 
with Tito's 
Yugoslavia 
after Tito's 
break with 
the Soviet 
Union 
2 1961 3300 Jordan Syria and 
Egypt 
Dealignment Middle East Breakup 
with Syria 
over the 
Syrian coup 
3 1962 3075 Cuba Rio Treaty 
members 
Dealignment Western 
Hemisphere 
Withdrawal 
from the Rio 
Treaty after 
the Cuban 
revolution 
4 1962 3150 Cuba Organizatio
n of 
American 
States 
(OAS) 
members 
Dealignment Western 
Hemisphere 
Withdrawal 
from OAS 
after the 
Cuban 
revolution 
5 1964 3455 Senegal African and 
Malagasy 
Union 
(UAM) 
members 
Expiration Africa Replaced by 
a non-
alliance 
organization 
(African and 
Malagasy 
Union for 
Economic 
Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
6 1964 3455 Benin African and 
Malagasy 
Union 
(UAM) 
members 
Expiration Africa Replaced by 
a non-
alliance 
organization 
(African and 
Malagasy 
Union for 
Economic 
Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
7 1964 3455 Congo African and Expiration Africa Replaced by 
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Malagasy 
Union 
(UAM) 
members 
a non-
alliance 
organization 
(African and 
Malagasy 
Union for 
Economic 
Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
8 1964 3455 Mauritania African and 
Malagasy 
Union 
(UAM) 
members 
Expiration Africa Replaced by 
a non-
alliance 
organization 
(African and 
Malagasy 
Union for 
Economic 
Cooperation: 
UAMCE) 
9 1971 3330 Malaysia United 
Kingdom 
Expiration Asia Replaced by 
a non-
alliance 
agreement 
(Five Power 
Defence 
Agreements: 
UK, 
Australia, 
NZ, 
Malaysia, 
and 
Singapore) 
10 1971 3525 Malaysia Singapore Expiration Asia Replaced by 
a non-
alliance 
agreement 
(Five Power 
Defence 
Agreements: 
UK, 
Australia, 
NZ, 
Malaysia, 
and 
Singapore) 
11 1974 3395 Congo France, 
Central 
African 
Republic, 
and Chad 
Expiration Africa Replaced by 
a non-
alliance 
agreement 
with France 
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12 1974 3405 Greece United 
Kingdom, 
Cyprus, and 
Turkey 
Dealignment Europe Breakup 
with Turkey 
over the 
Cyprus issue 
13 1977 3260 Thailand Southeast 
Asia Treaty 
Organizatio
n (SEATO) 
members 
Expiration Asia Mutually 
agreed 
disbandment 
of the 
SEATO 
14 1977 3260 Philippines Southeast 
Asia Treaty 
Organizatio
n (SEATO) 
members 
Expiration Asia Mutually 
agreed 
disbandment 
of the 
SEATO 
15 1979 3365 Iran United 
States 
Dealignment Middle East Breakup 
with the US 
after the 
Iranian 
Revolution 
16 1979 3570 Iraq Egypt and 
Jordan 
Dealignment Middle East Breakup 
with Egypt 
over Egypt-
Israel peace 
17 1981 3750 Spain United 
States 
Renewal Europe Spain joined 
the NATO 
18 1985 3758 Sudan Egypt Dealignment Middle East Breakup 
with Egypt, 
and then 
leaning on 
Libya 
19 1992 3210 Philippines United 
States 
Renewal Asia US base 
agreement 
ended while 
mutual 
defense 
treaty 
remains in 
effect 
20 1992 3560 Bulgaria USSR Expiration Europe Replaced by 
a neutrality, 
nonaggressio
n, 
consultation 
pact (ATOP 
code 4305) 
21 1992 3595 Bulgaria Czechoslov
akia 
Expiration Europe Replaced by 
a 
nonaggressio
n, 
consultation 
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pact (ATOP 
code 4195) 
22 1992 3650 Romania Bulgaria Expiration Europe Replaced by 
a neutrality, 
nonaggressio
n, 
consultation 
pact (ATOP 
code 4150) 
23 1992 3650 Bulgaria Romania Expiration Europe Replaced by 
a neutrality, 
nonaggressio
n, 
consultation 
pact (ATOP 
code 4150) 
24 1993 3535 Mongolia USSR Expiration Asia Replaced by 
a 
nonaggressio
n pact 
(ATOP code 
4395) 
25 1993 3610 Romania Czechoslov
akia 
Expiration Europe Replaced by 
a 
nonaggressio
n, 
consultation 
pact 
respectively 
with 
Slovakia 
(ATOP code 
4510) and 
with Czech 
Republic 
(ATOP code 
4610) 
26 1993 3645 Romania Poland Expiration Europe Replaced by 
a 
nonaggressio
n, 
consultation 
pact (ATOP 
code 4405) 
27 1996 3680 Romania Hungary Expiration Europe Replaced by 
a 
nonaggressio
n pact 
(ATOP code 
4845) 
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28 1999 3795 Panama United 
States 
Expiration Western 
Hemisphere 
Panama 
Canal 
returned to 
Panama 
29 2000 3785 Ivory Coast Non-
Aggression 
and Defense 
Assistance 
Agreement 
(ANAD) 
members 
Expiration Africa Replaced by 
a non-
alliance 
agreement 
(ECOWAS: 
Economic 
Community 
of West 
African 
States) 
30 2000 3785 Niger Non-
Aggression 
and Defense 
Assistance 
Agreement 
(ANAD) 
members 
Expiration Africa Replaced by 
a non-
alliance 
agreement 
(ECOWAS: 
Economic 
Community 
of West 
African 
States) 
31 2000 3785 Senegal Non-
Aggression 
and Defense 
Assistance 
Agreement 
(ANAD) 
members 
Expiration Africa Replaced by 
a non-
alliance 
agreement 
(ECOWAS: 
Economic 
Community 
of West 
African 
States) 
32 2000 3785 Burkina 
Faso 
Non-
Aggression 
and Defense 
Assistance 
Agreement 
(ANAD) 
members 
Expiration Africa Replaced by 
a non-
alliance 
agreement 
(ECOWAS: 
Economic 
Community 
of West 
African 
States) 
33 2000 3785 Togo Non-
Aggression 
and Defense 
Assistance 
Agreement 
(ANAD) 
Expiration Africa Replaced by 
a non-
alliance 
agreement 
(ECOWAS: 
Economic 
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members Community 
of West 
African 
States) 
34 2000 3785 Mali Non-
Aggression 
and Defense 
Assistance 
Agreement 
(ANAD) 
members 
Expiration Africa Replaced by 
a non-
alliance 
agreement 
(ECOWAS: 
Economic 
Community 
of West 
African 
States) 
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Appendix 3: Multicollinearity Diagnosis Indexes for Capabilities Change Variables (VIF: 
above; and TOL: below)           
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model 
12 
Model 
13 
        
Capabilities 
change variables 
 
 
      
Capabilities 
change to allies 
1.26 
0.7927 
      
        
Stronger to allies  1.13     1.61 
  0.8822     0.6224 
        
Capabilities 
change to 
neighbors 
  1.25 
0.8003 
    
        
Stronger to 
neighbors 
   1.20 
0.8335 
  1.53 
0.6540 
        
Capabilities 
change of allies 
to neighbors 
    1.28 
0.7799 
  
        
Allies stronger to 
neighbors 
     1.26 
0.7937 
1.43 
0.6981 
        
Individual ally 
state 
characteristics 
       
Regime change   1.25          
0.8008 
 1.23 
  0.8156 
 1.21 
0.827
4 
1.22 
0.8215 
  1.20 
0.8358 
  1.22 
0.8205 
  1.25 
0.8023 
        
Regime type 
level 
1.51 1.54 1.55 1.55 1.51 1.50 1.57 
 0.6610 0.6493 0.6468 0.6432 0.6613 0.6655 0.6355 
        
Inter-allies 
relationship 
       
Symmetric ally 1.70 
0.5895 
1.70 
0.5894 
1.67 
0.5971 
1.68 
0.5953 
1.86 
0.5376 
1.85 
0.5411 
1.94 
0.5157 
        
Regime 
dissimilarity 
1.39 
0.7192 
1.39 
0.7195 
1.39 
0.7187 
1.40 
0.7151 
1.39 
0.7197 
1.39 
0.7186 
1.40 
0.7138 
        
Alliance 
portfolio 
similarity 
 1.99 
0.5027 
1.99 
0.5034 
2.00 
0.4993 
1.99 
0.5015 
2.01 
0.4968 
2.00 
0.4995 
2.01 
0.4972 
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Other 
International 
Relations 
       
Rivalry 1.11 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.12 1.12 1.13 
 0.9045 0.9061 0.9205 0.9225 0.8899 0.8968 0.8849 
        
Cold War 1.17 1.17 1.21 1.17 1.20 1.17 1.18 
 0.8577 0.8577 0.8241 0.8529 0.8319 0.8520 0.8464 
        
Alliance 
arrangement 
       
Non-military 
cooperation 
 1.37 
0.7296 
 1.36 
0.7379 
1.35 
0.7420 
1.36 
0.7372 
1.35 
0.7396 
1.35 
0.7388 
1.37 
0.7303 
        
Institutionalized 
level 
1.37 
0.7273 
1.37 
0.7287 
1.37 
0.7284 
1.37 
0.7289 
1.38 
0.7252 
1.37 
0.7280 
1.37 
0.7273 
        
Alliance format        
Treaty 1.63 1.63 1.64 1.64 1.65 1.63 1.64 
 0.6125 0.6128 0.6086 0.6111 0.6077 0.6125 0.6107 
        
Total number of 
allies 
 1.78 
0.5609 
  1.75 
0.5729 
  1.90 
0.5268 
   1.82 
 0.5508 
   1.80 
 0.5542 
   1.76 
 0.5686 
   1.84 
 0.5446 
        
Wartime alliance 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.20 1.19 1.19 1.20 
 0.8406 0.8413 0.8406 0.8363 0.8414 0.8396 0.8343 
        
 
Appendix 4. Results of Model Specification Test for Capabilities Change Variables (Link 
test) 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model 
12 
Model 
13 
_hatsq 0.717 0.737 0.701 0.856 0.759 0.628 0.808 
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Appendix 5. Multicollinearity Diagnosis Indexes for Domestic Political Change 
Variables (VIF: above; and TOL: below) 
 Model 13 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
Domestic 
political change 
variables 
      
Regime change 1.25   1.34  1.94 
 0.8023   0.7445  0.5163 
       
Winning 
coalition 
change 
 1.21 
0.8277 
  1.32 
0.7561 
1.91 
0.5244 
       
Government 
change 
  1.15 
0.8685 
1.24 
0.8059 
1.26 
0.7934 
1.28 
0.7813 
       
Individual ally 
state 
characteristics 
      
Regime type 
level 
1.57 
0.6355 
1.56 
0.6407 
1.60 
0.6251 
1.60 
0.6234 
1.61 
0.6222 
1.63 
0.6153 
       
Capabilities 
change 
variables 
      
Stronger to 1.61 1.60 1.60 1.61 1.60 1.61 
allies 0.6224 0.6241 0.6252 0.6222 0.6241 0.6222 
       
Stronger to 
neighbors 
1.53 
0.6540 
1.54 
0.6507 
1.52 
0.6587 
1.53 
0.6540 
1.54 
0.6506 
1.54 
0.6501 
       
Allies stronger 
to neighbors 
1.43 
0.6981 
1.42 
0.7027 
1.42 
0.7055 
1.44 
0.6958 
1.43 
0.7009 
1.44 
0.6956 
       
Inter-allies 
relationship 
      
Symmetric ally 1.94 
0.5157 
1.94 
0.5151 
1.94 
0.5152 
1.94 
0.5148 
1.94 
0.5144 
1.94 
0.5144 
       
Regime 
dissimilarity 
1.40 
0.7138 
1.41 
0.7117 
1.40 
0.7156 
1.40 
0.7131 
1.41 
0.7113 
1.41 
0.7110 
       
Alliance 
portfolio 
similarity 
2.01 
0.4972 
2.01 
0.4966 
2.01 
0.4963 
2.02 
0.4962 
2.02 
0.4952 
2.02 
0.4951 
       
Other 
International 
Relations 
      
Rivalry 1.13 1.13 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 
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 0.8849 0.8837 0.8713 0.8708 0.8713 0.8706 
       
Cold War 1.18 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.16 1.19 
 0.8464 0.8639 0.8644 0.8460 0.8638 0.8425 
       
Alliance 
arrangement 
      
Non-military 
cooperation 
1.37 
0.7303 
1.38 
0.7255 
1.36 
0.7343 
1.37 
0.7282 
1.38 
0.7242 
1.38 
0.7235 
       
Institutionalized 
level 
1.37 
0.7273 
1.35 
0.7418 
1.35 
0.7429 
1.37 
0.7273 
1.35 
0.7415 
1.38 
0.7259 
       
Alliance format       
Treaty 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 
 0.6107 0.6107 0.6107 0.6106 0.6107 0.6106 
       
Total number of 
allies 
1.84 
0.5446 
1.85 
0.5413 
1.82 
0.5485 
1.88 
0.5312 
1.89 
0.5295 
1.90 
0.5253 
       
Wartime  1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.21 
alliance 0.8343 0.8341 0.8344 0.8306 0.8301 0.8292 
       
 
 
Appendix 6. Results of Model Specification Test for Domestic Political Change 
Variables (Link test) 
 Model 13 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
_hatsq 0.808 0.024 0.008 0.786 0.049 0.809 
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